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Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether family ownership and control, and corporate 
governance are associated with earnings quality, and whether family influence in 
firms weakens the association between corporate governance and earnings quality. 
This study uses a panel sample of 527 publicly traded firms over the period 2003-
2008 from the Malaysia Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia). Identifying family firms 
as firms in which family members hold a significant portion of shares and possess 
control over the board of directors, this study finds that family firms have 
significantly higher earnings quality. The results remain unchanged, even after using 
alternative measures of earnings quality and family influence. This study also finds 
that the earnings quality of firms in Malaysia is positively associated with the size 
and independence of the audit committee and negatively associated with the size of 
the board of directors. However, these relationships exist only for nonfamily firms. 
These results on the corporate governance variables suggest that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance could be mediated by family influence. Using multivariate 
regressions that include interaction variables for corporate governance and family 
firms, the study finds that the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings quality is mediated by family ownership and control. The result is consistent 
with the argument that the monitoring role of corporate governance reduces when 
there is substantial control by family owners in a firm. Overall, this study concludes 
that family ownership and control drives higher quality earnings for firms regardless 
of their corporate governance structure. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
High quality of earnings is especially important in modern corporations, in which 
equity ownership is separated from control of corporate decisions. The agency theory 
explained in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggests that 
conflicts of interest between an agent acting as a representative of a principal might 
arise in these firms due to divergence of interests and asymmetric information. As 
agents, the firm managers prepare financial statements to discharge their stewardship; 
and principals use the information provided, to rewards the agents. However, the use 
of financial information, such as earnings, in many contractual agreements might 
provide incentives for earnings management, which results in lower quality of 
earnings. To mitigate the problem and ensure that alignment of interests exists 
between the managers and shareholders, significant monitoring mechanisms such as 
corporate governance are installed within the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), if both principal and agents have aligned 
interests, then there is no conflict of interest and no agency problem. This is 
obviously true where the principal is the one who manages the firm. Using this 
argument, research on family firms and earnings quality claims that in family firms, 
where owners have significant control over the running of the business, agency 
problems would be reduced and agency cost would be lower. Lower agency 
problems, as a result of alignment of interests between owners and managers, would 
2 
lead to less incentive for earnings management and therefore higher quality of 
reported earnings. 
 
However, extant research on firm ownership also suggest that firms in which owners 
have significant control over management have a different but severe agency problem 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; 
Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Wang, 
2006). Villalonga and Amit (2006), who refer to the problem between controlling 
owners and other shareholders as a Type II agency problem
1
, explain that the large 
shareholder may use its controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits at 
the expense of the minority shareholders.  Thus, family firms, which are typically 
characterized by having significant controlling owners, might experience higher Type 
II agency problem, resulting in lower quality of reported earnings. 
 
Prior studies have predominantly focused on the individual effects of various 
corporate governance instruments on earnings quality without considering how the 
family structure would affect the success of corporate governance mechanisms in 
ensuring better quality of earnings. The corporate governance instruments studied 
include board independence (Klein, 2002), audit committee independence (Klein, 
2002; Vafeas, 2005; Yang, 2002), board and audit committee meetings (Vafeas, 
2005; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003), board and audit committee financial 
background (Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003), and CEO-chairman independence 
                                               
1 Whereas Type I agency problems refers to the agency problem between owners and managers. 
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(Chau and Gray, 2010; Klein, 2002; Saleh, Iskandar, and Rahmat, 2005). 
Investigation of the interaction between family control and corporate governance is 
important, since the presence of strong family influence may reduce the effectiveness, 
or substitute for a firm‟s corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
1.2 Research Motivations, Objectives and Questions 
Wang (2006) investigated the net effect of Type I and Type II agency problems in 
family firms on the quality of earnings. Despite the argument that the entrenchment 
effect of controlling shareholders in family firms could lead to poor quality of 
earnings, Wang (2006) found that earnings quality was higher for family firms. 
However, Wang (2006) cautions that inferences from this result are applicable only to 
large publicly traded firms in the United States. The finding that earnings quality is 
higher in family firms may not hold for other countries, where minority investors‟ 
legal protection is weaker (Wang, 2006). This is because the advantage (or 
drawbacks) for family firms in monitoring earnings quality might depend on the legal 
protection of minority investors. According to Bebchuk (1999), poor legal protection 
makes diffusely owned firms unstable, as it allows managerial extraction of private 
benefits. Consistently, Burkart et al. (2003, p. 2170) claim that when legal protection 
of outside investors is very good, there is little need for monitoring. On the other 
hand, when legal protection of minority shareholders is weak, it is very hard to 
control for managerial expropriation. In this kind of environment, family firms may 
suffer higher Type II agency cost. From this argument, it is clear that a study 
examining the quality of earnings of family firms in countries with weak institutional 
4 
environment is very much warranted. In view of that, the first objective of this study 
is to examine the association between family firms and earnings quality in Malaysia, 
a country where minority investors‟ legal protection is weak. 
 
Malaysia presents an ideal setting to address issues related to earnings quality among 
family firms because of the presence of a large number of family owned and/or 
controlled entities among publicly listed companies. Apart from the availability of a 
large population for the sample of family firms, Malaysian family firms have a 
number of features that makes them very suitable for the purpose of this study. First, 
in the majority of family firms in Malaysia, the top management and board of 
directors are dominated by family members, or individuals that are very close to the 
family. Thus, the controlling family is very much involved with the operations of the 
business. Second, the ownership of the company is highly concentrated. Most of the 
family firms are reluctant to allow the holding of a significant proportion of shares by 
institutional or other outside blockholders. This suggests that in Malaysia, the 
controlling family tends to maintain control for a long-term period.  
 
Examination of the relationship between earnings quality and family influence in 
Malaysia is also motivated by the fact that despite a high proportion of family firms 
in Malaysia, research on family ownership and financial reporting quality in the 
country is still limited. Analysis of the ten largest Malaysian publicly listed 
companies by market capitalization by the World Bank (2005) reveals that the five 
largest shareholders in these companies owned 60.4 percent of the outstanding shares 
5 
and more than half of the voting shares. From the total shares of the ten largest 
publicly listed companies, 67.2 percent of the shares were in family hands, 37.4 
percent had only one dominant shareholder, and 13.4 percent were state controlled. 
Cheung and Chang (2004), in a study of corporate governance in Asia, show that 
Malaysia has the second highest degree of family ownership after Hong Kong & 
China with 66.7 per cent of total market capitalization controlled by family groups. 
Given the significant amount of shares held by family members in Malaysia, it is 
apparent that a study investigating the relationship between family influence and 
earning quality in Malaysia is highly relevant. 
 
In Malaysia, concerns about the quality of accounting information heightened after 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the outbreak of local accounting scandals such as 
Technology Resources Industries Berhad, Megan Media Holdings Berhad, Nasiocom 
Holdings Berhad, GP Ocean, Ocean Capital Ltd., Welli Multi Corporation Berhad, 
Transmile Group Berhad and Southern Bank Berhad. Through creative accounting 
and fraud, the management of these firms misled their investors by presenting false 
and deceptive corporate reports. For example, Technology Resources Industries Bhd 
(TRI) issued fake invoices totaling nearly RM260 million in 1998 and 1999; and 
Megan Holdings was found to have misled the Securities Commissions and the stock 
exchange, Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange), 
by inflating revenue by RM1 billion in its 2006 financial statements. The 2006 
unaudited report of Transmile Group Berhad showed an 80% jump in revenue from 
RM550 million in 2005 to RM989.2 million, and trade receivables increased 
6 
drastically from RM111 million to RM381 million (Fong, 2007a). The company 
reported profit of RM75 million and RM158 million for the years 2005 and 2006 
respectively. However, the audit revealed that the results should have been net losses 
of RM370 million and RM126 millions. As a consequence, the company‟s stock 
dropped by 47% from RM14.20 to RM6.70 in June 2007 (Fong, 2007b). 
PricewaterhouseCoopers reported that Southern Bank Berhad, for the year ended 31 
December 2005, had made inappropriate valuations of certain derivative financial 
instruments, wrongly written back specific provisions of certain foreclosed properties 
and capitalized certain costs that should be expensed. This misleading accounting 
resulted in overstated net assets of RM160 million. 
 
The cause of the Asian financial crisis and the many accounting scandals has been 
attributed to poor corporate governance. The World Bank (1998) points out that weak 
corporate governance contributed to the Asian financial crisis as it shielded banks, 
financial institutions and corporations from market discipline. Ineffective boards of 
directors, weak internal controls, lack of adequate disclosure, lax enforcement to 
ensure compliance, and poor audits are among the problems that led to the crisis and 
scandals. 
 
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between earnings quality and 
corporate governance practices in developed markets such as in the US (e.g. Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, and Riley Jr, 2002), the UK (e.g. Conyon, 1997; Weir et al., 2002) 
and Australia (Kang, Cheng, and Gray, 2007; Tomasic and Fu, 2006; Williamson-
7 
Noble and Haynes, 2003). However, very little research has looked at the association 
between earnings quality and corporate governance mechanisms in emerging capital 
markets. According to  Gibson (2003) and Lins (2003), corporate governance is 
especially important in emerging markets, such as Malaysia, where the market for 
corporate control is weak.  
 
Evidence supporting the importance of firm-level corporate governance in countries 
with poor legal infrastructures and environment is shown in cross-countries studies 
conducted by Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005). Results in 
Klapper and Love (2004)  and Durnev and Kim (2005) support the argument that in 
these countries, firms could choose to adopt quality firm-level governance to make up 
for the weak institutional factors. In addition, better corporate governance serves as a 
signal of firm‟s willingness to offer better protection for the investors. Corporate 
governance needs to be effective in these countries for investors to provide the 
requisite capital. Based on the argument that earnings quality-corporate governance 
relationship could be more important in emerging markets and the fact that research 
on earnings quality and corporate governance is still sparse, the second objective of 
this study is to examine the association between corporate governance and earnings 
quality in Malaysia. 
 
Previous studies raise concerns regarding the appropriateness of policy that calls for a 
standard requirement for corporate governance in countries with a concentrated 
ownership structure, especially in the hands of family members (Cheung and Chan, 
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2004; Klein, Shapiro, and Young, 2005; Machuga and Teitel, 2009). According to 
Klein et al. (2005), similar to the argument that differences in the general governance 
environment (e.g. competition in product and capital markets, the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control and managerial labour markets) could affect the 
efficiency of firms corporate governance in different countries, differences in 
ownership structures across countries may also interact with the corporate governance 
mechanisms installed in firms. Similarly, Machuga and Teitel (2009) noted that the 
prevalence of concentrated family ownership and weak legal environment in Mexico 
could be the reason of ineffectiveness of the country‟s code of corporate governance 
in improving the quality of firms‟ earnings. Thus, when examining the effectiveness 
of corporate governance mechanisms in an environment where different ownership 
structures exists, extra care should be taken to consider the impact of ownership 
structure. 
 
Agency theory suggests that corporate governance is crucial when there is separation 
between managers and owners, or when no other control exists to monitor managerial 
behaviour. As explained by  Jensen and Meckling (1976), the shares held by 
managers help align their interests with those of shareholders. Thus, it could reduce 
the need for corporate governance. This is supported by a number of studies, which 
have found that as managerial ownership increases, the quality of earnings increases 
(e.g. Teshima and Shuto, 2008; Warfield, Wild, and Wild, 1995).  
 
9 
The Malaysian setting provides the opportunity to extend the literature by examining 
the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality in family-owned 
firms and diffusedly owned firms. The traditional agency-motivated corporate 
governance mechanisms may not be important in family-owned firms. In these firms, 
it is usual for a particular family that owns a significant portion of firm‟s shares to 
have strong control over management and hold positions on the board. Since the 
control by the owner (family) already exists in these firms, earnings quality could be 
high in these firms even if corporate governance is weak. This is based on the 
alignment effect argument, which suggests that agency conflicts are relatively lower 
in family controlled firms as compared to diffusedly-owned firms. On the other hand, 
if the entrenchment effect of the controlling family towards minority interests 
dominates, earnings quality would be low in family firms even if corporate 
governance appears to be strong in form. Either way, it is likely that in family 
controlled firms, the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality 
is weak. Therefore, the third objective of this study is to examine whether the 
existence of family firms mitigates the relationship between corporate governance 
and earnings quality. 
 
Aligned with research objectives, this study addresses three research questions: 
1. What is the relationship between earnings quality and family influence? 
2. What is the relationship between earnings quality and corporate governance? 
3. Does family influence in firms mitigate the relationship between earnings quality 
and corporate governance? 
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1.3 Primary Findings 
In general, the results of this study are consistent with the findings of prior studies 
that recognize family influence (Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan, 2007; Sánchez, 
Alemán, and Martín, 2007; Wang, 2006; Yang, 2010) and corporate governance (Lin, 
Li, and Yang, 2006; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Saleh, Iskandar, and Rahmat, 2007; 
Vafeas, 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005) as being contributing factors to high quality 
financial reporting. The results are also in line with prior evidence that family 
influence in firms mediates the effect of corporate governance on earnings quality 
(Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Jaggi, Leung, and Gul, 2009; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 
2011). 
 
Specifically, the results of this study show that firms with significant family 
ownership or/and control have significantly higher quality of earnings compared to 
nonfamily firms. The results support the notion that family firms have special 
features that substitute for the monitoring role of governance over the firm‟s 
activities. The higher earnings quality of family firms could be a result of the family 
firm‟s altruism and long-term orientation that reduces the incentives for earnings 
manipulation. The results could also be due to the fact that family firms have lower 
agency costs and greater expertise relating to the firm‟s operations. 
 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the results show that in nonfamily firms, 
earnings quality, as represented by the quality of its accruals, is positively associated 
with the size and independence of the audit committee and negatively associated with 
11 
the size of board of directors. However, none of these corporate governance variables 
are associated with earnings quality in family firms. The results that corporate 
governance variables are associated with earnings quality only in nonfamily firms, 
suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance could be mediated by family 
influence. The fact that the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
quality is mediated by family ownership and control is confirmed using multivariate 
regressions that include interaction variables for corporate governance and family 
influence. The results are consistent with the argument that the monitoring role of 
corporate governance is less important when there is substantial control by family 
owners. Overall, this study concludes that family ownership and control leads to 
better quality of earnings in firms regardless of their corporate governance mode. 
 
1.4 Research Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are three-fold. First, Malaysia is among the top 
performing emerging economies. Since independence, the country has recorded 
average GDP growth of around 6% per annum. In 2010, the Malaysian economy 
became the third largest economy in Southeast Asia and the 29
th
 largest economy in 
the world by purchasing power parity with a gross domestic product of $412.3 billion 
(International Monetary Fund, 2010). In November 2009, The World Bank reported a 
productivity and investment climate assessment update and concluded that 
Malaysia‟s investment climate compared favorably with other countries at similar 
levels of income (The World Bank, 2009).  
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In a report published by PricewaterhouseCoopers on the growth of emerging market 
economies, Malaysia was marked as a country with a very solid track record of long-
term economic growth. The report, prepared by Hawksworth and Cockson (2008) 
highlights the rapid growth and increasing global significance of emerging 
economies, including Malaysia. These combined reports clearly demonstrate that 
Malaysia has gained importance in the world economy. However, the Malaysian 
economy is still under researched, especially the country‟s accounting and financial 
reporting system. This study extends the research on the Malaysian capital market by 
providing insights into Malaysian financial reporting environment, through the 
examination of firms‟ earnings quality. 
 
Second, the Malaysian regulatory bodies intensified their efforts to improve the 
quality of financial reporting for the country‟s publicly listed companies. Several 
initiatives has been undertaken by the government, including the introduction of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, the establishment of the Minority 
Shareholders Watch Group and the introduction of an IFRS-based set of accounting 
standards. Thus, studies examining the quality of reported earnings of firms in the 
country are very timely and warranted. This study provides useful information to the 
regulators, standard setters and other agencies including the Security Commission, 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance, Minority Shareholders Watch Group, 
Malaysia Accounting Standard Board, and the Financial Reporting Foundation.  
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Thirdly, this study contributes to the growing body of literature on (i) earnings 
quality, (ii) firm ownership and control, and (iii) corporate governance. This thesis is 
among the early studies to examine the differences in earnings quality in family and 
nonfamily firms outside the scope of developed economies. This study extends 
Wang‟s (2006) study on family ownership and earnings quality. Wang (2006) 
highlights that his findings and inferences apply only to large publicly traded firms in 
the United States and may not hold outside the US, where minority investors‟ legal 
protection is weaker. The current study contributes to the extant study on earnings 
quality and family ownership by examining the data from an emerging country, 
Malaysia, where institutional governance is weak. According to Claessens et al. 
(2002), the effect of large controlling shareholders are difficult to detect using data 
from developed markets. This is because in a developed market, expropriation of 
minority interests is limited by strong market controls. The entrenchment effect or the 
expropriation of minority interests by controlling shareholders would be more 
apparent in a country with weak institutional arrangements. Therefore, this study 
provides better evidence of the net effect of managerial entrenchment and the 
alignment of interest in family firms on earnings quality. 
 
This study is among the earliest that examines the association between the quality of 
earnings and corporate governance in Malaysia during the period after the 
implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. The study uses a 
reasonably large sample size in analysing the relationship between earnings quality 
and corporate governance. Related studies on corporate governance in Malaysia 
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include Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2005) and Rahman and Ali (2006). Specifically, 
Saleh et al. (2005) focus on the characteristics of board monitoring and the incentives 
to manage earnings and find that earnings management is negatively associated with 
managerial ownership, and positively related to the existence of CEO duality in 
Malaysia.  They also find that earnings management is negatively associated with 
directors having multiple directorships in firms that have negative earnings. However, 
Saleh et al. (2005) fail to find any association between earnings management and 
non-executive and independent directors, and size of boards. On the other hand, 
Rahman and Ali (2006) show that there is a positive association between size of 
boards and earnings management, but found no evidence of a relationship between 
earnings management and factors such as board independence, audit committee 
independence and ethnicity. However, the results of these studies are open for 
question as they used relatively small samples and were based on short periods
2
. 
Further, these prior studies measured earnings management using Jones (1991) 
discretionary accruals model, which has been subject to criticism.  Using a relatively 
big sample size over a longer period, this study provides new and robust evidence on 
the association between earnings quality and corporate governance mechanisms in 
Malaysia after the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance.  
 
This study also contributes to the existing literature by examining how corporate 
governance interacts with family ownership and control to influence the quality of 
                                               
2 Saleh et al. (2005) used a sample of 561 Malaysian companies in 2001 and Rahman and Ali (2006) used a small 
sample of 97 Malaysian companies for a two-year period, 2002 and 2003.  This study uses 3162 firm-year 
observations of 527 Malaysian companies over a five-year period from 2003-2007. 
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earnings. This study is closely related to that of Jaggi, Leung and Gul (2009). Their 
study examines the effectiveness of independent board of directors in monitoring 
earnings management in Hong Kong. They find that board independence is effective 
in reducing earnings management. They also show that the monitoring effectiveness 
of an independent board is mitigated by family control. While Jaggi et al., (2009) 
examine the association between board independence and earnings management, this 
study has a broadened scope by also covering other corporate governance 
mechanisms and examining earnings quality in terms of the quality of accruals.  
 
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented in this study could be of use to regulators 
considering corporate governance and accounting standards reforms; investors; 
minority shareholders and managers who are concerned with the quality of reported 
earnings; and academics studying earnings quality, family ownership, corporate 
governance and adoption of new accounting standards. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Remainder of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is set out as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of  
the Malaysian institutional environment, including the development of the Malaysian 
capital market, ownership structure of publicly listed firms, corporate governance 
initiatives and requirements imposed by the government, as well as the adoption of 
new accounting standards and financial reporting practices. A review of the literature 
on earnings quality, family ownership and corporate governance is presented in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides the theoretical framework, hypotheses and research 
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methodology used in this study. The empirical results are reported and discussed in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of study, acknowledges the limitations 
of the study and identifies issues for future research. 
 
  
17 
CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW OF MALAYSIAN INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the institutional environment of the Malaysian 
economy. It examines the emergence of the Malaysian economy, the development of 
in corporate governance and the development of the financial reporting environment. 
Section 2.2 describes the historical predominance of family firms in the Malaysian 
economy. Section 2.3 discusses the corporate governance of Malaysian publicly listed 
firms and the initiatives taken to improve the governance of such firms. Section 2.4 
describes the financial reporting system in Malaysia, including the legal and 
regulatory requirements and the other measures taken by the government to promote 
high quality financial reporting. Finally, Section 2.5 provides a summary of the 
chapter. 
 
2.2 Background of the Malaysian Economy and Family Businesses 
Malaysia is one of the emerging Asian economies. Since its independence, Malaysia 
has recorded excellent economic growth, with average growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP) of 6.3% per annum during 1957 to 2010. Before the 1980s, the 
majority of Malaysian companies were either subsidiaries of foreign multinational 
corporations or local companies owned by Chinese families. Most of the local 
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companies were privately owned and were reluctant to offer their equity to the market 
for fear of losing control (Ow-Yong and Guan, 2000). 
 
During the early 1980s until the mid 1990s, the country experienced rapid growth, 
mostly due to the high level of foreign and domestic investment. There was also a 
large increase in the number of companies listed on the Malaysian capital market, due 
to the introduction of a second tier market and the government's privatisation 
programme. Nevertheless, the majority of the companies were still controlled by 
certain individuals or families with the public as minority shareholders (Saludo, 
1999). During 1988 to 1996, the country‟s economy peaked with average growth in 
GDP of 9.4% per annum. Its economic dependence on rubber and tin exports was 
reduced as the economy was diversified into an emphasis on manufacturing and 
services. At that time, Malaysia was one of the largest exporters of semiconductor 
devices, solar panels, and electrical and information technology products (Bureau of 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2011). 
 
The Malaysian economy however, suffered a sharp reverse during the 1997 financial 
crisis. Important lessons were learned and since then Malaysia has intensified its 
efforts to strengthen its capital market. 
 
2.2.1 Malaysian Economic History 
Prior to independence in 1957 when it was still a British colony, Malaysia‟s economy 
was segregated along ethnic lines so as to facilitate administration (Haque, 2003). 
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The indigenous people, the Malay
3
, were confined to the paddy fields, Indians 
worked in the rubber estates and the Chinese were involved in tin mining and 
business. The British regarded the traditional agricultural sector, in which the 
majority of Malays were involved as being irrelevant to fostering the British colonial 
economy. The Malays were thus left where they were (Williams, 2007) while the 
British instead chose to promote the more lucrative of tin and rubber exports 
industries using cheap labours from China and India.  
 
The economic policy followed by the British left its mark on Malaysia‟s current 
economic structure (Amran and Devi, 2008). The segregation of economic activity 
along ethnic lines in particular resulted in an economic imbalance between the ethnic 
groups in the country. According to Johnson and Mitton (2003), although Malays 
account for the majority of the Malaysia population (about 60%), business in 
Malaysia has been historically dominated by the Chinese. The economic disparity 
between the majority Malay and Chinese finally led to racial riots in 1969.   
 
In order to redress the imbalances that caused the riots, the Malaysian government 
subsequently introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1970. This restructured 
the Malaysian economy over the period 1970-1990 with intent to (1) redistribute 
corporate entity so that the Malaysian share would rise from 2% to 30% for the 
                                               
3 Malay is also known as the Bumiputera, which literally mean “the son of the soil”. Other than Malay, 
Bumiputera also includes other indigenous groups from East Malaysia. 
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Bumiputera
4
; and from 35% to 40% for other ethnic Malaysian; while the foreign 
share would fall from 63% to 30%, (2) to eliminate the close link between race and 
economic function and restructure employment so that that the Bumiputera share in 
each sector would reflect their proportion of total population, and (3) to eradicate 
poverty irrespective of race.  
 
Since the implementation of the NEP, the Bumiputera has received most favoured 
treatment from the government including priority for government contracts, increased 
access to capital, opportunities to buy assets that were privatised, and other subsidies 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003). In 1975, the government passed the Industrial 
Coordination Act, which required any non-Bumiputera firm with more than 25 
employees and capital and reserves funds of more than RM250,000 to have at least 
30% Bumiputera equity ownership or participation, in order to obtain approval or 
renewal of business licenses (Lee, 2000). The government has also established 
several institutions such as the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), Bumiputera 
Commercial and Industrial Community, Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS), 
Bank Bumiputera, and the State Economic Development Corporations to provide 
credit and technical assistance to Malay business entrepreneurs, and requested major 
business firms and corporations to facilitate the promotion of Malays to higher 
management positions (Economic Planning Unit, 1991). 
 
  
                                               
4 Bumiputera includes the Malay, Orang Asli (the aborigines) and other indigenous ethnics, such as the 
indigenous natives from Sabah and Sarawak. 
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Table 2.1: Equity Ownership of Malaysian Publicly Listed Companies in 1970-1990 
Ownership Group 
Actual Percentage of Equity Ownership 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Bumiputera 1.90% 9.20% 12.50% 19.10% 20.30% 
     Bumiputera individuals * 3.60% 5.80% 11.70% 14.00% 
     Trust agencies * 5.60% 6.70% 7.40% 6.30% 
Non-Bumiputera 37.40% 37.50% 44.60% 54.90% (a) 46.2%  
     Chinese * * * 33.40% 44.90% 
     Indian * * * 1.20% 1.00% 
     Others * * * 1.30% 0.30% 
     Nominee companies * * * 7.20% 8.40% 
     Locally controlled companies * * * 11.80% ** 
Foreign investors 60.70% 53.30% 42.90% 26.00% 25.10% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Million Ringgit 5,289 15,084 32,420 77,964 109,800 
Note: * indicates unavailable data. ** indicates data that was deleted from statistics. (a)The percentage of equity 
capital owned by nominee companies in 1990 is not included in the subtotal of non-Bumiputeras shares. 
Source: Torii (1997). 
 
The NEP had significant consequences for the ownership structure of Malaysian 
firms. Under the policy, all publicly listed firms in Malaysia were required to reserve 
a pre-emptive 30% equity stake for the Bumiputera (Chu and Cheah, 2006). As 
showed in Table 2.1, implementation of the NEP resulted in significant changes in 
the equity ownership of the Bumiputeras, non-Bumiputeras and foreign investors. 
However, nominee accounts were widely used by many shareholders to hide their 
identity to avoid the NEP requirement. A report of a study on corporate governance 
and finance in East Asia by the Asian Development Bank‟s reveals that in 1997, 
nominee companies held 45.6% of the total shares of average non-financial publicly 
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listed companies held by the top five shareholders (Capulong, Edwards, Webb, and 
Zhuang, 2000).  
 
The NEP has also resulted in the establishment of conglomerate firms by family 
owners and political parties (Searle, 1999), which are mainly Malays. According to 
Haque (2003), during the mid 1980s, the Malaysian government awarded 61.2% of 
privatised assets or companies, amounting to RM8.1 billion, to Malays. This resulted 
in the emergence of a number of Malay tycoons. Among the Malay business groups, 
that emerged in the 1980s as a consequence of the economic policy, were the AMDB 
group, headed by Tan Sri Azman Hashim; the Sapura group, headed by Tan Sri 
Shamusuddin Abdul Kadir; the Antah group, headed by Tuanku Naquiyuddin and 
Tuanku Imran of the Negeri Sembilan royal family; and the Melewar group, headed 
by Tunku Abdullah and Tunku Iskandar of the Negeri Sembilan royal family (Torii, 
1997). 
 
After 20 years of the NEP, the Malaysian government introduced the National 
Development Policy (NDP)
5
. Despite some shift differences in strategy the NDP is 
also an “ethnicity-oriented” (Torii, 1997). The policy has resulted in considerable 
involvement of the government in the corporate sector (Tam and Tan, 2007), as a 
result of which selected companies have been given certain patronage and 
advantages. 
 
                                               
5 The National Development Policy were made effective from 1991 to 2000.  
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From this historical review of the Malaysian economy, it is important to note that the 
economy was originally shaped by the British, and was then transformed through the 
NEP and NDP. The next section provides a discussion on family businesses in 
Malaysia and their characteristics. 
 
2.2.2 Family Firms in Malaysia 
Like in many other parts of the world, most of the businesses in Malaysia started as 
family businesses. In a survey report, Jasani (2002) states that almost all Small and 
Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in Malaysia were established, managed and 
funded by families. These businesses not only acquire capital from the founding 
family, but employ family members and relatives to handle day to day operations. In 
particular, Jasani (2002) reports that 59% of the businesses in Malaysia are controlled 
and owned by the founder and 30% are passed to the second generation.  
 
Family businesses in Malaysia are not limited to private companies. More than half of 
the publicly listed companies on Malaysian stock exchange, Bursa Malaysia, are 
dominated by families (Claessens et al., 2002). Lim (1981) reported that the 100 
largest firms in Malaysia have highly concentrated ownership, the majority being 
owned by families. Specifically, he found that there were 210,103 stockholders in the 
62 largest corporations in Malaysia during 1974-1976. However, less than 100 of the 
stockholders held more than 50 per cent of the shares in these companies (Lim, 
1981). Lim (1981) also reports that only a few hundred families own the majority of 
stocks in Malaysia.  These findings are supported by Sieh (1982), who shows that the 
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collective holdings of the largest shareholders represented nearly half of the total 
capital in the 98 largest manufacturing companies. An update by Zhuang (1999) also 
shows that over the years 1991-1996, 53.3% of Malaysian companies included in the 
study had concentrated ownership, with families being the ultimate controlling 
shareholders. A later study by Claessens et al. (2000) found that 57.5% and 67.2% of 
publicly listed firms in Malaysia, as of the end of fiscal year 1996, were owned by 
family at the10% and 20% cut off level, respectively.  
 
Family firms, which dominate the majority of publicly listed corporations in Malaysia 
share some common characteristics (Capulong et al., 2000).  Firstly, the firms rest on 
the financial and human capital of the founding family (McConaughy, 2000). In these 
firms, the board of directors is often dominated by the controlling interests of 
families, and the chairman of the board of directors and the chief executive officer are 
often the same individual or, if different, are from the same family (Zhuang, 1999). 
The involvement of family members in the firm‟s management and governing body 
reflects the family‟s strong concern over the success of the business. According to 
Redding (1996), this is due to the fact that the family‟s prosperity is closely linked to 
the firms‟ performance. Secondly, family shareholdings in the firms are usually 
concentrated. This allows the controlling family to maintain a dominant voice in the 
company‟s policies and decisions (Tam and Tan, 2007). Other than being 
concentrated, the control is also obtained through cross-holdings (Thillainathan, 
1998) and interlocking shareholdings (Zhuang, 1999).  
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Berjaya Corporation Berhad is an example of family firm in Malaysia. The company 
is among the main players in the Malaysian stock market with a RM4.63 billion 
market capitalisation
6
 (Sraa et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 2.1: Percentage of Control of Vincent Tan Family over Berjaya Corporation 
Berhad and Its Publicly Listed Subsidiaries 
 
Note: * is combined interests held by Berjaya Corporation Berhad and Vincent Tan 
Source: retrieved from Berjaya Corporation Berhad website at www.berjaya.com/corporate-structure.html on 20 
June 2011. 
 
Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and his family hold 42.55% of Berjaya Corporation‟s total 
shares including both direct and deemed interests in the company. Through the 
significant level of control over the shares of Berjaya Corporation, the family also 
controls five other publicly listed companies (its subsidiaries), namely, Berjaya Land 
Berhad, Berjaya Sports Toto Berhad, Berjaya Assets Berhad, Berjaya Media Berhad 
and Berjaya Retail Berhad. Figure 2.1 shows the control of Vincent Tan‟s family over 
the five other publicly listed companies in Malaysia through the holding in Berjaya 
Corporation Berhad. 
 
                                               
6 Market capitalization as at 21 January 2011. 
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Figure 2.2: Family Directors in Berjaya Corporation Berhad 
 
 
Source: Berjaya Corporation Berhad Annual Report 2010 
 
Like most family firms in Malaysia, Vincent Tan‟s family does not only own a 
significant proportion of the shares in the public listed companies, but also secures 
control over the firms by holding important positions in top management and the 
corporate boards. Vincent Tan, the founder of Berjaya Corporation, serves as the 
board chairman and chief executive officer. As shown in Figure 2.2, other family 
members, including his brother and sons also hold appointments as company 
directors and various positions in the company‟s publicly listed subsidiaries. 
 
A further example is the IOI Corporation Berhad. The company is mainly controlled 
by Len Shin Cheng‟s family through their shares in Progressive Holdings Sdn. Bhd, a 
privately owned company. In total, the family has at least a 41.10% direct interest in 
IOI Corporation Berhad as they own 100% of Progressive Holdings equity. 
Specifically, Len Shin Cheng and his wife Hoong May Kuan own 76%, while his two 
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sons; Lee Yeow Chow and Lee Yeow Seng each own 12% of the private company‟s 
total equity (Sraa et al., 2011). Figure 2.3 provides an excerpt from the IOI 
Corporation Berhad‟s annual report that hides the actual direct interest of the family 
members through the incorporation of the private company. Similar to Berjaya 
Corporation Berhad, four family members hold appointments as the company‟s 
directors to protect the interest of the family. 
 
Figure 2.3: Excerpt from 2010 Annual Report of IOI Corporation Berhad 
SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDERS 
(as per Register of Substantial Shareholders) 
 NO OF SHARES HELD 
NAME OF SHAREHOLDERS DIRECT % INDIRECT % 
Tan Sri Dato’ Len Shin Cheng 58,684,900  0.92 2,630,833,780 41.25 
Puan Sri Datin Hoong May Kuan - - 2,689,568,680 42.17 
Dato’ Lee Yeow Chor 8,196,400 0.13 2,621,527,380 41.10 
Lee Yeow Seng 1,160,000 0.02 2,621,527,380 41.10 
Progressive Holdings Sdn. Bhd. 2,621,527,380 41.10 - - 
Employees Provident Fund Board 721,642,900 11.32 90,858,725 1.42 
Source: IOI Corporation Berhad Annual Report 2010 
 
The existence of family firms in a developing country like Malaysia can be explained 
by several factors. According to Burkart et al. (2003), from an economic perspective, 
family firms exists due to imperfections in the market for managerial talent or the 
market for corporate control. When the market for managerial talent does not exist, 
firms may have to depend on successive generations of the founding family to 
provide for managerial personnel (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). Likewise, in the 
absence of a market for corporate control, where there is no prospect of takeovers to 
credibly threaten the management of poorly performing companies, the convergence 
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of management and ownership becomes a second best monitoring solution. Similarly, 
Holan and Sanz (2006) explain that family ties provide bonds of trust and a sense of 
common purpose that can substitute for shortcomings in the legal system. In family 
firms, it is assumed that agency problems are less because the agents and principals 
are members of the same family. If such problems arise, the family usually has 
internal mechanisms and solutions to deal with them (Holan and Sanz, 2006). This 
supports the argument that family firms are more common in countries with a weak 
capital market because family ownership acts as substitute for legal protections 
(Burkart et al., 2003). Other than the market imperfections arguments, family firms 
might be an outcome of altruism, externalities associated with social capital and the 
high cost of contract enforceability (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). 
 
This review of family businesses in Malaysia shows that family firms dominate the 
Malaysian capital market, signaling its importance to the country‟s economy and 
growth. The existence of these firms is partly due to the economic policies of British 
colonial government and the country‟s national economic policies since 
independence. The next section focuses on the country‟s experience during the 1997 
Asian economic crisis and its effort to install good corporate governance.  
 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis and high-profile corporate scandals in Malaysia have 
been linked to, or at least exacerbated by, poor corporate governance (Morris, Pham, 
and Gray, 2011; Rahman, 2006). The crisis and scandals have drawn attention to the 
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importance of monitoring and control mechanisms in ensuring proper management of 
firms‟ resources and effective protection of shareholder wealth. In an effort to 
strengthen the corporate governance system of Malaysian companies, the government 
and its agencies have launched new market regulations, introduced codes of corporate 
governance and recommended best governance practices, which follow those 
introduced in developed countries (Rahman, 2006). The assessment of Malaysian 
corporate governance by the World Bank (2005) shows that major corporate 
governance reforms have been implemented since 1998. However, the country is still 
facing some challenges relating to the protection of minority interest and directors 
accountability.  
 
The extent of compliance of the Malaysian corporate governance framework to date 
with the OECD corporate governance principles is illustrated in Appendix 1. The 
following subsections, Section 2.3.1 illustrate the problems faced in the country 
during the Asian financial crisis that emphasised the need for better corporate 
governance in Malaysia; while Section 2.3.2 provides the initiatives taken by the 
government in promoting good corporate governance practices. 
 
2.3.1 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
In the year 1997, several countries in East Asia, including Malaysia, were hit by a 
major financial crisis. The crisis originated from international currency speculation, 
which led to major slumps in exchange rates. It began as a currency crisis in Thailand 
after the country removed the pegged exchange rate between the Thai baht and the 
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U.S. dollar (Morris et al., 2011). The crisis turned into a financial and economic crisis 
and spread rapidly to other East Asia countries when foreign investors lost confidence 
and started to pull out their investments, causing the countries‟ currencies to fall 
further (Rahman and Haniffa, 2005). By January 1998, the Malaysian Ringgit had 
depreciated by almost half of its value from RM2.42 in April 1997 to RM4.88 to the 
U.S dollar, and interests rates climb to more than 12% per annum. Some of the 
affected countries received help from the International monetary Fund (IMF) to 
counter the crisis by injecting funds and making changes to their fiscal and monetary 
policies. The Malaysian government chose to implement an independent measure by 
pegging the Ringgit to the U.S. dollar. 
 
The vulnerability of the Malaysian economy to the Thai spill-over was claimed to be 
due to several reasons. Some argued that the major factor contributing to the crisis 
was the large proportion of private sector debt (e.g. Suto, 2003; Thomas, 2002). In 
1997, Malaysia had a 170% debt to GDP ratio and a large proportion of it was short-
term corporate borrowings used to cover long-term projects (Low, 2002). Even 
worse, some of the borrowings were from foreign banks. High interest rates and the 
significant drop of Malaysian Ringgit at that time resulted in large numbers of non-
performing loans for the local banks, as well as financial hardship for the borrowing 
companies.  
 
A report by the Asian Development Bank (2000) states that other than the excessive 
use of unhedged short-term foreign debt, the vulnerability was caused by weaknesses 
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in corporate governance and the poor quality of investments. Poor corporate 
governance had resulted in poor quality of corporate reporting by publicly listed 
companies. Ineffective board of directors, weak internal controls, poor audits, lack of 
adequate disclosure and lax legal enforcement are believed to have contributed to the 
crisis by shielding companies from market discipline and by failing to terminate 
unprofitable projects, recognise bad loans, restructure or liquidate poorly performing 
enterprises, and discipline banks (Capulong et al., 2000). Further, the majority of 
Malaysian companies had concentrated shareholdings, with subsequent potential 
problems in the protection of minority shareholders (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), and 
lack of an active market for corporate control to discipline managers who were not 
working towards maximising shareholder value (OECD, 1999).  
 
The financial crisis has resulted in calls for better corporate governance to be installed 
in Malaysian companies. According to Morris et al. (2011, p. 207),  
The crisis was a large and unexpected macroeconomic shock that 
pushed firms‟ market values out of equilibrium. The crisis created 
unforeseen uncertainty about firms‟ values and the expected level of 
wealth expropriation by insiders arising from Malaysian firm‟s 
pyramid share ownership structures. As a result, investor demand 
for transparency and corporate governance increased and regulatory 
reforms to financial reporting and governance were introduced after 
the crisis. 
 
2.3.2 The Introduction of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
Several initiatives were taken by the policy makers and regulators to improve the 
quality of financial reporting by Malaysian companies. One of the initiatives was to 
strengthen the corporate governance of Malaysian public listed companies by 
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introducing a code of corporate governance. The Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance was drafted in 1999 and introduced in March 2000. The code was then 
revised in 2007 to include additional recommendations relating to the boards of 
directors and audit committees. The code was basically issued to serve as a guideline 
to enhance corporate governance practices among public listed companies in 
Malaysia.  
 
Figure 2.4: Summary Content of the Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance 
 
Source: Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (Revised, 2007) 
 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate governance was based on the recommendations of 
the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) in the United Kingdom. 
PART 1 
Broad Principles of Corporate 
Governance for Publicly Listed 
Companies 
•The board of directors 
•Board balance 
•Supply of information 
•Appointment to the board 
•Re-election of the board 
•Dialogue between companies 
and investors 
•The annual general meeting 
•Internal control 
•Financial reporting 
•Relationship with auditors 
•Level and makeup of directors' 
remuneration 
•Remuneration procedure 
•Disclosure 
PART 2 
Best Practices of Corporate 
Governance for Publicly Listed 
Companies 
•Six principal responsibilities of 
the board 
•Separation between chairman 
and chief executive officer 
•Board balance 
•Board meetings and 
procedure 
•Supply of information to the 
board of directors by company 
secretary 
•Establishment of board 
committees, such as audit 
committee, nomination 
committee and remuneration 
committee 
•Relationship of the board to 
management 
•The audit committee size, 
financial literacy, meetings, 
duties and responsibilities 
•The relationship between the 
board and shareholders 
PART 3 
Principles and Best Practices 
for Other Corporate 
Participants 
•Institutional shareholders' 
responsibility to vote 
•Constructive communication 
between institutional  
investors and companies 
management and board 
•Evaluation of governance 
disclosures by institutional 
investors 
•The role and responsibility of 
extenal auditors 
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The code sets out the principles and best practices on corporate governance to 
improve the monitoring function of the board of directors, audit committee, and the 
external audit. This includes the essential criteria for the structure and operational 
process of the monitoring units, such as the composition of the board, procedures for 
recruiting new directors, remuneration of directors, the use of board committees, their 
mandates and their activities.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance consists of 
three main components. Part 1 sets out broad principles of good corporate governance 
that is flexible and adaptable to varying circumstances of individual companies. It 
proposes the application of 13 broad principles that are related to the board of 
directors, shareholders, internal control, financial reporting, auditors and director‟s 
remuneration. Under Bursa Malaysia listing requirements, companies are required to 
include in their annual report a narrative statement of how they apply the principles to 
their particular circumstances. Part 2 provides a set of guidelines and best practices to 
assist companies in adopting adequate corporate governance instruments. It contains 
33 provisions that include matters relating to the construction of an effective board, 
the number of non-executive directors, board structure and procedures, relationship of 
the board to management, establishment of board committees and the relationship 
between the board and shareholders. The compliance with best practices in Part 2 is 
voluntary. However, under Bursa Malaysia listing requirements, companies are 
required to disclose their level of compliance with best practice and explain any 
circumstances justifying departure from such best practice in their annual reports.  
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Part 3 sets out the principles and best practice for other corporate participants such as 
investors and auditors with the aim of improving their role in corporate governance. 
The recommendations in Part 3 are purely voluntary and have no disclosure 
requirements. In addition to the three main sections in the code, explanatory notes to 
Part 1, 2 and 3 are provided in Part 4. The section also includes “mere best practices” 
in addition to the recommendations in earlier sections. The mere best practices are 
completely voluntary, and companies are not required to state or explain any 
departure from the recommendations.  
 
Under the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, the role, composition and 
structure of the board of directors are viewed as the most important elements for 
effective corporate governance. The board is responsible for reviewing and approving 
a strategic plan and to oversee the business operations, while directly monitoring and 
evaluating the management‟s performance and to ensure the integrity of accounting 
and financial reporting systems. A well balanced and effective board would take the 
lead role in establishing best corporate governance practice. According to the code, a 
well- balanced board has a good mixture of executive directors and non-executive 
directors, including independent directors. The revised code specifically recommends 
that independent non-executive directors should make up at least one-third of the 
members of a board. This is to ensure that any decision made by the board is 
independent and not dominated by an individual or a small group of individuals. In 
view of that, the code also recommends the separation of responsibilities between the 
chairman and the CEO. Moreover, the code also specifies that non-executive directors 
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should have necessary skills and experience and be a person of calibre and credibility 
so as to bring independent judgment to the board. 
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance recommends the establishment of the 
audit, remuneration, nomination, risk management and corporate governance 
committees by the board of directors
7
. The nomination committee is responsible for 
proposing new nominees for the board and assessing performance of the directors on 
an ongoing basis. It should comprise of non-executive directors, with a majority of 
independent directors. Under the Bursa Malaysia listing requirements, all directors 
are subject to retirement and re-election at least once every three years. The audit 
committee should meet the following requirements; (1) must be composed of not 
fewer than three members (all must be non-executive directors); (2) a majority of the 
audit committee members must be independent directors; and (3) at least one member 
of the audit committee must be a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
(MIA) or possesses sufficient accounting experience and qualification, or deemed to 
be “financially literate”. A member of the audit committee is financially literate if 
he/she has the ability to read and understand financial statements, analyse financial 
statements and ask pertinent questions about the company‟s operations against 
internal controls and risk factors, and understand and interpret the application of 
approved accounting standards (Bursa Malaysia, 2009). 
 
                                               
7 The establishment of audit committee was made mandatory for publicly listed companies starting 
from the year 1994 under Bursa Malaysia listing requirement. 
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Figure 2.5: Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Governance Principles under Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements 
 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (2005). 
 
Initially, compliance with the all principles and best practice recommended in the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was completely voluntary. Disclosure of 
compliance with the code was made mandatory by Bursa Malaysia after the revision 
of its listing requirements in January 2001. As in Figure 2.5, the mandatory disclosure 
of corporate governance is clearly stated in Paragraph 15.26 and 15.27 of the Bursa 
Malaysia listing requirements. 
 
BURSA MALAYSIA LISTING REQUIREMENTS 
Para 15.26 
•(a) Publicly listed companies are required to provide a disclosure pursuant to 
the Code in the annual report with a narrative statement on how the broad 
Principles of Corporate Governance (Part 1) has been applied by the company 
and institutional shareholders. (Effective date: Financial year ending after 30 
June 2001) 
 
•(b) Publicly listed companies are required to make a statement on the extent 
of compliance  with the Best Practices  of Corporate Governance (Part2). 
(Effective date: Financial year ending after 30 June 2001) 
Para 15.27 
•(a) Board of directors are required to provide Statement of Director's 
responsibility for preparing the annual audited accounts in the annual report. 
(Effective date: 1 June 2001) 
 
•(b) Companies are required to provide a Statement on the state of internal 
control of company and group in the annual report. (Effective date: Financial 
year ending after 31 December 2001) 
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The revised Bursa Malaysia listing requirements are more demanding on public listed 
companies to enhance Malaysia‟s corporate governance regime (Yatim, Kent, and 
Clarkson, 2006).  All publicly listed companies are required to include a Statement of 
Corporate Governance in their annual reports, starting from 1 July 2001. In the 
statement, the companies are obliged to disclose their level of compliance with the 
code‟s recommendation of best practice and explain any departure from the code in 
their annual reports. 
 
Bursa Malaysia has also taken another initiative to promote good corporate 
governance practice among publicly listed companies. The stock exchange requires 
all directors to undergo continuous training, such as the Mandatory Accreditation 
Program and the Continuing Education Program to improve their capabilities in 
performing their duties as directors and influence corporate thinking on issues related 
to corporate governance. The training of directors is set as a condition for continued 
listing and is required to be disclosed in annual reports, starting from 31 December 
2005. 
 
 
2.4 Malaysian Financial Reporting Environment 
Accounting and financial reporting practices in Malaysia have evolved and developed 
in response to the growth in the country‟s economy. Today, Malaysia has a financial 
reporting framework that is internationally benchmarked, with adequate qualified 
accounting professionals and adequate regulatory and governing bodies.  Since the 
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year 1978, the International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) had become the model for Malaysian 
accounting standards. In 1996, most IAS standards had either been adopted or were 
under consideration in Malaysia (Ball et al., 2003). Following the introduction of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the IASB, Malaysia has also 
adopted IFRS, which was made effective from 1 January 2006.  
 
The first formal accounting framework in Malaysia was set up under the Financial 
Reporting Act 1997 (FRA 1997). The parliamentary act established two bodies, the 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB), which is the accounting standard 
setter; and the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF)
8
. Under the FRA 1997, both 
listed and non-listed companies are legally required to follow MASB standards. In 
1998, the requirement to comply with the „approved accounting standards‟ as in FRA 
1997 was also included as a new provision in the Companies Act 1965 (Amended)
9
.  
 
A number of regulating bodies, including the Securities Commission, Bursa 
Malaysia, the Central Bank of Malaysia, and the Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, are in charge of enforcing the compliance with MASB standards. In the 
case of non-compliance with approved accounting standards, the regulators have the 
power to direct the company to take the necessary rectifying actions or make 
                                               
8 FRF is a trustee body who is responsible to oversee MASB's performance, financial and funding 
arrangements. It acts as a sounding board for the MASB. For instance, the FRF would be the first to 
review MASB‟s technical pronouncements before it goes out to the public. 
 
9 Section 166A of Companies Act 1965. 
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necessary announcements with respect to the non-compliance and required 
corrections. For publicly listed companies, there are also financial penalties for such 
offences.  
 
Through the issuance of rules and policies, the Security Commission (SC) imposes 
compliance with the accounting standards by publicly listed companies. For example, 
the SC requires all publicly listed companies to meet the terms in its Corporate 
Disclosure Policy, which demands that the companies maintain a very high level of 
disclosure. The SC also requires companies that would like to issue or offer securities 
to the public to submit the proposed issuance to SC for approval. In the case of failing 
to submit or submitting false and misleading information to the SC, the company may 
be penalised for RM3 million or the responsible manager may receive up to 10 years 
imprisonment. In addition to that, the SC provides timely discussion and review of 
issues relating to the minimum compliance of accounting standards and other 
statutory requirements for publicly listed companies. The SC also issued the Post 
Listing Obligations that requires all publicly listed companies to submit annual and 
interim corporate reports prepared in accordance with the accounting standards.  
 
The Malaysian stock exchange, Bursa Malaysia, also contributes to the enforcement 
of accounting standards in Malaysia. Bursa Malaysia monitors the companies traded 
on the stock exchange through the monitoring of their announcements, market trading 
activity, the media in general, public complaints, and internal review of documents 
submitted to Bursa Malaysia. For these companies, compliance with the accounting 
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standards is made mandatory through the Bursa Malaysia listing requirements. The 
listing requirements include the preparation of financial statements in accordance 
with approved accounting standards and submission of corporate annual reports as 
well as additional disclosures. Companies that do not meet the terms of the listing 
requirements may receive warning letters, reprimands, fines for an amount not 
exceeding RM 1 million, directions for rectification, the non-acceptance of 
applications or submissions, the imposition of conditions for approval of submissions, 
suspension of trading and de-listing by Bursa Malaysia. Where listing requirements 
are breached, the stock exchange may also, on application to the High Court, seek an 
order requiring the removal of a director of a company and bar him/her from being a 
director of any other public company. 
 
Compliance with accounting standards in the financial statements of private 
companies is monitored by a government agency, which is the Companies 
Commission of Malaysia (CCM). The main responsibility of the CCM is to regulate 
matters relating to the incorporation of companies, deal with business registration and 
collect payment for related fees. However, CCM also promotes good ethical conduct 
amongst directors and managers and provides a facility whereby any corporate 
information received by the Companies Commission may be analysed and supplied to 
the public. 
 
For publicly listed banks and financial institutions, in addition to the rules and 
regulations imposed by Bursa Malaysia, the Central Bank ensures that the financial 
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statements comply with the approved accounting standards. In paragraph 11.1 of its 
Guidelines for Financial Reporting by Banking Institutions, banks and financial 
institutions are required under section 42 of the Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act (BAFIA) to publish a complete set of the financial statements (both the 
institution‟s and consolidated financial statements) within 14 days of presentation of 
the financial statements at its general meeting, in at least two local daily newspapers. 
The Central Bank also provides specimen financial statements and guidelines on 
financial reporting for banks and financial institutions that deal specifically with non-
performing loans and interest. 
 
In summary, Malaysia has incorporated high quality accounting standards through the 
adoption of international accounting standards. The financial reporting framework in 
the country has been strengthened by the establishment of the Malaysian Accounting 
Standard Board and the Financial Reporting Foundation.  The Malaysian government 
has also, through its agencies, applied a lot of effort to ensure that companies comply 
with the approved accounting standards in the preparation of their financial 
statements.  
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides the institutional setting for this study, which mainly focuses on 
the growth of the Malaysian economy, the existence and characteristics of family 
businesses in Malaysia, development of corporate governance practices and the 
financial reporting environment for publicly listed companies in the country. It is well 
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documented that Malaysia experienced good economic growth until it suffered the 
financial crisis of 1997. Like other developing countries, corporate shareholdings of 
Malaysian companies are highly concentrated and mostly dominated by families.  
The highly concentrated ownership structure, weak legal system, lack of investors‟ 
protection and poor quality of financial reporting are among the factors that caused 
the loss of investors‟ confidence during the crisis. Since the financial turmoil, the 
Malaysian government has endeavoured to strengthen and enhance the country‟s 
corporate governance framework. Among the initiatives taken was the introduction of 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in the year 2000 and revision of the 
existing listing requirements to mandate disclosure of the company‟s compliance with 
the code‟s recommendations. While the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
focuses on good corporate governance practice among publicly listed companies, a 
formal accounting framework was established in 1997 to improve the quality of 
financial reporting in Malaysia. Statutory bodies such as the Securities Commission, 
the stock exchange, the Companies Commission and the Central Bank, have all 
contributed to ensuring that companies comply with the prescribed accounting 
standards. 
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CHAPTER THREE: PRIOR STUDIES ON EARNINGS QUALITY, FAMILY 
FIRMS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study draws and builds on three major streams of accounting research; earnings 
quality, family businesses and corporate governance. This chapter provides a review 
of the studies that form the basis for the framing of the hypotheses as well as those 
studies that provide related evidence.  Section 3.2,  explains the concept of earnings 
quality, reviews the measures of earnings quality employed in previous studies, and 
discusses the importance of having high earnings quality. Section 3.3 provides a 
review of the previous studies on family firms and the relationship with earnings 
quality. Section 3.4 defines corporate governance and reviews prior studies on 
corporate governance and earnings quality. Section 3.5summarises this chapter. 
 
3.2 What is Earnings Quality? 
The extant literature has not yet come to a unanimous conclusion on what earnings 
quality is; rather it is viewed as a conceptual term that can be defined from many 
different perspectives. Academic researchers have introduced and operationalised 
different dimensions of earnings quality constructs using certain characteristics of 
earnings and its components. This section describes the definitions from the 
perspective of standards setters and financial statements users, discusses various 
measures used in prior studies as proxies for earnings quality, explains the functions 
44 
and limitations associated with each approach and provides examples of the 
application of each approach in existing studies on earnings quality. 
 
3.2.1 Earnings Quality from Different Perspectives 
From a decision-usefulness perspective, earnings quality is regarded as being high if 
the earnings numbers are useful for decision making purposes. Based on this point of 
view, the notion of earnings quality is defined differently by different users of 
financial statements. For example, according to Dechow and Schrand (2004), analysts 
are likely to view earnings to be of high quality when the earnings numbers 
accurately reflect the company‟s current operating performance, are good indicators 
of future operating performance and are a good summary measure for assessing firm 
value. This is consistent with the objectives of financial analysts, which are to 
evaluate the performance of the company, assess the extent to which current earnings 
indicates future performance and determine whether the current stock price reflects 
intrinsic firm value (Dechow and Schrand, 2004).  Investors are likely to have similar 
objectives. On the other hand, creditors and compensation committees may define 
high quality earnings as earnings that are easily convertible into cash flows and that 
reflect managers‟ real performance. 
 
Financial statement users may also define earnings quality in terms of the „absence of 
earnings management‟. This is because the intentional manipulation of earnings by 
managers, within the limits possible in accounting standards, may distort the 
usefulness of earnings to users.  Earnings that are persistent and predictable may not 
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be of high quality if it is a result of earnings management. Managers may tend to 
manage earnings for a number of reasons including those related to capital market 
motivations, compensation and bonus as well as debt or lending contracts, which will 
result in low quality of earnings. According to Schipper and Vincent   (2003), debt 
agreements based on low and defective earnings will induce unintended wealth 
transfers; overstated earnings used as an indicator of managers‟ performance in 
compensation contracts will result in overcompensation to managers; and low quality 
of earnings will provide defective resource allocation signals to investors. 
 
Dechow and Schrand (2004) state that when earnings conform to the spirit and the 
rules of generally accepted accounting principles, they are of high quality in the eyes 
of regulators. Earnings should be free from fraud and show a true and fair view of a 
company‟s financial performance. However, accounting standard setters are also 
concerned with the effectiveness of the standards that they have promulgated. By 
focusing on the usefulness of earnings numbers to financial statements users, standard 
setters can evaluate quality of earnings prepared under a particular set of accounting 
standards. 
 
Other than the decision-usefulness context, earnings quality has also been explained 
in prior research using the economics-based definition of Hicksian income (e.g. 
Dempster, 2008; Hodge, 2003; Schipper and Vincent, 2003). Shipper and Vincent 
(2003, p. 98)  define earnings quality as “the extent to which reported earnings 
faithfully represent Hicksian income, where representational faithfulness means 
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correspondence or agreement between a measure or description and the phenomenon 
that it purports to represent”. This construct measures the quality of earnings based on 
its correlation with „true earnings‟, which does not depends on accounting recognition 
rules and the implementation of the accounting rules. „True earnings‟ is a neutral and 
context-free benchmark, yet difficult to assess as Hicksian income is not observable. 
However, since Hicksian earnings is not observable, the construct is not operational 
(Schipper and Vincent, 2003).  
 
Yee (2006) explains that earnings quality depends on two main elements, the 
„fundamental‟ earnings and reported earnings. The former is a profitability figure that 
measures a firm‟s ability to make future dividend payments, while the latter is an 
imperfect signal or estimation of „fundamental‟ earnings that a firm announces. 
According to Yee (2006), earnings quality is based on the ability of reported earnings 
to quickly and precisely reveal a firm‟s fundamental earnings. The more accurate and 
timely that reported earnings reflect shocks in the present value of expected future 
dividends, the higher the quality of earnings. 
 
3.2.2 Earnings Quality Measurements 
Previous studies define earnings quality through certain characteristics of earnings 
such as persistence or sustainability, predictive ability, smoothness, conservatism, 
value-relevance, timeliness, earnings management or earnings manipulation and 
accrual quality. In general, earnings viewed as being of high quality are those that 
have a high level of persistence, are more predictable, less volatile, more timely, have 
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lower level of earnings management and/or higher accrual quality. The following 
subsections discuss each of the measures, which have frequently been used in prior 
studies. 
 
3.2.2.1 Accrual Quality 
A seminal study by Dechow and Dichev (2002) introduced a model for earnings 
quality based on the notion that the function of accruals is to adjust the recognition of 
cash flows over time, so that it better reflects firm performance. This model relates 
total current accruals (TCA), measured by changes in working capital, to lagged, 
current and future cash flows from operations, and has been used in the existing 
studies as a proxy for earnings quality (Aboody, Hughes, and Liu, 2005; Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2003; Myers, 
Myers, and Omer, 2003; Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck, and Willekens, 2007). In the 
model, the total current accrual is measured by changes in working capital, since 
related cash-flow realisations generally occur within one year, which is as follows: 
 
TCAi,t / Ai,t-1  = α0,i + α1,i(CFOi,t-1 / Ai,t) + α2,i (CFOi,t / Ai,t)   
+ α3,i (CFOi,t+1 / Ai,t) 
 
(3.1) 
where: 
TCAi,t = firms i‟s total current accruals in year t
10
, 
Ai,t = firms i‟s average total assets at the beginning and at the end of fiscal 
                                               
10 Total current accrual is measured as changes in current assets minus changes in current liabilities, minus 
changes in cash and plus changes in short term debt (also equivalent to changes in working capital). 
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year t, 
CFOi,t = cash flows from operations in year t, calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items minus total accruals
11
 
 
This model captures both intentional and unintentional accrual estimation error by 
management, which is the inverse measures of earnings quality (Hermanns, 2006). In 
other words, the estimation error indirectly measures the extent to which accruals 
map into cash realisation, where a poor match indicates low quality.  
 
Since the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach provides a direct link between income 
and accruals, this model does not have the same problems as the earnings 
management approach introduced by Jones (1991)
12
, which requires the assumption 
that certain underlying accounting fundamentals remain constant and unmanipulated. 
However, Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is also subject to some limitations. 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) highlight that the model does not distinguish non-
manipulative estimation errors from intentional earnings management and requires 
the assumption that working capital accruals lag or lead cash receipts by no more than 
one year. 
 
McNichols (2002) suggests future research should include the change in revenues and 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) as additional explanatory variables in the 
                                               
11 Total accrual is measured as changes in current assets minus changes in current liabilities, minus changes in 
cash, plus changes in short term debt, minus depreciation. 
12 See Section 3.1.2.2 for discussions of Jones (1991) model. 
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Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, in order to distinguish the unintentional accrual 
estimation error from those that are intentional. However, inclusion of the new 
explanatory variables would require the same assumptions as in the Jones (1991) 
model.  
 
Based on the McNichols (2002) discussion of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, 
Francis et al. (2005) examine the market pricing of  accruals quality by investors. 
Their results show that the market requires less return from firms with better accruals 
quality than from firms with poor accruals quality.  
 
Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007) examine the relationship between accrual quality and 
internal controls and find that firms with weak internal control over financial 
reporting generally have lower accruals quality. This supports their theory that a good 
internal control system is a key foundation for high quality financial reporting. A later 
study by Krishnan et al. (2008) suggests that inventory policy affects earnings 
variability and accruals quality. They find that accruals quality is systematically 
worse for FIFO firms than for LIFO firms after controlling for correlated omitted 
variables and known firm attributes.  
 
3.2.2.2 Earnings Management  
Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1985) define earnings management as the process of 
taking deliberate steps, within the constraints of generally accepted accounting 
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practice, to bring about a desired level of reported earnings. Similarly, Healy and 
Wahlen (1999, p. 368) note that: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some shareholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depends on reported accounting numbers. 
 
According to the definitions, it is clear that earnings management is possible because 
of the discretion available to managers in preparing financial reports. However, it is 
limited to the boundaries set under a particular set of accounting standards. Thus, any 
changes in the amount or extent of managerial discretion allowed under the 
accounting standards may also change the degree of earnings management.  
 
The extant literature on earnings management suggest that earnings management 
exists due to the important roles and functions played by the reported income or 
earnings number. As claimed by Vander Bauwhede (2001), managers may be 
inclined to manage earnings due to the existence of the firm‟s explicit and implicit 
contracts, the firm‟s relation with capital markets, the need for external financing, the 
political and regulatory environment or several other specific circumstances. For 
example, earnings numbers are normally included in management compensation and 
bonus contracts, debts covenants, management buyouts, proxy contests, valuation of 
initial public offerings (IPOs), labour union negotiations and lobbying on accounting 
standards and regulations. 
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There are numerous situations or incentives that may motivate management to 
become involved in earnings management. Researchers provide evidence that 
managers have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to maximise their bonus 
and compensations (e.g. Gaver and Gaver, 1998; Gaver, Gaver, and Austin, 1995; 
Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; McNichols, Wilson, and 
DeAngelo, 1988; Shuto, 2007; Steven, 1998; Teshima and Shuto, 2008), to avoid 
violation of debt covenants or to decrease the cost of debt (e.g. Carlson and Bathala, 
1997; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jaggi and Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994), to 
circumvent industry and other regulations (e.g. Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen, 
1995; Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca, 2005; Jones, 1991; Key, 1997; Moyer, 1990; 
Reza, 2003), to meet the earnings forecasts and targets issued by financial analysts or 
management (e.g. Dutta and Gigler, 2002; Jaggi, Chin, Lin, and Lee, 2006; Kasznik, 
1999; Robb, 1998) and to maximise the proceeds of IPOs (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 
2008; Chaney and Lewis, 1998; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2001; Friedlan, 
1994; Jaggi et al., 2006; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998). 
 
Previous researchers have established that earnings management can be achieved 
through several means. The findings of their studies show that using the discretion 
allowed under accounting standards, managers manipulate earnings by changing 
firm‟s depreciation policy including depreciation methods and estimates (Archibald, 
1969; Herrmann and Inoue, 1996; Keating and Zimmerman, 2000), adjusting the 
estimate of the provision for bad debts (McNichols et al., 1988), changing the useful 
life and/ or residual value of fixed  assets through assets revaluations (Easton, Eddey, 
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and Harris, 1993; Ervin, Keith, and Tracy, 1998; Whittred and Chan, 1992), 
classifying gains and losses as extraordinary items (Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan, 1976; 
Beattie, Brown, Ewers, and John, 1994; Choo and Peter, 1998; Godfrey and Jones, 
1999; Jaggi and Baydoun, 2001), not recognising goodwill impairment or not 
recognising goodwill amortisation and/or write-offs (Beatty and Weber, 2006; 
Henning, Shaw, and Stock, 2004; Jordan, Clark, and Vann, 2007; Sevin and 
Schroeder, 2005). 
 
Zheng (2003) claims that the purpose of earnings management, as stated in Healy and 
Wahlen‟s (1999) definition indicates that managed earnings are of lower quality than 
unmanaged earnings. Consistently, previous studies on earnings quality (e.g. Barth, 
Landsman, and Lang, 2008; Chen, Dhaliwal, and Trombley, 2007; Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2005) use the term „earning quality‟ to denote the absence of earnings 
management. In addition, Levitt (1998) mentioned that when earnings management is 
on the rise, the quality of financial reporting is on the decline.  
 
Prior studies have adopted a variety of approaches to measuring the degree of 
earnings management. Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) and Jones (1991) are among 
the early studies that use abnormal accrual models to detect earnings management. 
Dechow et al. (1995) explain the development of these early models and give detailed 
descriptions and provide comparisons between the models. Dechow et al. (1995) 
found that among Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), modified Jones 
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model and industry model, the modified version of Jones (1991) model is the most 
powerful method of detecting earnings management.  
 
Many of the existing studies refer to Jones (1991) model as a basis for assessment of 
the level of earnings management. In the Jones (1991) model, the concept of 
discretionary accruals is used to indicate the quality of earnings. The main idea in the 
Jones (1991) model is that accruals are likely to be the result of managerial discretion 
and changes in the firm‟s economic environment (Hermanns, 2006). Basically, the 
model estimates firms‟ abnormal accruals (discretionary) based on certain economic 
and accounting fundamentals using time-series regression. In the model, Jones relates 
total accruals to the change in sales and the level of gross property, plant and 
equipment. The residuals of the model are considered as abnormal or discretionary 
accruals as they are not explained by the firm‟s economic conditions. The regression 
model is as follows: 
 
TAit / Ait-1 = αi(1 / Ait-1) + β1i(REVit / Ait-1) + β2i (PPEit / Ait-1) + εit (3.2) 
Where: 
TAit = total accruals in year t for firm i; 
REVit = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i; 
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i; 
Ait-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i; 
εit = error term in year t for firm i; 
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According to Jones (1991), revenue is included in the model because it is an objective 
measure of the firm‟s operations before managers‟ manipulations. It is expected that 
total accruals, which includes changes in accounts receivables, inventories and 
accounts receivables rely on the extent of changes in revenue (Jones, 1991). While 
revenues are included to control for firms economic environment, the gross, property 
and equipment is included to control for the portion of total accruals related to 
nondiscretionary depreciation expense. The prediction error in the model, εit, 
measures the level of discretionary accruals. 
 
3.2.2.3 Earnings Persistence 
Earnings quality is also defined in previous studies and accounting text books in 
terms of persistence and sustainability (e.g. Ahmed, Billings, and Morton, 2004; 
Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 2006; Penman 
and Zhang, 2002; Richardson, 2003; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2005; 
Sloan, 1996) Revsine, Collins and Johnson (2002) state that earnings are considered 
to be of high quality when they are sustainable; and Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002) 
defined quality of earnings as the extent to which we might expect the reported level 
of earnings to be sustained. Focusing on investors‟ perception of earnings quality, 
Ayres (1994) notes that one view of earnings quality relates to the overall 
permanence of earnings. That is, high quality of earnings reflects earnings that can be 
sustained for a long- period. Similarly, in an empirical study that investigates the joint 
effects of accounting conservatism and investment on the quality of earnings, Penman 
and Zhang (2002) define high-quality earnings to be „sustainable earnings‟ as often 
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referred to in financial analysis. They explain that when an accounting treatment 
produces unsustainable earnings, it indicates that the earnings figures are of poor 
quality. 
 
Sloan (1996) leads a stream of studies on earnings persistence that decomposes 
earnings into two underlying components; accruals and cash flows. He analyses the 
characteristics of information (about future earnings) contained in those two 
components of current earnings and investigate the extent to which this information is 
reflected in stock prices. Sloan (1996) argues that the accrual and cash components of 
earnings are both relevant to financial statement users, but the former is less reliable, 
and therefore that the accrual component of earnings is less persistent than the cash 
flow component. This signifies that there is a negative association between the 
magnitude of the accrual component of earnings and the persistence of current 
earnings, and thus earnings quality. 
 
The different persistence of the accrual and cash components of earnings observed in 
Sloan (1996) inspired subsequent studies to further investigate the implication of 
accruals for earnings quality (Zheng, 2003). For example, Johnson, Khurana and 
Reynolds (2002) modified the Sloan (1996) model and introduced a cross-sectional 
model to examine the impact of audit tenure on the persistence of the accrual 
component of earnings.  
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3.2.2.4 Earnings Predictability 
A number of studies measure earnings quality by assessing the ability of earnings to 
predict future cash flows (Barragato and Markelevich, 2008; Cohen, 2004; Doyle, 
Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003; Francis et al., 2004; Greenberg, Johnson, and 
Ramesh, 1986; Van der Meulen et al., 2007). Barragato and Markelevich (2008) 
define high-quality earnings as an earnings stream that is a better predictor of future 
operating cash flows. They claim that their definition of earnings quality frequently 
appears in financial analysts‟ reports and treatises of financial statement analysis, 
which supports the view that financial statements should provide information that is 
useful in assessing the amounts, timing and uncertainties of prospective cash inflows.  
 
Earlier, there were arguments that current earnings may not be a good predictor of 
future cash flows compared to current cash flows because of the managerial 
discretion involved in measuring earnings. To clarify this matter, Greenberg et al. 
(1986) empirically examine whether current earnings or current cash flows are the 
better predictor of future cash flows. This is done by comparing the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) from regressions using either cash flows or earnings as the 
variable. Their results show higher R
2
 from the earnings regression, which suggest 
that current earnings are the better predictor of future cash flows. Similarly, Dechow, 
Kothari and Watts (1998) report that the forecasting model using current earnings 
yields smaller variations for forecast errors than the model based on cash flows. On 
the other hand, Barth, Cram and Nelson (1999) find that disaggregating earnings into 
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cash flows and aggregate accruals significantly increases the adjusted R
2
 for 
forecasting future cash flows.  
 
Earnings predictability is a similar construct to earnings persistence as both relate to 
the time-series behavior of earnings. However, Schipper and Vincent (2003) note that 
there is a possible situation where persistence and predictability may not be 
consistent. Volatile earnings might be high quality in terms of high persistence (i.e. 
earnings follows random walk), but low in quality in terms of low predictability (i.e 
the magnitude of a typical shock to earnings is large). 
 
3.2.2.5 Value Relevance 
In much of the accounting research into financial reporting quality, earnings quality is 
measured by its value-relevance to investors in relation to equity valuation (e.g. 
Cheng, Hsieh, and Yip, 2007; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Lang, Raedy, and 
Yetman, 2003; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). These studies relate earnings 
directly to stock prices or market returns. The association (the slope coefficient or the 
explanatory power of the model) between earnings and stock market performance 
suggests that earnings are both relevant and reliable to investors (Barth, Beaver, and 
Landsman, 2001). Generally, earnings is considered to be higher in quality if it is 
more value- relevant. As claimed by Bao and Bao (2004): 
Theoretically, if quality of earnings is improved, then the 
association between firm value and reported earnings should also be 
improved. If quality of earnings is impaired, then the association 
between firm value and reported earnings should also be impaired. 
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Studies investigating the effect of changes in accounting standards have found that 
earnings quality is significantly affected by the change indicated in value relevance 
models. Among others, Cheng et al. (2007) examine whether the choice of accounting 
treatment of the transition obligation under SFAS106 affects firm value, and whether 
the quality of earnings was improved after the implementation of the standard. They 
found that although the total value relevance of both earnings and book value is not 
affected by the choices allowed under the new accounting standard, earnings quality 
under the immediate recognition method has been severely undermined by the one-
time charge of the transition obligation. The study concludes that, by transforming the 
accounting standard from the cash basis to accrual basis, SFAS 106 is proved to have 
resulted in higher quality of earnings. 
 
Another set of studies compares the value relevance of earnings under different 
accounting standards. For example, Harris, Lang and Moller (1994) compare the 
associations of earnings reported under foreign and US GAAP. Another study, Joos 
and Lang (1994) investigates the financial statement effects of differences in 
accounting measurement practices in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and 
find evidence of significant differences in financial ratios and stock market valuation 
based on accounting data. Hung (2001) investigates the effect of accrual accounting 
in different accounting standards on the value relevance of financial statements across 
21 countries. Using a sample of 17,743 firm-year observations during the period 
1991-1997, she shows that the use of accrual accounting negatively affects the value 
relevance of accounting performance measures (earnings and ROE) for countries with 
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weak shareholder protection. Moreover, for countries with strong shareholder 
protection, accrual accounting does not negatively affect the value relevance of 
earnings. 
 
3.2.2.6 Timeliness 
Timeliness of earnings is often regarded as one of the characteristics of high quality 
financial reporting. According to Abdullah (2006) timelier reporting is associated 
with higher accounting quality as users are able to use the information for such 
purpose as valuation and evaluation. More timely information (including earnings) is 
more relevant and thus more useful for financial statements users. Based on this idea, 
a number of studies use timeliness as one of the qualities of desirable earnings. In 
Francis et al. (2004), which examines the association between cost of equity and 
earnings quality, the quality of earnings is represented by seven different attributes 
including timeliness.  
 
A number of studies have examined factors associated with the timeliness of 
earnings. Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004) examine the relationship between 
governance mechanisms and three different proxies for earnings timeliness. They find 
evidence of a positive association between timeliness and the proportion of outside 
board members. Abdullah (2006) study the roles of the composition of board of 
directors, audit committee and the separation of the roles of the board chairman and 
the chief executive officer on the timeliness of reporting in Malaysia. Abdullah 
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(2006) found that board independence and the separation of the roles of board 
chairman and CEO significantly are associated with timelier reporting. The study also 
shows that the 1997 financial crisis had adversely affected the timeliness of reporting, 
implying that that during difficult periods, companies tend to take a longer time to 
prepare their audited financial reports. 
 
In Beekes, Pope and Young (2004), timeliness is defined as the length of time taken 
to reflects information in earnings. Similarly, Raonic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos 
(2004, p. 120) state that: 
Reported earnings may be considered to be timely when they fully 
reflect the information that has been incorporated by the market in 
its pricing of a firm‟s equity. Earnings are less timely if value 
changes that are recognised by the market in the present period are 
not incorporated in the accounting computations until sometime in 
the future. 
 
3.2.3 The Importance of High Quality Earnings 
Using different approaches to defining earnings quality, the extant literature 
emphasises that the quality of earnings is very important to users of financial 
information as well as to practitioners, regulators and accounting researchers. This is 
because reported earnings are considered to be the premier information in financial 
statements. According to Salvato and Moores (2010), high quality accounting 
information on attributes such as earnings is essential for firms to access equity and 
debt markets. The informative function of earnings means that it is often used as a 
basis to describe the financial performance of a firm. For example, the earnings 
numbers and various ratios or metrics derived from it are widely used in 
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compensation agreements and debt agreements (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
Earnings are also used by analysts to evaluate firms‟ previous and current 
performance and forecast firms‟ future ability to create additional wealth to 
shareholders.  
 
According to Schipper and Vincent (2003), the importance of earning quality can be 
explained from at least two perspectives, the contracting perspective and investment 
perspective. From the contracting perspective, low quality of earnings may result in 
unintentional wealth transfers. For instance, firms that rewards managers based on 
earnings may overcompensate the managers if earnings are overstated. From an 
investing perspective, poor quality of earnings is problematic as it can mislead 
investors, resulting in misallocation of resources (Myers et al., 2003; Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003). High earnings quality would also increase the attractiveness of stocks 
to outside investors and increase market liquidity (Young and Guenther, 2003),  
lower cost of debt (Salvato and Moores, 2010), reduce cost of capital (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Salvato and Moores, 2010), and promote more efficient capital 
allocation (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2011). 
Thus, it is very important for the reported earnings to be high in quality.  
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3.3 Prior Studies on Family Firms 
Family firms
13
 have received little attention in the academic literature as their 
predominance seems to be limited to developing countries and privately owned firms 
(Praet, 2007). Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) state that family businesses are the 
main form of organisation during the early stage of a country‟s economic 
development, and their importance diminishes as the capital market develops. Thus, 
family firms are seen to be more dominant in developing countries and emerging 
markets like East Asia. An examination of 2680 companies in East Asia countries by 
Claessens et al. (2000) reveals that at 20% cut off level, the majority of the companies 
in five out of the nine countries surveyed are family controlled. Specifically, they 
found that 71.5% of publicly traded companies in Indonesia are under family control, 
followed by Malaysia (67.2%), Hong Kong (66.7%), Thailand (61.6%) and 
Singapore (55.4%). Consistent with Claessens et al. (2000), other studies also shows 
that the majority of the publicly listed firms in Indonesia (Siregar and Utama, 2008), 
Malaysia (Tam and Tan, 2007), Hong Kong (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Jaggi et al., 
2009; Mok and Lam, 1992), Thailand (Suehiro and Wailerdsak, 2004), Singapore 
(Yeung and Soh, 2000) are controlled by families.  
 
While limited research into family firms in developed markets has shown that 
families own substantial stakes even in the most developed stock markets. In a cross-
country study of ownership structure in 13 Western European countries, Faccio and 
                                               
13Previous studies mainly defined family firms based on the percentage of shares owned by family 
members and/or the existence of family members who are directors. The definitions of family firms 
employed in previous studies are illustrated in Appendix 2. 
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Lang (2002) reported that the majority of the publicly listed firms in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain are family firms. A study by La 
Porta et al. (1999), that investigates the ownership structure of the publicly traded 
firms in the 27 wealthiest countries with more than $500 million market 
capitalisation, find that, on average, 30% of firms in their large firms sample and 45% 
of firms in their medium-size sample, based on a 20% cut-off level, are family 
controlled. Specifically, they reveal that in the UK (and the US), 40% (60%) and 10% 
(30%) of firms in the medium-size sample are family firms based on 20% (10%) cut-
offs, respectively. Research on large public firms in the US also indicates that 
founding families have substantial stakes and are represented on the board of 
directors. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) document that about one-third of 
the S&P 500 companies are controlled by founding families and account for 18 
percent of the outstanding equity, while Shleifer and Vishny (1986) report that in a 
sample of 456 of the Fortune500 firms, 149 firms (32%) have large shareholders and 
with families represented on the board.  
 
Studies on family firms are based mainly on two theories. The first theory views 
family firms as a source of comparative advantage that allows the firms to have 
superior economic outcomes over nonfamily counterparts (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2006). The capability of family firms to gain an advantage compared to nonfamily 
firms is due to the special characteristics and values that they possess (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2010). The second theory is concerned with family firms having „private 
benefits of control‟. Based on this theory, the efficiency of family firms is limited 
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only to family investors. With the strong control over firms management, the family 
could seek to maximise value only for the family by exploiting nonfamily investors 
(Burkart et al., 2003). Managerial decisions in family firms in favour of family 
members could be at the expense of other shareholders‟ wealth (Villalonga and Amit, 
2010).  
 
With reference to previous studies, the following subsections, Section 3.3.1 and 
Section 3.3.2, discuss the special qualities of family firms and disadvantages of 
family firms, respectively. Section 3.3.3, reviews empirical studies on the quality of 
earnings in family firms. 
 
3.3.1 The Special Qualities of Family Firms 
It is often contended that family firms have special characteristics that provide them 
with advantages over diffusedly owned firms (Lee, 2006). Many empirical studies on 
family firms provide evidence that family firms are associated with better corporate 
performance (e.g. Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud, and Kurashina, 2008; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003a; Andres, 2008; Lee, 2006), higher growth (Lee, 2006) and greater 
market value (McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko, 2001; McConaughy, Walker, 
Henderson Jr, and Mishra, 1998; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Anderson and Reeb 
(2003a) explain that this could be due to the reason that the family understands the 
business better, and the family members that are involved in management view 
themselves as stewards of the firm. Similarly, McConaughy et al. (1998) and 
McConaughy et al. (2001) suggest that family relationships improve monitoring that 
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is associated with better firm performance. Other than having lower monitoring costs, 
Davis (1983) highlights that family values such as humanity, trust and altruism, 
concern over long-term performance (and existence) of the business and greater 
commitment to quality are among factors that contribute towards higher performance 
of family firms. 
 
3.3.1.1 Altruism in Family Firms 
Family firms are special as they are based on altruism, a trait that positively links the 
welfare of an individual to the welfare of others (Becker, 1981; Bergstrom, 1989). 
According to Schulze et al. (2003), altruism provides powerful and self-reinforcing 
incentives since efforts to maximise one own‟s benefit would results in satisfying 
both altruistic (other-regarding) and egoistic (self-regarding) preferences. For 
example, a parent‟s welfare is linked to the welfare of their children, and thus any 
increase in the parent‟s or children‟s wealth would be preferred by both parents and 
children. Likewise,  Becker (1981) claims that parents are generous and charitable to 
their children not only because they love them but also because their own welfare 
would be negatively affected if they acted in any other way. Schulze et al. (2003), 
Simon (1993) and Eshel et al. (1998) note that altruism demands parents care for their 
children. Altruism encourages family members to be kind, thoughtful and considerate 
of one another. It creates and sustains family bonds and fosters family members‟ 
loyalty and commitment to the family and to its prosperity (Ward, 1987).  
 
Stark and Falk (1998) indicate that altruism ensures that family members who work 
in the family firm believe that they are the firm‟s owners who have a residual claim 
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on the family‟s estate. The sense of ownership aligns the interests among family 
agents and lowers the cost of reaching, monitoring, and enforcing agreements. 
Altruism would also lead to more effective communication and cooperation within 
the family firm and increase the use of informal agreements (Daily and Dollinger, 
1992). The sharing of knowledge among family members and effective 
communication suggests that information asymmetries among family members would 
be very low, thus decisions made by family managers are based on adequate and 
reliable information.  
 
3.3.1.2 Long-term Horizon of Family Firms 
Extant literature on family firms also suggests that family owners and managers tend 
to have a long-term orientation (Allouche et al., 2008; Martínez, Stöhr, and Quiroga, 
2007). This is because family firms are concerned with preserving the family 
inheritance and its transmission to following generations (Casson, 1999). The long-
term orientation of family firms engenders organisational qualities that are hard for 
other firms to replicate (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006); and leads to the 
implementation of optimal long-term investment policy (James, 1999). With longer 
investment horizons, family managers suffer less managerial myopia and postpone 
uncertain short terms earnings so as to harvest long-term profits (Stein, 1989). Family 
firms also have the potential to perform better as family managers tend to see further 
ahead than managers in nonfamily firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). 
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The long-term nature of a family firm could also strengthen its relationship with the 
stakeholders, through concerns over the firm‟s good name and reputation. According 
to Andres (2008), in family firms, knowledge and experience are usually passed on to 
descendents to allow them to continue building up trust with employees and develop 
long-term relationships with suppliers, customers and other external stakeholders. 
Anderson et al. (2003) suggest that the importance of reputation and long-term 
orientation allows family firms to enjoy relatively lower cost of debt financing 
compared to non-family firms. They explain that due to the long-term family 
commitment, bondholders regard family firms as an organisational structure that 
decreases the conflicts between shareholders and themselves and consequently better 
protects their interests. 
 
Martinez et al. (2007) claim that the longer investment perspective in family firms 
results in the firms‟ longevity. According to Tapies and Fernandez (2010), longevity 
of family firms is not only the consequence of long term vision, or the end of process, 
it is an asset that strengthens the family firm‟s image, reputation and credibility. 
Longevity positively affects the family in business, through pride in belonging, pride 
in the family commitment to its workers and to the business. It creates an emotional 
link beyond the merely economic ties, strengthens employees‟ commitment, 
generates confidence in projects and in people who manage it, and opens the 
possibility of even more longevity. The longevity of family firms is also related to the 
incorporation of family values into their corporate culture. A study by Koiranen 
(2002) explores the corporate values of two family firms in Finland that are over 100 
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years old and still entrepreneurially active in business. He finds the top values in 
these firms that contribute towards their century-old business performance are 
honesty, credibility, obeying the law, commitment to quality and hard work. 
 
3.3.1.3 Lower Monitoring Costs in Family Firms 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) indicate that family firms would be more efficient than 
firms with dispersed ownership because of lower monitoring costs. According to 
Schulze et al. (2001), there are at least three reasons why family firms incur 
significantly lower agency costs compared to other firms. First, owner management 
in family firms naturally aligns the owners‟ and managers‟ interests relating to 
growth opportunities and risks. The alignment reduces their incentive to be 
opportunistic, sparing firms the need to maintain "costly mechanisms for separating 
the management and control of decisions" (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p. 332). Second, 
in family firms, property rights are largely restricted to „internal decision agents‟ 
whose personal involvement assures that managers will not expropriate shareholder 
wealth through perquisites consumption and  misallocation of resources (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a, p. 332). Finally, in family firms, shares are held by family members, 
who have special relations with the managers and thus have an advantage in 
monitoring and disciplining the managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p. 306). 
 
Andres (2008) notes that large investors such as family shareholders have the 
incentive and power to decrease agency costs. Unlike small shareholders, large 
shareholders have a big enough stake that encourages them to spend private resources 
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to monitor management. Further, it is much easier for large shareholders to 
coordinate their actions and put pressure on managers since voting power is not 
divided into highly segmented group of investors (Andres, 2008, p. 432). In family 
firms, incentives to monitor managerial actions are particularly strong since families 
usually have invested most of their private wealth in the company and are not well-
diversified. Family shareholders also have an advantage in monitoring as their long-
term presence in the firm provides the relevant firm-specific and market knowledge. 
A family‟s special technical knowledge concerning a firm‟s operations may put it in a 
better position to monitor the firm more effectively (Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 
2006). 
 
Family firms are also likely to have lower agency costs of debt. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Anderson et al. (2003) explain that diversified shareholders have an 
incentive to take on risky projects by jeopardising the wealth of bondholders. On the 
other hand, family members have a basically different risk profile. Due to their 
undiversified shareholding, long-term orientation and concern for reputation, family 
shareholders are not only concerned with maximising the value of the equity, but are 
more likely to maximise the overall value of the company. As a result, the agency 
costs of debt are more likely to be lower in family firms.  
 
3.3.2 Disadvantages of Family Firms 
There are also a range of studies that argue that family ownership and control could 
be detrimental to a firm (Martínez et al., 2007). The characteristics of family 
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shareholdings: undiversified and concentrated, favoring of family managers, and the 
possibility of exploiting of minority shareholders, are among the factors claimed to 
have negative effects on the performance of family firms. The following subsections 
explain the disadvantages of family firms widely discussed in the literature. 
 
3.3.2.1 Divergence of Interests between Family and Minority Owners 
The concentrated shareholdings in family firms could be detrimental to minority 
shareholders. This is because large shareholders usually promote their own interests 
and not those of other shareholders (Andres, 2008). Family owners may use their 
control rights in order to maximise their own utility, which might come at the 
expense of other shareholders. As their investments are undiversified, family owners 
may not be pursuing the same objectives as the minority owners. While minority 
owners aim to maximise profits and enhance shareholders wealth, family owners may 
have greater preference for strategies that promote firm growth, technological 
innovation and firm survival (Martínez et al., 2007).  
 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), large, undiversified shareholders, like 
families, are costly to firms due to their risk avoidance or aversion. The founding 
family may unduly reduce the firm‟s risk through corporate diversification. For 
example, to reduce risk, founding families may influence the firm‟s investment 
decisions by pursuing projects with imperfectly correlated cash flows relative to 
existing projects (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b). Families may also reduce the risk of 
default by placing greater reliance on equity financing or, conversely, less than 
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optimal use of leverage in the firm‟s capital structure (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b). 
The avoidance of or aversion of risk by family managers would impose costs on 
minority shareholders, whose investments are already diversified.  
 
3.3.2.2 The Hiring of Family Managers 
Family firms tend to hire family members to fill management positions, to maintain 
control over the company‟s decisions. This could potentially reduced firm‟s 
competitive advantage as managerial positions are usually reserved for family 
members, even when they are not necessarily the most competent managers. Andres 
(2008) claims that a founder might derive pleasure from seeing his offspring run the 
company he established. Families also tend to hand over executive positions to family 
members and thereby restrict the labor pool to a very small group (Andres, 2008). 
Using Canadian data, Morck et al. (2000) argue that entrepreneurial spirit and 
expertise are only partly inherited. Supporting the argument, they conclude that 
descendants gradually regress towards average talent and affect firm performance 
negatively. In Spain, Gomez- Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) find that 
family firms suffer higher agency costs because the family is unwilling to fire 
managers who are members of that family. Moreover, family managers may be 
treated more leniently when they free-ride or shirk (Schulze et al., 2003). 
 
3.3.2.3 Expropriation of Minority Interests 
Due to their concentrated ownership, controlling families also have the power and 
incentive to extract private benefits from the firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The expropriation of the firm‟s wealth usually occurs 
through excessive compensation, tunneling of assets, related party transactions, 
special dividends and transfer pricing. In a case study of a large US firm, DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (2000) demonstrate how the controlling family reduced dividends to 
minority shareholders while paying itself a special dividend. Excessive compensation 
also occurs through salaries, bonuses and other perquisites for family managers. 
Bhaumik and Gregoriou (2010) explain that in family firms, asset tunneling typically 
involves the transfer of a firm‟s assets to companies fully owned by the families.  For 
example, in Italy, the Tanzi family tunneled out about USD 3 billion from the 
Parmalat group into other companies that were directly owned by the family 
(Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010).   
 
In China, Jian (2003) found that firms with controlling shareholders are more likely 
to be involved in related party transactions especially when they have incentives to 
inflate earnings to avoid being delisted or prior to issuing new equity. Further, 
controlling families might utilise transfer pricing to shift income to another firm that 
is fully owned by them, at the expense of the minority shareholders (Ibrahim and 
Samad, 2010). According to Faccio et al. (2001), the expropriation of wealth by 
controlling families is usually present in weak financial markets, as the interests of 
minority shareholders are poorly protected by such legal systems. 
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3.3.3 Family Firms and Earnings Quality Studies 
The question of whether or not family firms have higher earnings quality is ultimately 
an empirical issue. In addressing the possible associations between the two, existing 
studies have advanced two alternative arguments. The first argument is based on the 
„alignment‟ hypothesis, which predicts that family firms are positively associated 
with earnings quality.  The controlling family‟s interests is in the long-term success 
of the firm, its concerns over the family and firm‟s reputation and ability to better 
monitor managers leads to higher quality of accounting, planning and auditing 
choices (Salvato and Moores, 2010). The second argument is based on the 
„entrenchment‟ hypothesis, which posits that family firms are related to lower quality 
earnings.  This is due to the controlling family‟s attempts to mislead other 
stakeholders about the firm‟s actual financial performance. Family firms may also 
have the tendency to conceal the extent of wealth expropriation by the founding or 
controlling families, thus resulting in low quality of accounting, planning and 
auditing (Salvato and Moores, 2010). 
 
The existing studies on earnings quality and family firms yield mixed evidence
14
. 
According to Salvato and Moores (2010), most of the supporting evidence for the 
alignment hypothesis is documented in studies from countries where ownership 
concentration is low such as in the US (e.g. Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan, 2007; 
Chen, Chen, and Cheng, 2008; Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2009; Wang, 2006). On the other 
hand, evidence supporting the entrenchment hypothesis is usually reported in studies 
                                               
14 A summary of research examining firms‟ ownership (including family) and earnings quality is 
provided in Appendix 3. 
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conducted in countries with high ownership concentration or weak legal system (e.g. 
Choi, Park, and Yoo, 2007; Machuga and Teitel, 2009). However, some of the recent 
studies show that even in an environment where ownership concentration is high, 
family firms possess higher quality of earnings compared to nonfamily firms 
(e.g.Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, and Sansone, 2010; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 
2011; Yang, 2010).  
 
Using data from the S&P500 companies in the US, Wang (2006) finds that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between founding family firms and earnings 
quality. Specifically, the study provides consistent evidence that higher founding 
family ownership is associated with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings 
informativeness and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. Wang 
(2006) concludes that founding family firms are less likely to manage earnings due to 
fact that founding families have a long-term business horizon, high stake in the firm 
and great concern for the firm‟s and family‟s reputation.  
 
Similar to Wang (2006), Ali et al.‟s (2007)  examination of S&P500 companies also 
reveals that family firms have better quality of earnings compared to nonfamily firms 
in terms of lower positive discretionary accruals, greater ability of earnings 
components to predict cash flows, and larger earnings response coefficients (Ali et 
al., 2007). Based on the results, Ali et al. (2007) conclude that the difference in 
agency costs across family and non-family firms due to Type I agency problems 
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dominates the difference in agency costs across family and non-family firms due to 
Type II agency problems. 
 
A similar recent study using S&P 500 companies by Jiraporn and Dadalt (2009) 
confirms the Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) findings that family firms are less 
likely to manage earnings than nonfamily firms. Jiraporn and Dadalt (2009) show that 
the level of abnormal accruals is approximately a third lower for family controlled 
firms than for their nonfamily counterparts. 
 
Consistent with the studies in the United States, Sánchez et al. (2007) document that 
the quality of earnings is higher in family firms compared to non-family firms in 
Spain. Specifically, their results show that family firms have lower discretionary 
accruals and greater predictability of future cash flows. This supports the argument 
that family firms are considered by the family to be an asset to be passed to the heirs. 
Sanchez et al. (2007) conclude that the positive impact of family control on earnings 
quality persists even in a context where a few shareholders have a high proportion of 
the voting rights. 
 
In Korea, Jung and Kwon (2002) examine the dominant role of the owner-largest 
shareholders, which are typically a founder or his immediate family. The study found 
a positive relationship between the owner-largest shareholders and earnings 
informativeness, supporting the convergence of interest and alignment hypothesis. 
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In Italy, Cascino et al. (2010) found that accounting quality is systematically related 
to the family firm status being different across family and nonfamily firms. Their 
results indicate that family firms convey financial information of higher quality than 
that provide by their nonfamily peers. Specifically, family firms show higher quality 
of accruals, more persistent, predictable, smoother and value-relevant and timely 
earnings, relative to nonfamily firms. Cascino et al.‟s (2010) result is consistent with 
an earlier examination by Prencipe, Markarian and Pozza (2008) on the income 
smoothing incentives of family firms in Italy. Focusing on R&D costs capitalisation, 
Prencipe et al. (2008) show that family firms have less incentive to smooth income as 
they are less sensitive than nonfamily firms to the short term fluctuations of the 
market. The result supports the argument that the main goal of family firms is to 
ensure the long-term survival of the firm rather than to maximise short-term 
shareholders wealth. 
 
An examination of firms‟ voluntary disclosure in the United States reveals consistent 
findings. Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008) find that family-controlled firms are more 
likely to issue bad news earnings warnings relative to nonfamily firms. The higher 
likelihood of bad earnings warnings are consistent with family owners being more 
concerned with the litigation-related and reputation costs of withholding bad news.  
 
In the same vein, Claessens et al. (2002) investigate the effect of large shareholdings 
on firm value in eight East Asian economies and find that concentrated ownership in 
the hands of family controlled firms is associated with a higher market-to-book ratio. 
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However, they also find that the wedge between control and ownership is associated 
with value discounts for family-controlled firms. The wedge between control and 
ownership in family firms allows the family managers to divert benefits to 
themselves, thus resulting in lower firm value (Claessens et al., 2002). This finding 
suggest that in so far as the controlling family has equal degrees of ownership and 
control, family firms are associated with higher firm valuation. Nevertheless, firm 
value decreases when there is a wedge, which is the difference between ownership 
(cash flow rights) and control (voting rights).  
 
A recent study on family firms and earnings management of companies listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange provides mixed findings. Yang (2010) suggests that the level 
of insider ownership and appointment of a family CEO plays an important role in 
family firms (Yang, 2010). Specifically, the study finds that in family firms, the 
higher the level of shares owned by insiders such as top officers, nonexecutive 
directors and large shareholders; the greater the extent of earnings management. The 
result that greater insider ownership is associated with low earnings quality supports 
the entrenchment effect argument. On the other hand, Yang (2010) also documents 
that the family CEOs have a lower tendency to manage earnings relative to nonfamily 
CEOs, suggesting that the involvement of family members as the CEO in family 
firms reduces earnings management and enhanced monitoring. The results indicate a 
possibility that the involvement of family firms in earnings management practices 
might not be due to the influence of the controlling family. The level of shares of the 
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insiders including the managers and nonexecutive directors could be the contributing 
factor to the entrenchment effect found in the study. 
 
Evidence of the family entrenchment effect is documented in Machuga and Teitel 
(2009) and Choi, Park and Yoo (2007). Using a sample of 34 Mexican Bolso firms, 
Machuga and Teitel (2009) report that firms, which do not have concentrated family 
ownership, have greater increases in earnings quality in terms of lesser income 
smoothing, more timely loss recognition and lower conditional accruals. They claim 
that their results support the theory that the interactions between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the external market and legal environment cause family 
ownership to be associated with lower quality earnings. Similarly, using a sample 
from Korea, Choi et al. (2007) found that firms with „chaebol‟ or family control in 
the board of directors report significantly lower performance. Choi et al. (2007) state 
that even though family founders provide the initial entrepreneurial contribution, 
keeping firms ownership and management in the hand of a family creates more costs 
than benefits.  
 
A related study by Zhao and Millet-Ryes (2007) that investigates how family and 
bank ownership affect the accounting information content of French firms finds that 
in family firms the value relevance of book value is higher than the value relevance of 
earnings. They suggest that their finding is attributed to the lack of incentive to report 
timely and relevant earnings to minority investors in family firms. Additionally, the 
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study also finds that markets perceive family-controlled firms as more likely to have 
increased agency costs when using long-term debt. 
 
To date, there are only a few studies that examine the association between family 
firms and the quality of financial reporting in Malaysia. Studies by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find that family firms disclose less 
voluntary information and are less transparent than nonfamily firms. Specifically, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a significant negative association between the 
proportion of family members on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosures by 
Malaysian companies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) justify the negative association 
between the proportion of family members and the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
their study as being due to the fact that there is less demand for published information 
in family firms as the majority of the owners have easy access to internal information.  
 
Haniffa and Cooke‟s (2002) study was extended by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) to 
include the period after the 1997 financial crisis. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
suggest that family owned companies tend to preserve tradition inherited from the 
past and have resisted changing their attitude towards greater voluntary disclosure, 
even after the corporate governance reforms. A study by Wan-Hussin (2009) takes a 
contrary view and reports that companies with a higher proportion of family members 
on the board are more inclined to disclose all the required items for the primary basis 
of segment reporting. The study concludes that the alignment effect of family firms 
leads to high corporate transparency.  
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The alignment effect of family firms is also evidenced in the Saw-Imm, Ali and 
Pillay (2006) study that examines the relationship between ownership identity of the 
largest shareholders, premiums paid and take-over performance in Malaysia. With 
reference to 63 large acquisitions by Malaysian public listed firms from 1990 to 1999, 
they find that the premiums paid are much higher than those in developed countries 
and have a curvilinear relationship with take-over performance. Lower to moderate 
levels of premiums improve firms‟ post-take-over performance, while excessive 
premiums drag down the performance of the bidding firms. Their findings also show 
that there is an interaction effect between family ownership and premiums paid which 
contributes positively to the post-take-over performance, suggesting that family 
ownership mitigates agency problems in corporate take-overs. 
 
A related study of family firms in Malaysia, by Chu and Cheah (2006) finds that 
family controlled firms are less efficient, in terms of lower ROA as compared to 
foreign owned firms. However, even though family controlled firms show up poorly 
in terms of ROA, their performance is significantly better in terms of the PE ratio. 
Family firms suffered less from the adverse impacts of the 1997 economic crisis 
compared to other structures, including conglomerate and state controlled firms. 
Relative to other structures, family controlled firms are also found to have 
significantly stronger sales expansion after the financial crisis period. The study 
concludes that, in principle, family controlled firms still maintain the passion of 
entrepreneurship, which focuses on firm‟s expansion, as well as maximisation of 
shareholder value. 
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A review of literature on earnings management in family firms by Bhaumik and 
Gregoriou (2010) finds that while the literature on the various aspects of family 
control is rich, empirical studies are relatively few. They suggest that future studies 
should undertake empirical examination of issues relating to family firms, especially 
those concerning the impact of agency conflicts and institutional implications. As 
little is known about the effect of family influence on the quality of earnings 
especially in a weak institutional environment like Malaysia, further investigation is 
warranted. 
 
3.4 Prior Studies of Corporate Governance 
3.4.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
The importance of corporate governance to ensuring effective monitoring has been 
widely discussed in the prior literature. However, the literature provides no common 
definition of what corporate governance is. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain that 
corporate governance is a set of instruments that should be in place to guarantee the 
maximum rate of return on investments of the shareholders and creditors of a 
company. Similarly, John and Senbet (1998) state that corporate governance 
encompasses the set of mechanisms that protect shareholders interests and by which 
shareholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and 
management. According to Labelle, Gargouri and Francoeur (2010) corporate 
governance is the set of principles or rules aimed at improving the accuracy and 
reliability of financial statements to ensure protection of investors. Also based on the 
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agency perspective, a narrower definition is provided by Mitton (2002), who define 
corporate governance as the means by which minority shareholders are protected 
from expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders. Corporate governance 
acts as a set of controls that govern the behavior of managers, define their 
discretionary powers, and serve to offset potential losses due to the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers (Bozec and Bozec, 2007). 
 
Another group of studies define corporate governance in terms of the connection 
between the stakeholders. Monks (1994) states that corporate governance is the 
relationship between the various participants who determine the direction and 
performance of corporations. According to Tricker (1994), corporate governance 
helps address the issue facing the boards of directors, including the interaction with 
top management, and relationship with the owners and others interested in the affairs 
of the company, such as creditors, debt financiers, analysts, auditors and corporate 
regulators.  
 
Corporate governance is also defined as a monitoring process or system. For instance, 
Demb and Neubauer (1992) define corporate governance as the process by which 
corporations are made responsive to the rights of stakeholders. Cheung and Chan 
(2004) define corporate governance as the system through which the behavior of a 
company is monitored and controlled. They explain that corporate governance is 
significant especially in the large corporations of modern economies, which are 
typically characterised by separation between the parties who provide the capital and 
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the parties who manage the resources. Corporate governance could minimise the 
conflict of interest among the two sets of parties and ensure that the company 
management is properly monitored (Cheung and Chan, 2004).  
 
The Cadbury Report (1992, para 2.5) states that “corporate governance is the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled”. The report explains that the board 
of directors and auditors are appointed by the shareholders to ensure that appropriate 
governance is in place. The board is thus responsible to supervise the management of 
the business and report to shareholders on their stewardship (Cadbury, 1992). 
Similarly, the OECD (2004) describes corporate governance as a set of relationships 
between a company‟s board of directors and stakeholders. The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004, p. 11) states that: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company‟s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that 
are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should 
facilitate effective monitoring. 
 
In Malaysia, the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (2000, p. 52) defines 
corporate governance as: 
…the process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity 
and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realising 
long term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests 
of other stakeholders. 
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Although the definition of corporate governance in the literature varies, it is basically 
concerned with both the internal controls and board structure, and external aspects 
including the relationship with shareholders and stakeholders (Rahman, 2006). 
 
3.4.2 Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality 
There are numerous studies on earnings quality and corporate governance in the 
academic journals (e.g. Chang and Sun, 2009; García Lara, García Osma, and 
Penalva, 2007; Machuga and Teitel, 2007, 2009). These studies have, at least in part, 
been motivated by the economic crises and unexpected business failures that occurred 
world-wide (Chia, Lapsley, and Lee, 2007; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 
2004; Habib and Azim, 2008; Hermanns, 2006; Rahman, 2006). Such studies become 
more relevant as business communities become more concerned about the importance 
of having sufficiently robust corporate governance to ensure high quality of corporate 
financial reports. A summary of studies on corporate governance and earnings quality 
is provided in Appendix 4. 
 
Extant studies document that low quality of earnings is systematically related to 
weaknesses in the oversight of management. Specifically, the studies show that firms 
that report high quality earnings are more likely to have higher quality external 
auditors (Chia et al., 2007; Teitel and Machuga, 2010), more likely to have an audit 
committee (Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996), more 
likely to have a larger audit committee (Lin, Li, and Yang, 2006; Yang and Krishnan, 
2005), more likely to have a more independent audit committee (Abbott, Parker, and 
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Peters, 2004; Bradbury, Mak, and Tan, 2006; Chang and Sun, 2009; Davidson, 
Goodwin-Stewart, and Kent, 2005; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003), more likely to have 
greater audit committee financial expertise (Bédard et al., 2004; Archambeault and 
DeZoort, 2001; Raghunandan et al., 2001; Raghunandan and Read, 2001; Krishnan, 
2005), more likely to have smaller board (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; 
Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Vafeas, 2000; Yermack, 1996), less likely to have a CEO 
who also serves as chairman of the board (Chang and Sun, 2009; Chau and Gray, 
2010), more likely to have higher proportion of outside independent directors (Chau 
and Gray, 2010; Jaggi and Tsui, 2007; Petra, 2007) and more likely to have higher 
proportion of non-executive directors (Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell, Pope, and 
Young, 2005; Xie et al., 2003).  
 
Bédard, Chroutou and Courteau (2004) study the effect of a firm‟s corporate 
governance practices on earnings quality, in terms of the extent of earnings 
management. Specifically, the empirical study examines whether the expertise, 
independence and activities of a firm‟s audit committee is associated with the quality 
of its publicly released financial information. The study concluded that the quality of 
earnings is positively associated with audit committee members‟ financial and 
governance expertise, the independence of the audit committee members, and the 
presence of a clear mandate defining the responsibilities of the committee.  
 
García Lara et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between board of directors 
characteristics and conditional accounting conservatism. According to García Lara et 
al. (2007) strong corporate governance promotes efficient monitoring by the board of 
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directors, that results in higher financial statement transparency; lower accounting 
manipulation, particularly in terms of lower income-increasing earnings management; 
constraints on the ability of managers to conceal bad news for a long period of time; 
and greater independence of committees such as the audit and remuneration 
committees to monitor management. Their evidence shows that for firms where the 
CEO has a low level of influence over the functioning of the board of directors have a 
greater degree of accounting conservatism. They conclude that even in an 
institutional setting with low litigation risk such as Spain, firms with strong boards 
use conservative accounting numbers as a governance tool to protect shareholders 
interests.  
 
Another study by Machuga and Teitel (2009) focuses on the association between 
earnings quality and three board characteristics, which are the board composition 
disclosure, family concentrated ownership and „shared-directors‟, who have more 
than one directorship. The study finds that firms that do not have concentrated family 
ownership or shared-directors have higher earnings quality than firms that have 
concentrated family ownership or shared-directors. Based on their findings, Machuga 
and Teitel (2009) highlight the importance of considering cultural and legal 
environments when assessing the impact of board-level corporate governance reforms 
on earnings quality, as the environment may limit the expected result. 
 
Given that the institutional setting could have some impact on the earnings quality 
corporate governance relationship, another strand of studies includes institutional 
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variables such as the introduction of a code of corporate governance or new 
regulations. For example, Machuga and Teitel (2007) investigate whether the 
introduction of the code of corporate governance improves the earnings quality of 
firms in Mexico. Using three earnings quality characteristics, viz, income smoothing, 
timeliness of earnings, and abnormal accruals, Machuga and Teitel (2007) find that 
firms that are listed exclusively on the Mexican stock exchange show all three forms 
of improvement in earnings quality after the implementation of the code. However, 
Mexican firms listed on the U.S. stock exchange only show improvements in terms of 
lower income smoothing and more timely loss recognition. The study concludes that 
different reporting requirements and incentives faced by the firms influence the effect 
of the Mexican Code of Corporate Governance on firms‟ earnings quality. Firms that 
are cross-listed on the U.S. stock exchange prepare their financial statements under 
better reporting standards and are under higher regulatory and investor scrutiny than 
do firms that do not cross-list in the U.S. The improvement in corporate governance 
does not have as much impact on the cross-listed firms as they already have higher 
earnings quality compared to other firms during the pre-code period. 
 
Based on a similar notion of the role of the institutional environment, Chang and Sun 
(2009) examine whether the provisions of SOX improve the effectiveness of 
corporate-governance in monitoring the earnings quality of cross-listed foreign firms. 
They hypothesise that SOX improves the effectiveness of corporate governance 
monitoring functions due to greater oversight on financial reporting practices. In 
addition, the passage of SOX creates great pressure on cross-listed foreign firms to 
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reshape their corporate-governance structures in order to maintain their listing status 
in the U.S. markets. Chang and Sun (2009) find that earnings informativeness 
(earnings management) is positively (negatively) associated with the aggregate 
corporate-governance score in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Therefore, Chang 
and Sun (2009) conclude that the SOX provisions and subsequent regulations have 
changed the market‟s perceptions of the role of corporate governance in monitoring 
the quality of accounting earnings. Furthermore, the effectiveness of firms' corporate 
governance in monitoring earnings management behavior improved after the 
implementation of SOX.  
 
In Malaysia, there are a number of studies that examine the association between 
corporate governance and the quality of earnings. However, the evidence is mixed. 
Saleh et al. (2005), who examined the effectiveness of some board characteristics for 
monitoring management behavior with respect to their incentives to manage earnings, 
find that earnings management is negatively related to management ownership, but 
positively related to the existence of CEO-Chairman duality. Their result also shows 
that directors that have multiple directorships are more likely to detect earnings 
management practices to avoid losses. The study also reports that the ratio of 
independent board members is not significantly related to earnings management in 
firms with CEO-Chairman duality. 
 
Rahman and Ali (2006) examine whether size and independence of the board of 
directors, audit committee and concentrated ownership are effective in reducing 
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earnings management among 97 firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia 
over the period 2002-2003. The study finds that earnings management is positively 
related to the size of the board of directors, supporting the view that larger boards are 
less effective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards. However, the study 
did not find any significant association between the independence of board or audit 
committee or concentrated ownership, and earnings management.  
 
Abdullah and Nasir (2004) investigate whether firm‟s internal corporate governance, 
namely the independence of the board of directors and the audit committee have the 
ability to constrain the management of discretionary accruals. Using data from the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) non-financial Main Board listed companies 
in 1998, they find that neither board independence nor the audit committee 
independence effectively are significantly associated with firm‟s accrual 
management. 
 
Another study by Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007) examines the effectiveness of 
some audit committee characteristics, that is, the independence of members, size of 
the committee, frequency of meeting, and knowledge of the members, to monitor 
management behavior with respect to their incentives to manage earnings. Saleh et al. 
(2007) find that the presence of a fully independent audit committee,  more 
knowledgeable audit committee members and more frequent audit committee 
meetings reduces earnings management practices.  
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Using data from Malaysia and Singapore, Bradbury, Mak and Tan (2006) report 
similar evidence relating to the association between audit committees independence 
and financial reporting quality. Specifically, the study finds that audit committee 
independence is related to higher quality accounting when the abnormal accruals are 
positive and when all members are independent directors. The study concludes that 
audit committees are effective in the financial reporting process by reducing the level 
of positive abnormal accruals.  
 
3.4.3 The Mediating Effect of Family Firms on the Corporate Governance-Earnings 
Quality Relationship 
Although the literature surrounding family firms, corporate governance and earnings 
quality is rich, empirical studies that examine the effect of family ownership or 
control on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality are 
still sparse. Among the few studies is an empirical examination by Jaggi and Leung 
(2007) on the impact of family dominance on monitoring of earnings management by 
audit committees. Using 523 observations of Hong Kong firms during the period 
1999-2000, the study examines whether the establishment of audit committees by 
Hong Kong firms would constrain earnings management, especially in firms with 
concentrated ownership and family-dominated corporate boards. The study shows 
that the existence of an audit committee is negatively associated with earnings 
management. The effectiveness of the audit committees is, however, significantly 
reduced when family members are present on corporate boards, especially when 
family members dominate the corporate board. Based on the results, Jaggi and Leung 
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(2007) conclude that audit committees can provide effective monitoring of earnings 
management even for firms that operate in the institutional environment where  
family ownership and control is high, the protection for investor rights is low and 
managers‟ motivation to manage earnings is high. Nevertheless, the appointment of 
family members on corporate boards reduces corporate board independence and thus 
the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees.  
 
Similar results are documented in Jaggi et al. (2009), who investigate whether there is 
an association between corporate board independence and earnings management in 
Hong Kong firms, and whether family control influences the association between 
board independence and earnings quality. Their findings shows that the independent 
corporate boards of Hong Kong firms provide effective monitoring of earnings 
management, suggesting that corporate board independence is important to ensure 
high-quality financial reporting in Hong Kong, in which the institutional environment 
differ from that of the US and UK firms. However, their findings also show that the 
monitoring effectiveness of corporate boards is moderated in family firms, through 
ownership concentration and the presence of family members on corporate boards. 
Thus, Jaggi et al. (2009) conclude that an increase in the proportion of outside 
directors to strengthen board monitoring is unlikely to be effective in family-
controlled firms. 
 
A recent study by Prencipe and Bar-Yosef (2011) examines the effectiveness of board 
independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. The 
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empirical analysis is based on a sample of Italian listed companies, which includes a 
relatively large proportion of family-controlled companies. The authors hypothesise 
that, due to the lower board member independence in family-controlled companies, 
the impact of the board on earnings management is weaker. This is because even if 
the board members are formally independent, they may have implicit ties to the 
controlling-family. Therefore, the board members may not effectively be 
independent. Also, when the CEO and the board chairman appointments are 
significantly influenced by the controlling-family, the extent of formal separation of 
between the CEO and the chairman may not be as clear as in non-family-controlled 
companies. Based on this argument, Prencipe and Bar-Yosef  (2011) estimate board 
independence using two parameters (i) proportion of independent directors on board, 
and (ii) lack of CEO/Board Chairman duality, with special attention paid to the case 
where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family. Their empirical results provide 
evidence that the impact of board independence on earnings management is weaker in 
family-controlled companies. The same result is found for lack of CEO/Board 
Chairman duality, when the CEO is a member of the controlling-family. 
 
A related study by Choi et al. (2007) reports a significant difference in the effect of 
governance mechanisms, the outside independent directors, on firm value between 
Chaebol vs. non-Chaebol firms in Korea. In general, they find that the results of the 
Chaebol sample are much weaker overall compared to the non-Chaebol sample. They 
suggests that Chaebols are so powerful in Korea that they could possibly dominate 
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and nullify the oversight and market discipline function of internal and external 
governance mechanisms. 
 
3.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter reviews prior studies that provide an understanding of earnings quality 
concepts, the special features of family firms, and corporate governance. It presents 
various definitions of earnings quality and discussed proxies used in empirical 
literature to measure earnings quality. Prior studies measure earnings quality by using 
time-series properties of earnings including earnings persistence, predictability, 
timeliness and volatility; relating accruals to future cash flows, associating earnings 
with stock market metrics such as stock prices and returns and assessing the level of 
discretionary accruals. The literature emphasises that the quality of earnings is very 
important as the earnings figure is widely used in many contractual agreements and 
investing decisions.  
 
Even though many agree that family firms are the most common form of business 
corporation around the world (Burkart et al., 2003), existing research on family firms 
is still limited. Extant studies on family firms are mainly supported by two agency 
theories, which are based on (1) the relationship between shareholders and managers, 
and (2) the relationship between the controlling family and minority shareholders. 
Studies on family firms are interesting due to the special issues related to family firms 
including altruism, long-term horizon, lower monitoring cost, divergence of interest 
between family and minority shareholders, hiring of family managers and 
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expropriation of minority interests. As prior studies provide evidence of the 
relationship between earnings quality and family firms is mainly based on developed 
countries, the current study focuses on earnings quality of family firms in an 
emerging country, where expropriation of minority interests could be more prevalent. 
 
A review of prior studies on the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings quality shows that the findings of prior studies are inconclusive. This could 
be due to factors such as differences in institutional environment and other influences 
that could affect the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms of companies 
in their sample. For instance, the discussion relating to corporate governance in 
family firms suggests a possibility that family influence through share ownership and 
control over the board of directors could affect the effectiveness of firms‟ corporate 
governance. While family influence could affect the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms in monitoring the quality of financial reports, its effect on 
the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality has not been 
extensively explored. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an overview of empirical studies on earnings quality, 
family firms and corporate governance. This chapter explains the theoretical 
framework; develops hypotheses predicting the relationships between earnings 
quality, family influence and corporate governance; and provides the research 
methodology of the study including the sample selection, measurement of variables, 
regression models and robustness analysis. 
 
This chapter has eleven main sections. Section 4.2 describes the theoretical 
framework of this study that relates earnings quality to family influence and corporate 
governance. Section 4.3 provides the argument underlying the development of each 
specific hypothesis. It is divided into three subsections based on the research 
objectives. The sample selection and data is described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 
discusses measurement of the dependent variable in this study, which is the earnings 
quality. The process of identifying the family and nonfamily firms used in the study 
is outlined in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 presents the measures for the seven corporate 
governance variables. The specification of the control variables included in the 
analysis is set out in Section 4.8. Section 4.9 sets out the regression models to tests 
the hypotheses. The sensitivity and robustness tests performed to ensure that the 
96 
results generated by the regressions are robust are set out in Section 4.10. Finally, 
Section 4.11 summarises this chapter. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework of the Empirical Study 
The three objectives of this study are to examine (1) the association between family 
firms and earnings quality, (2) the association between corporate governance and 
earnings quality, and (3) the influence of family firms on the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings quality. To achieve these objectives, this study 
uses the theoretical framework presented in Figure 4.1. The diagram shows all the 
variables investigated in the study.  
 
Firstly, the current study examines the association between family ownership and 
control and earnings quality. The relationship between family ownership and control 
and earnings quality can be explained by agency theory, which focuses on the 
separation of ownership and control in a firm. It is based on the idea that managers 
who are not owners will not watch over the affairs of a firm as diligently as the 
owners  (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004). The conflict of interests that results from 
the separation between owners and managers is called “principal-agent” problem by 
Ross (1973). According to Ross (1973), the principal-agent problem arises when the 
owners (principal) grant authority to the managers (agents) to act on their behalf. 
Basically, it is due to the divergence of interests and information asymmetry between 
the managers and owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), agency problems could be eliminated if both parties have the same 
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interests.  However, if agents and principals are different parties they might not have 
their interests aligned. The agents might have the incentive to maximise their own 
wealth at the expense of the principals. Moreover, the agents have the advantage of 
having more or better information than the principal does, the decision situation, or 
the consequences of actions (Ross, 1973). 
 
Similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest that agency problems that arise from the 
separation of ownership and control could be reduced if the residual claimants 
(shareholders) and the decision agents (managers) in a firm are the same. This is 
because, the interests of shareholders and managers are closely aligned. Thus, in 
firms where the ownership and control rest with the same group of people or 
individual, the need for monitoring by outside shareholders is reduced (McConaughy 
et al., 1998). This argument is relevant for family-owned firms because the majority 
of family firms are managed by the controlling family (Claessens et al., 2000). 
 
The agency problems between managers and shareholders could be lower in family 
firms. This is because in family firms, the family usually owns a significant portion of 
the firm‟s equity and often maintains control over the management. According to 
Habib (2005), in a firm with diffuse ownership structure and low level of a 
managerial shareholding, the managers might try to present the operating result of the 
firm in the most favourable manner possible in order to avoid shareholder unrest, or 
to lessen the probability of takeover attempts. In contrast, in a firm with more 
concentrated ownership, such as in family-owned firms, the managers do not need 
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earnings manipulation as a job-preserving strategy, because the owners possess 
control of the firm. Thus, less earnings manipulation, or higher earnings quality could 
be expected in family-owned firms, relative to firms with diffuse ownership structure. 
According to Chen, et al. (2008), concentrated ownership also reduces the attention 
toward stock market fluctuations in the short term and lowers market pressures 
caused by meeting or beating analyst forecasts. As the managers‟ incentives  to report 
accounting information that deviates from the underlying economic performance  is 
reduced, financial reporting quality of firms with concentrated ownership should 
therefore increase (Warfield, Wild, and Wild, 1995). 
 
However, it is also argued that agency conflicts in family firms do not lie between the 
owners and managers, but between the controlling family and minority shareholders. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) documented that when a firm has an entrenched 
dominant shareholder, there is the potential that agency conflicts with minority 
shareholders would arise. Family influence exists when family members owns a 
significant portion of the firm‟s equity and/or family members hold positions as 
directors on the firm‟s board. With the power to control the board and influence 
managerial decisions, the family has the potential to make decisions that are not in the 
best interests of the minority shareholders. This is labelled a Type II agency problem. 
In this case, the existence of family could lead to lower earnings quality.  
 
Secondly, the current study examines the relationship between earnings quality and 
various corporate governance variables, including size of the audit committee, audit 
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committee independence, audit committee meeting frequency, audit committee 
financial expertise, board independence, board size, and separation between CEO and 
chairman roles (duality). Corporate governance mechanisms evolve to resolve the 
agency conflicts between the owners and managers in a company (Beasley, 1996; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) note that strong corporate 
governance within a firm would mitigate the problem of information asymmetry and 
reduce agency costs through the alignment of interests between the managers and 
shareholders. Thus, higher earnings quality could be expected in firms with stronger 
corporate governance.  
 
Thirdly, the study examines the mitigating effect of the influence of family firms on 
the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality. Based on the 
argument presented in Section 4.3.3 below, it is expected that the presence of family 
influence would weaken the impact of corporate governance on earnings quality. The 
expected links between the three variables; family firms, corporate governance and 
earnings quality, as modelled in Figure 4.1 is the framework used to develop the 
hypotheses of this study.  
 
Control variables such as the quality of external auditors, firm growth, leverage, size, 
occurrence of loss, sales variability, capital intensity, operating cycle, variability of 
cash flows, intangible intensity and financial distress are also included in the analysis. 
These variables are included based on previous studies that show their impact on 
earnings quality. 
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Figure 4.1: Framework of the Study 
 
 
 
 
 
FAMILY FIRMS 
Family equity ownership 
Family control of board 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
Audit committee size (H2A) 
Audit committee independence (H2B) 
Audit committee meeting (H2C) 
Audit committee financial expertise (H2D) 
Board independence (H2E) 
Board size (H2F) 
Separation of CEO and chairman roles (H2G) 
 
EARNINGS QUALITY 
(H1) 
(H3) 
(H2) 
CONTROLS: 
Auditor Quality Capital Intensity  
Growth  Sales Variability  
Leverage  Operating Cycle 
Firm Size  Variability of Cash Flows 
Occurrence of Loss  Financial Distress 
Intangible Intensity  
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 4.3 Development of the Hypotheses 
This section presents related hypotheses developed to answer the question of whether 
earnings quality is associated with family firms and corporate governance, and 
whether family influence mitigates the relationship between earnings quality and 
corporate governance. In Section 4.3.1, the development of the hypothesis related to 
earnings quality and family firms is explained. The arguments and rationale for 
hypotheses relating to earnings quality and corporate governance are provided in 
section 4.3.2. In Section 4.3.3, the explanation for hypothesis relating to the 
mediating effect of family firms on the earnings quality-corporate governance 
relationship is presented. 
 
4.3.1 Earnings Quality and Family Firms 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest that firms owned by a family should be more 
efficient than firms with dispersed ownership due to lower monitoring costs. In firms 
with dispersed ownership, agency problems arise due to information asymmetries and 
different incentives for managers and owners (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). 
With superior knowledge about the business and capacity as agents for the owners, 
managers have the ability to exploit or expropriate business resources that otherwise 
would provide returns to the owners. They could report accounting information that 
deviates from the substance of underlying economic transactions for the purpose of 
maximising their private benefits (Leuz et al., 2003; Warfield et al., 1995). This is 
supported by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who indicate that managers with lower 
firm ownership have greater incentives to manipulate accounting numbers.  
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Unlike diffusely owned firms, in which ownership and control are separated, family 
members in family firms usually hold a significant portion of the shares and often 
control top management positions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). Therefore, in family 
firms, the agency problems caused by the separation between owner and manager
15
, 
could be low relative to diffusely owned firms because the owners‟ and managers‟ 
interest are very much aligned (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a).  
 
The concentrated ownership of family firms might also contribute towards the better 
monitoring of managerial activities (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). The efficient monitoring in family firms leads to lower earnings management 
and higher quality accounting information on earnings. Wang (2006) and Bushman et 
al. (2004) argue that because of the better monitoring of managers by family owners, 
the demand for information from non-family owners to monitor managers is lower 
due to the substitutive relation between direct monitoring and public disclosure.  
 
The family members/shareholders usually hold their investments for a long-term 
period, and pass the investments to multiple generations. Families often hold an 
undiversified portfolio of shares, and thus, are very concerned about the long- term 
survival of the firm. Due to the long-term investment horizon and reputation 
concerns, Sanchez et al. (2007) explain that family members/ shareholders would 
tend to maximise firm‟s wealth in the long-run rather than consume it during their 
lifetime. Similarly, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) suggest that family involvement 
                                               
15 Agency problems caused by the separation between owners and managers are usually referred to as Type I 
agency problems. 
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serves to monitor and discipline managers because of the long-term relationships that 
exist between family members and the firm. According to Anderson et al. (2003), the 
controlling family represents a special class of shareholder that potentially has a 
unique incentive structure, a strong voice in the firm and powerful motives to 
effectively manage the firm. Anderson et al. (2003) study finds that bondholders 
charge a lower cost of debt for family firms, as it is regarded as an organisational 
structure that protects their interests.  
 
Family firms are also characterised by having special attributes that can promote an 
atmosphere of love and commitment (James, 1999). Schulze et al. (2003) highlights 
that family altruism encourages family members to be considerate to each other and 
fosters loyalty and commitment to the family and firm. Similarly, from the 
economist‟s point of view, altruism is modeled as a utility function in which the 
welfare of one family member is positively related to the welfare of the others in the 
firm (Bergstrom, 1989). Family loyalty, concern over business reputation and wealth, 
the desire to pass the business to heirs as a going concern, would all contribute to 
better monitoring of business conduct, including the reporting of high quality of 
earnings. 
 
However, family firms may suffer more severe Type II agency problems, which are 
caused by the incentive and ability of controlling shareholders to extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Morck et 
al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This is called the entrenchment effect of 
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controlling shareholders. According to Warfield et al. (1995), in extracting private 
benefits from minority shareholders, the controlling shareholders have the desire to 
prevent the detection of their behaviour, which creates incentives to alter reported 
earnings. This causes the controlling family to report accounting information that is 
based on family self-interest rather than a reflection of the firm‟s underlying 
economic transactions (Sánchez et al., 2007). In addition to that, the informal 
relationships of family owners and managers in family firms may harm the credibility 
of or access to earnings information (Salvato and Moores, 2010). 
 
Evidence of the family entrenchment effect is found in Machuga and Teitel (2009), 
Choi et al. (2007). Machuga and Teitel (2009) investigate earnings quality 
surrounding the implementation of the code of corporate governance in Mexico. 
Their results show that firms, which do not have concentrated family ownership, have 
greater increases in earnings quality in terms of lesser income smoothing, more 
timely loss recognition and lower conditional accrual. Similarly, using sample from 
Korea, Choi et al. (2007) find that firms with chaebol or family control in the board 
of directors report significantly lower performance.  
 
According to studies on corporate ownership around the world (e.g. Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999), the risk of expropriation by the 
dominant or controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders are the 
main agency problem in countries other than the US and the UK. Peng and Jiang 
(2006) explain that developed countries have better legal and regulatory institutions 
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that enable the benefits of family ownership to outweigh the drawbacks of controlling 
shareholders because the government is better equipped to control manipulation of 
earnings. On the other hand, less developed countries and emerging markets provide 
greater opportunities for families to manage earnings due to weak investor protection 
and the lack of a market for corporate control (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). 
Because of this, the effect of Type II agency problems in family firms could be more 
prevalent in these countries. Since the arguments on the alignment and entrenchment 
effects of family firms provides contradicting predictions about the effect of family 
ownership on earnings quality, the first hypothesis is stated in null form, as follows: 
 
H1: There is no difference between earnings quality in family and nonfamily firms. 
 
4.3.2 Earnings Quality and Corporate Governance  
According to the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, corporate governance is 
the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of a 
company to enhance business prosperity and corporate accountability (Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance, 2000). It is comprised of the mechanisms used 
by stakeholders of a corporation to exercise control over corporate insiders and 
management (John and Senbet, 1998). Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) highlight 
that the establishment of governance processes is essential to maintain the credibility 
of firms‟ financial statements and safeguard against earnings manipulation. Strong 
corporate governance is expected to be able to protect stakeholders interests, curb 
agency conflicts and limit agency costs (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
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Agency theory predicts that good corporate governance can strengthen monitoring 
and control of managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). According to Ho and Wong 
(2001), the adoption of good governance mechanisms provides an “intensive 
monitoring package” for a firm to reduce opportunistic behaviours and information 
asymmetry (Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman, 1981; Welker, 1995). Under such an 
environment, it is difficult for managers to withhold any information or disclose false 
information for their own benefit (Ho and Wong, 2001). Therefore, having good 
corporate governance promotes transparency and accountability in the firm‟s 
information; which subsequently has a positive impact on the level of earnings 
quality (Johnson et al., 2002). The development of hypotheses related to corporate 
governance mechanisms examined in this study is as follows: 
 
4.3.2.1 Earnings Quality and Audit Committee Size 
Audit committees are independent committees charged with overseeing a company‟s 
financial reporting process. In Malaysia, audit committees are responsible for 
reviewing earnings releases and financial reports; assessing the appropriateness of 
management‟s selection of accounting policies and disclosures in compliance with 
approved accounting standards; ensuring timely submission of financial statements 
by management; reviewing significant or unusual transactions and accounting 
estimates, reviewing and understanding management‟s representation; assessing 
whether the financial report presents a true and fair view of the company‟s financial 
position and performance and complies with regulatory requirements (Bursa 
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Malaysia, 2009). According to Xie et al. (2003), an audit committee that is well-
structured, active and well-functioning can prevent manipulation of accounting 
numbers. 
 
A larger audit committee is argued to provide better governance in ensuring the 
reliability of financial statements. According to  Mangena and Tauringana (2008), the 
size of the audit committee could influence the engagement of audit committee 
members to review interim reports. The complexity of the accounting and financial 
reporting matters reviewed by the audit committee requires considerable director 
resources, including the number of directors and time devoted to the work of the 
committee (Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). A larger audit committee has more 
resources to oversee the financial reporting and internal control systems (Anderson, 
Mansi, and Reeb, 2004), and thus would be more effective in uncovering and 
resolving potential problems in the financial reporting process.  
  
Evidence on the association between audit committee size and earnings quality has 
been presented in a number of studies including Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Lin et 
al. (2006). Using a sample of 896 firm-year observation for the years 1996–2000 in 
the US, Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that larger audit committees are associated 
with lower quarterly earnings management. Specifically, they show that the number 
of directors in an audit committee is significantly negatively associated with total 
discretionary accruals and current discretionary accruals. Lin et al. (2006) provide 
similar evidence when they examine the association between audit committee 
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characteristics and the restatement of reported earnings. They note that the negative 
association between audit committee size and the occurrence of earnings restatement 
suggests that a larger audit committee may provide more oversight over the financial 
reporting process, which consequently improves earnings quality and reduces the 
probability of restating financial statements. In Malaysia, Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-
Hussin (2010) find that a larger audit committee is associated with higher quality of 
financial information disclosure, measured by the accuracy of the IPO management 
earnings forecast. Based on the evidence that audit committee size is significant in 
mitigating earnings manipulation and improving the quality of reported earnings,this 
study hypothesises that: 
 
H2A: There is a positive relationship between earnings quality and the size of the audit 
committee 
 
4.3.2.2 Earnings Quality and Audit Committee Independence 
Audit committee independence is one of the attributes of an effective corporate 
governance system. A more independent audit committee would be able to provide 
more objective monitoring of the company‟s internal control and financial reporting. 
According to Abbott et al. (2004), a more independent audit committee is related to 
better monitoring for at least two reasons. First, independent directors do not have 
personal or economic interests in the company that may interfere with their ability to 
question management (Carcello and Neal, 2000, 2003). Thus, they are able to put 
their arguments forward without fear and favour (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and 
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Lapides, 2000). Second, each independent director in the audit committee has unique 
motivation to provide better monitoring in order to preserve and develop their 
reputation (Abbott et al., 2004). According to Beasley (1996), independent directors 
use their directorship to signal to the external market that they are decision experts 
who understand the importance of decision control and can work within such a 
control system. Thus, relative to non-independent directors, independent directors 
have greater incentive to avoid activities that would damage their reputation (Abbott 
and Parker, 2000; Abbott, Parker, Peters, and Rama, 2003b). Given the existence of 
information asymmetries and the potential for conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders, an independent audit committee offers vital governance in ensuring 
the integrity of financial statements, in addition to that provided by external auditors. 
 
The preference for an audit committee to be comprised of independent members has 
been explicitly expressed by the corporate governance committees of enquiry around 
the world, including the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and Smith Committee 
(2003). In the US, the Blue Ribbon Committee specifically recommends all audit 
committee members to be independent (Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 1999). In the 
UK, it was recommended that the audit committee should comprise of three 
members, all of whom should be independent non-executive directors (Smith 
Committee, 2003). In Malaysia, under the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
(2005), it is compulsory for all publicly listed companies to have a majority of 
independent directors and an independent chairman of the audit committee. An 
independent audit committee is expected to implement and support the oversight 
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function of the board in several ways, which includes reviewing the company‟s 
processes for producing financial data, its internal controls, and the independence of 
its external auditor; and to conduct detailed discussions on those matters (Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance, 2000). 
 
Studies examining the independence of the audit committee have discovered that 
audit committee independence is an important factor that contributes to higher quality 
of financial reporting. Abbott et al. (2004) discover that companies with more 
independent audit committees are less likely to have financial restatements to address 
material omission or misstatements in respect of prior financial statements. Similarly, 
Beasley et al. (2000) and Persons (2005) find that audit committee independence is 
negatively related to the likelihood of committing financial reporting fraud. Klein 
(2002) shows that the presence of a majority of independent directors on the audit 
committee improves the quality of financial reporting, in terms of lower level of 
earnings management. Klein‟s (2002) finding, later supported by Bédard et al. (2004), 
is that aggressive earnings management is negatively associated with audit committee 
independence. Using a sample from Malaysia and Indonesia, Bradbury et al. (2006) 
also document that when all members are independent directors, audit committees are 
effective in reducing the level of income increasing abnormal accruals. According to 
the argument that a more independent audit committee is more effective in 
performing its oversight role and ensuring high quality of financial reporting, it is 
hypothesised that: 
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H2B: There is positive relationship between earnings quality and audit committee 
independence. 
 
4.3.2.3 Earnings Quality and Audit Committee Meeting Frequency 
Existing studies provide evidence in support of the view that audit committees which 
meet more often are more effective in monitoring management and can potentially 
increase the quality of financial reporting. Specifically, the studies find that firms 
with audit committee that have more frequent meetings are less likely to face 
reporting problems (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996), less likely to engage in 
fraudulent behavior (Beasley et al., 2000) and less likely to report a small earnings 
increase (Vafeas, 2005). Higher frequency of audit committee meetings is also related 
to lower occurrence of financial reporting restatements (Abbott et al., 2004), lower 
level of discretionary accruals (Xie et al., 2003), and less income-increasing earnings 
management (Bédard et al., 2004).  
 
According to Larcker et al. (2007), the number of meetings held by the board and 
audit committees is evidence of monitoring activity. Meeting frequency is a signal of 
audit committee director liability concern and audit committee diligence (Menon and 
Williams, 1994). In previous studies, the frequency of audit committee meetings has 
been used as a proxy to measure audit committee member‟s effort or persistence in 
performing their tasks (Dezoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, and Reed, 2002), 
directors monitoring activity (Collier and Gregory, 1999), and audit committee 
diligence (Song and Windram, 2004; Xie et al., 2003).  
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Menon and Williams (1994) point out that the more often an audit committee meets, 
the more active it is perceived. Mangena and Tauringa (2008) mention that audit 
committees that are more active allow the members to perform their monitoring role 
more successfully. The meetings held by the audit committee provide the members 
with information and knowledge about relevant accounting and auditing concerns 
(Raghunandan, Read, and Rama, 2001), and enable them to analyse and decide 
appropriate actions to overcome reporting issues (Abbott, Parker, Peters, and 
Raghunandan, 2003a). 
 
The argument that more frequent meeting promotes greater diligence and 
effectiveness of the audit committee in the monitoring firm‟s financial reporting leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2C: There is positive relationship between earnings quality and the frequency of 
audit committee meetings. 
 
4.3.2.4 Earnings Quality and Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Previous studies support the notion that the financial expertise of the members of the 
audit committee is an important contribution towards high quality of financial 
reporting. From a survey on the efficacy of audit committees in Australian public 
corporations, Buckby, Dunstan and Savage (2002) conclude that the knowledge and 
experience of audit committee members improves audit committee effectiveness. In 
line with that, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) report that external auditors charge a 
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lower fee to firms that have an audit committee with accounting financial expertise as 
they possess lower risk of earnings manipulation. According to Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009), accounting financial experts provide at least two enhancements 
to the overall effectiveness of an audit committee. First, audit committee accounting 
financial experts can constrain earnings manipulation by assessing the adequacy of 
provisions for as warranty obligations, lawsuits, and other contingencies. Second, 
audit committee financial experts can better understand the nature of explanations 
provided by management. Further, Mangena and Tauringana (2008) explain that 
knowledgeable audit committee members are in a better position to understand 
financial reporting issues and auditor  judgments and therefore could provide better 
monitoring of the financial reporting process. 
 
The ability of audit committee members with accounting/financial knowledge to 
improve a firm‟s internal control is evident from existing studies. After examining a 
sample of audit committee members who completed internal control oversight tasks, 
Dezoort (1998) shows that audit committee members with experience made internal 
control judgments more like auditors compared to members without experience.  
Raghunandan et al. (2001) find that audit committees with at least
 
one member 
having an accounting or finance background have greater interaction with internal 
auditors, in terms of having longer meetings with the chief internal
 
auditor, having 
private access to the chief internal auditor;
 
and having detailed review of internal 
audit proposals and the results of internal
 
auditing. Krishnan (2005) and Zhang et al. 
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(2007) find that companies are more likely have internal control weaknesses, if their 
audit committees have less financial expertise.  
 
Findings from empirical studies that examine audit committee characteristics and the 
quality of financial reporting also support the view that audit committee members' 
expertise is an important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to engage 
in earnings manipulation (e.g. Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; 
Bédard et al., 2004; Xie et al., 2003; Yang and Krishnan, 2005). Xie et al. (2003) 
report that board and audit committee members with corporate or investment-banking 
backgrounds are associated with firms that have lower earnings management, or 
smaller discretionary current accruals. They claim that corporate and financial 
backgrounds are very important in determining the effectiveness of directors 
monitoring function as it contributes towards better understanding of how earnings 
are being managed. Similarly, Bédard et al. (2004) find that audit committee financial 
expertise is negatively associated with income-increasing and income-decreasing 
earnings management, based on the extent of abnormal accruals.  They suggest that 
the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee reduces the likelihood of 
aggressive earnings management. Consistent findings are also reported by Yang and 
Krishnan (2005), who show that quarterly earnings management is lower for firms 
whose audit committee directors have greater governance expertise.   
 
Abbott et al. (2004) examine the association between audit committee financial 
expertise and financial reporting restatements. They find that an audit committee that 
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lacks a member with financial expertise is positively associated with the occurrence 
of financial reporting restatements. Consistent with Abbott et al. (2004), Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) also find that firms with an audit committee that has an independent 
financial expert have a lower probability of having restatement of financial 
statements. Based on the evidence from the empirical studies, it is hypothesised that 
audit committee financial expertise is positively related to earnings quality: 
 
H2D: There is positive relationship between earnings quality and audit committee 
financial expertise. 
 
4.3.2.5 Earnings Quality and Board of Directors Size 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest that the function of the board of directors is to 
minimise the agency cost that arises from the separation of ownership and control in 
firms. The board of directors receives authority over the internal control of the firm 
from shareholders. They are responsible for monitoring management to ensure that it 
acts in the shareholders‟ best interests. Although the board delegates most decision 
and control functions to top management, the board retains ultimate control (Beasley, 
1996). Thus, the board of directors plays an important role in monitoring the quality 
of earnings reported to the public.  
 
The Malaysian stock exchange (Bursa Malaysia) mentions in the Corporate 
Governance Guide (2009) that there is no prescriptive rule for the optimum size of 
the board of directors. However, the establishment of board committees would 
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become impracticable with very small boards. Similarly in the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2001), the Securities Commission states that the board of 
directors should carefully determine the optimum number of board members to 
ensure that there are enough members to discharge responsibilities and perform 
related duties. Both guidelines that are proposed by two important bodies in 
Malaysia, the Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission, indicate that the size of 
boards is important in determining the effectiveness of board monitoring function. 
 
Although some studies argue that larger boards are better as they have greater 
capability to safeguard shareholder interest (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989), a  broader 
range of experience (Xie et al., 2003), and varied expertise (Rahman and Ali, 2006). 
There are also empirical studies that show that smaller boards are more effective than 
large boards, due to several reasons. First, smaller boards have fewer problems in 
coordinating directors efforts (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). 
A larger board involving a greater number of directors is more difficult to manage, as 
they have lower cohesion (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Second, unlike larger boards 
that have poor and slower decision-making (Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker, 1994), 
smaller board have better communication and more timely decision-making 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Lipton and Lorsh (1992) explain that even if a 
board‟s capacities increase with a greater number of directors, the benefits are 
outweighed by slower decision-making and less open discussion of managerial 
performance. Third, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) highlight that smaller boards have 
less severe agency problems such as directors‟ free riding, compared to larger boards. 
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The agency problems in large boards arise from dysfunctional behavior of directors 
on the board. This is because the cost to any individual director of not exercising 
diligence in monitoring management falls in proportion to the total number of board 
directors (Cheng, 2008). According to Jensen (1993), as the board size gets bigger, 
greater emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and frankness 
arises in the boardroom.  
 
The evidence that smaller boards are associated with higher quality of earnings is 
provided in the following studies. Yermack (1996) shows that companies with a 
larger board size are associated with lower market valuations in the U.S. Similarly, 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Mak and Kusnadi (2005) find that firms with fewer 
directors on the board are associated with higher firm value in Finland, and Singapore 
and Malaysia, respectively. Vafeas (2000) discovers that the earnings of firms with 
the smallest board in the sample (five members in the board) is viewed as more 
informative by the market. The discussion above and evidence from existing studies 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H2E: There is negative relationship between earnings quality and board size. 
 
4.3.2.6 Earnings Quality and Board Independence  
A number of studies have provided evidence of the association between board 
independence and earnings quality. For example, Petra (2007) provides evidence that 
there is a positive association between the proportion of outside independent directors 
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serving on firm‟s boards and earnings informativeness. Another study, Jaggi, Leung 
and Gul (2009), find that a higher proportion of independent directors is associated 
with more effective monitoring to constrain earnings management. They conclude 
that the quality of earnings is higher for firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors on the board. This is consistent with the earlier studies, Klein (2002) and 
Niu (2006) which find a negative association between earnings management and the 
level of board independence in the U.S. and Canada, respectively. In line with agency 
theory, these studies support the view that a more independent board would perform a 
better monitoring function, which would consequently result in a higher level of 
earnings quality. 
 
As the board is viewed as a monitoring mechanism to safeguard shareholders 
interests, a higher proportion of independent director is preferable. This is consistent 
with the agency theory premise relating to the divergence of interests between 
shareholders and managers in a company that needs to be controlled and monitored. 
Independent directors are preferable as they could increase the effectiveness of the 
board monitoring function (Gupta and Fields, 2009; Jaggi et al., 2009), and ensure 
that high quality earnings are reported in the financial statements. 
 
Among the studies that investigate this issue are Park and Shin (2004) and Gupta and 
Fields (2009). The latter examine a sample of Canadian firms in 1991-1997 and 
found that the level of earnings management does not decrease with the proportion of 
outside directors as board members. They conclude that in jurisdictions where 
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ownership is highly concentrated and the outside directors‟ labor market is not well 
developed, the existence of outside directors would not improve corporate 
governance practices of firms. 
 
Other studies, such as Xie at al. (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2005) provide evidence 
that the proportion of outside directors is negatively associated with earnings 
management. Specifically, Peasnell et al. (2005) find that the chance of abnormal 
accruals being large enough to turn a loss into a profit or to ensure that profit does not 
decline is significantly lower for firms with a high proportion of outside board 
members. The evidence leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2F: There is positive relationship between earnings quality and board independence. 
 
4.3.2.7 Earnings Quality and CEO Duality 
Empirical research in corporate governance has provided strong evidence that 
separation between the CEO and chairman roles is preferable as it improves the 
effectiveness of the board monitoring function. Chau and Gray (2010) argue that a 
chairman who is independent has the freedom to manage a company without 
constraint as he possesses a great amount of power and authority. According to 
Jensen (1993), the presence of chairman that is also the chief executive of a company 
could override the advantage of having independent directors on the board and 
weaken the function of the board of directors. Similarly, Forker (1992) claims that the 
duality role of CEO and chairman could be a threat to disclosure quality. He finds 
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that CEO duality is negatively associated with the quality of share option disclosure. 
This is because the chairman who is independent enhances the board function by 
monitoring the CEO and company‟s management, and thus has a low tendency to 
withhold any information from stakeholders.  
 
Using a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 1997-2002, García Lara et al. 
(2007) shows that firms with a CEO who has low influence over the functioning of 
the board of directors is associated with a greater degree of accounting conservatism. 
On the other hand, a CEO with excessive power over board matters could easily 
manipulate earnings numbers (Rahman and Ali, 2006). This is evidenced in Klein 
(2002) who finds that earnings management is positively related to the CEO holding 
a position on the board‟s nominating and compensation committee. In addition to 
that, there is evidence in the literature that when the position of CEO and chairman 
are separated, firms are valued more highly by the market (Yermack, 1996). This 
shows that unbiased monitoring of the CEO by the chairperson of the board signals 
stronger firm internal controls, which results in higher firm value. 
 
The extant studies imply that lower earnings quality is likely to be associated with the 
existence of the boards‟ chairman also performing the CEO role. The involvement of 
a CEO on a board as a chairman may create bias and influence board decision 
making. In other words, strong influence from the company‟s management over the 
board‟s decisions indicates weak governance.  Based on this argument, this study 
posits that: 
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H2G: There is negative relationship between earnings quality and CEO duality. 
 
4.3.3 Mediating Role of Family Influence on Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Quality Relationship  
As corporate control by the owner already exists in family firms, earnings quality 
might be good even if corporate governance was weak. This is supported by Jaggi et 
al. (2009) who find that family ownership control or family members on the board 
moderates the monitoring effectiveness of independent boards, because the founding 
family will limit the ability of managers to manipulate earnings. Jaggi et al. (2009) 
provide three explanations on why the monitoring effectiveness of independent 
directors moderates with the existence of family control in a firm.  First, consistent 
with Jensen and Meckling (1976), they argue that the monitoring role of corporate 
governance reduces when there is a high level of insider ownership. Second, in family 
controlled firms, independent directors are appointed to give advice on strategy rather 
than to perform monitoring and controlling duties on management. Thirdly, 
independent directors in family firms are relatively less independent. This is due to 
the dominance and control of family members that exists in family firms. Since the 
family members have control over the appointment of outside directors, independent 
directors are less likely to oppose their decisions (Jaggi et al., 2009).  
 
On the other hand, if control by the family members in family firms results in 
entrenchment of the controlling family and results in exploitation of minority 
shareholders interests, earnings quality might be weak even if the corporate 
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governance is strong in form. According to Cheung and Chan (2004), in emerging 
economies where the majority of firms are family-owned and concentrated, corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent non-executive directors, 
might not necessarily provide a strong system of checks and balances between the 
interest of the major shareholder and that of the minority shareholders. This is 
because the controlling families influence the formation of the corporate governance 
mechanisms in the firm. For example, as directors are elected by the controlling 
shareholders, i.e the family, it is unlikely that the independent directors will provide 
an adequate degree of monitoring or be able to exert a strong influence on major 
corporate decisions (Cheung and Chan, 2004). Cheung and Chan (2004), explain that 
such independent directors may serve as advisors in the decision-making process, 
rather than overseeing and monitoring managerial activities and the financial 
reporting process.  
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) show that conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms used to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
are less effective when family opportunism is in place. Some studies reveal that 
corporate governance mechanisms could be strong in form, but not in substance 
(Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2008; Gendron and Bédard, 2006). When 
family opportunism exists, the controlling family could make appointments of 
independent directors or audit committee members which would satisfy regulatory 
requirements, but provide less than adequate monitoring. According to Patelli and 
Principe (2007), the involvement of family owners in the appointment of external 
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directors could impair the directors‟ independence and lead to potential collusion 
between the directors and the controlling family. This is supported by previous 
empirical studies, that find that independent directors appointed through the influence 
of family owners support the major decisions in favour of family owners rather than 
outside investors (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004). 
 
In summary, based on the alignment effect argument, which suggests that agency 
conflicts are relatively lower in family firms, earnings quality would be high in these 
firms even if the corporate governance is weak as the control by the owner already 
exists in these firms. On the contrary, if the entrenchment effect of the controlling 
family towards minority interests dominates, earnings quality would be low in family 
firms even if corporate governance appears to be strong in form. Either way, it is 
likely that in family controlled firms, the relationship between corporate governance 
and earnings quality would be weak. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H3: The relationship between earnings quality and corporate governance is weaker in 
family owned firms compared to nonfamily firms. 
 
4.4 Sample Selection and Data 
The population of this study comprises all non-financial companies listed on the 
Malaysian stock exchange, Bursa Malaysia, during the period 2003-2008. The data 
requirements to calculate the earnings quality measure significantly influenced my 
sample selection. Even though this study covers the six-year period of 2003-2008, 
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data on the firms‟ cash flows from operations in the year before and after the study 
period is required to calculate the earnings quality measure. Thus, the study includes 
only companies that have a complete set of data during 2002-2009.  
 
Table 4.1: Derivation of Sample and Industry Category 
Panel A: Sample Derivation 
     
Number 
of firms  
 
Companies listed on Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 2009 960 
 
 
Companies with a fiscal year change in the period 2002-2009 (53) 
 
 
Companies under PN17 category or suspended from trading 
 
(34) 
 
 
Financial and insurance institutions 
 
(37) 
 
 
Utility companies 
 
(2) 
 
 
Government owned companies 
 
(40) 
 
 
Companies listed on Bursa Malaysia after the year 2002 
 
(250) 
 
 
Missing companies in Thomson One Banker database 
 
(1) 
 
 
Companies with missing data on Cash Flows From Operations (13) 
 
 
Companies with missing data on Changes in Working Capital (3) 
 
 
Final sample 
 
527 
 
       
Panel B: Bursa Malaysia industry category of the sample firms 
   
Number 
of firms  
Percentage 
of sample  
 
Construction 
 
35 
 
6.64 
 
 
Industrial product 
 
186 
 
35.29 
 
 
Consumer product 
 
94 
 
17.84 
 
 
Technology 
 
29 
 
5.50 
 
 
Trading/ Services 
 
90 
 
17.08 
 
 
Properties 
 
65 
 
12.33 
 
 
Plantation 
 
28 
 
5.31 
 
 
Total 
 
527 
 
100.00 
 
 
Panel A of Table 4.1 outlines the sample selection procedure. Firstly, all companies 
listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 2009 are identified. 
On that date, there were 960 financial and non-financial companies listed on the main 
market.  The 53 companies that had at least one fiscal year change during the period 
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2002-2009 and the 34 companies in the PN17
16
 category that were suspended from 
trading, are excluded from the sample. Consistent with previous earnings quality 
studies such as Peasnell et al. (2005), Davidson et al. (2005) and Klein (2002), the 37 
finance and insurance companies are also excluded from the sample due to the unique 
nature of their reporting practices
17
. In addition, 2 utility companies were also 
excluded from the sample for the reason that they may have different incentives and 
opportunities to manage earnings (Peasnell et al., 2005; Rahman and Ali, 2006).  40 
government-owned companies are also excluded due to the differences in their 
ownership structure and governance
18
. As the study requires data from 2002-2009 to 
compute the earnings quality variables, the 250 companies that were first listed on the 
stock exchange after the year 2002 are also omitted. . The 17 firms that lacked all the 
data required to compute the variables, primarily companies that did not have cash 
flow from operations data, were also omitted. The final sample for this study 
comprised 527 companies from 7 industries, based on Bursa Malaysia industry 
classification.  
                                               
16 PN17 stands for Practice Note 17/2005 issued by Bursa Malaysia. Companies in the PN17 category are 
financially troubled companies that meet at least one of the following criteria: companies‟ shareholders‟ funds are 
less than 25% of their total paid-up capital; receivers have been appointed to take control of the companies‟ assets; 
the winding-up of some of their subsidiaries and associated companies; the auditors have expressed adverse 
opinions on the companies; default in loan interest and principal repayments; the companies have suspended or 
ceased their operations; and companies do not have any significant businesses or operations. 
17Financial institutions are also subject to a regulatory framework that did not apply to other companies. 
Particularly, they are regulated under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989.  Among others, the Act 
limits a financial  institution to make portfolio investments in non-financial companies up to a maximum of 20 
percent of its shareholders funds and up to 10 percent of the issued share capital of the company in which the 
investment is made. The financial institutions are also prohibited from assuming any management role or taking 
up a board position. 
18 The companies are considered as government owned companies if the state or federal government has a direct 
or indirect control over the board of directors. In Malaysia, these companies are also known as Government-
Linked Companies (GLCs). The GLCs are controlled through seven Government-Linked Investment Companies 
(GLICs), the (1) Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB), (2) Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP), (3) 
Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP), (4) Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), (5) Lembaga 
Tabung Haji (LTH), (6) Menteri Kewangan Diperbadankan (MKD), and (7) Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). 
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The classification of the sample firms according to their industry is shown in Panel B 
of Table 4.1. As shown in the table, the sample is widely distributed across the 
different sectors and represents most of the sectors on the Bursa Malaysia stock 
exchange. The concentrations in industrial products (35.29%), consumer products 
(17.84 %), trading/services (17.08%) and properties (12.33%) resemble the 
population of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
 
For the purpose of calculating the cross-sectional measure of earnings quality, 8 years 
of financial data over 2002-2009 were downloaded.  The total of 8 years financial 
data used to estimate the cross-sectional estimation of earning quality comprises 4216 
firm-year observations, from 527 companies. Appendix 5 lists the ticker code used in 
this study to extract the financial data from the Thompson Financial One Banker 
database. Data relating to family ownership was hand collected from the Directors 
Profile and Shareholding Analysis sections in the annual reports. In total, 3162 annual 
reports were downloaded for the 527 companies over the year 2003-2008 from the 
Bursa Malaysia website. Details relating to family relationship of the board of 
directors were examined from the Directors Profile
19 
and the percentage of shares 
owned by the family members was identified from the Shareholdings Analysis 
section
20.
  
                                               
19 According to Bursa Securities Listing Requirement, App 9C (3), companies are required to disclose directors 
information, including directors‟ name, age, nationality, qualification & position (executive/ nonexecutive/ 
independent), working experience and occupation, date first appointed to the board, details of any board 
committee to which the director belongs, any directorship of public companies, any family relationship with any 
director and/or major shareholder, any conflict of interest with company, list of convictions for offences within the 
past 10 years other than traffic offences and number of board meetings attended in the financial year. 
20 All publicly listed firms in Malaysia are required by Section 69D (1), Companies Act 1965 to disclose 
information relating to substantial shareholding in the annual report. Specifically, the act stipulates the mandatory 
disclosure of substantial shareholders who hold more than five percent of equity in any firm irrespective of their 
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4.5 Measurement of Earnings Quality 
Following previous studies (Aboody et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2004; Francis et al., 
2003; Myers et al., 2003; Van der Meulen et al., 2007),this study measured the 
quality of earnings using the accrual quality model introduced by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) with some modifications as suggested by McNichols (2002). The 
original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is based on the assumption that accruals 
maps into cash realisations, thus any measurement errors in accruals not realised in 
cash flows indicate low quality of accruals. The modifications suggested by 
McNichols (2002) adjust for changes in firms economic environment, resulting in  a 
better proxy for earnings quality (Jaggi et al., 2009). 
 
According to  Dechow (1994) and Dechow and Dichev (2002), the accrual-based 
earnings solve the potential timing and matching problems associated with the use of 
cash flows as a short-term performance measure. In other words, the function of 
accruals is to adjust the recognition of cash flows over time, so that it better reflects 
firm performance. However, as accrual-based earnings include measures that are 
subject to estimations, the earnings figure could be manipulated. This will results in 
lower quality of earnings.  
 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model relates total current accrual (TCA), to lagged, 
current and future cash flows from operations. It is based on the assumption that 
                                                                                                                                      
direct or indirect control interest. This also includes their investment through nominees' institutions and others 
means. 
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current accruals are estimates of future year‟s cash flow realisation. The accruals are 
temporary adjustments that delay or anticipate the recognition of realised cash flows. 
Thus, the quality of accrual depends on the precision of these estimates. In this 
model, total current accrual is measured by changes in working capital, since related 
cash-flow realisations generally occur within one year, which is as follows: 
 
TCAi,t =  α0 + α1,iCFOi,t-1 + α2,iCFOi,t + α3,iCFOi,t+1 + i,t (4.1) 
 
where TCAi,t is the total current accrual
21
 of firm i in year t scaled by average assets, 
CFOi,t is the cash flow from operations of firm i in year t scaled by average assets and 
i,t is the residual of firm i in year t. 
 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model captures both intentional and unintentional 
accrual estimation error by management, which is the inverse measure of earnings 
quality (Hermanns, 2006). To distinguish the unintentional accrual estimation error 
from the intentional, McNichols (2002) suggests future research to incorporate some 
variables from the Jones (1991) model, the change in revenues (REV)  and property, 
plant and equipment (PPE), as additional explanatory variables in the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model. McNichols (2002) highlights that the combination of these 
models provide a more powerful approach to estimation of accrual quality in the 
presence of management discretion. This is because the inclusion of REV and PPE 
                                               
21 Total current accrual is measured as changes in working capital. It is also equivalent to the changes in current 
assets minus changes in current liabilities, minus changes in cash and plus with changes in short term debt. 
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would control for unintentional estimation errors, which are related to firm and 
industry characteristics. The accrual quality model proposed by McNichols is as 
follows: 
 
TCAi,t = α0 + α1,iCFOi,t-1 + α2,iCFOi,t + α3,iCFOi,t+1 + α4,iREVi,t + α5,iPPEi,t + i,t (4.2) 
 
where REVi,t is the change in revenue of firm i in year t scaled by average assets, 
PPEi,t is the gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t scaled by average 
assets, and all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
According to Dechow and Dichev (2002), accrual quality is an inverse function of the 
standard deviation of firm i‟s estimated residual. This measure is based on the time-
series expectation of accruals behaviour, in which a larger standard deviation of the 
residuals implies lower accrual quality. Based on this measure, a firm that has 
consistently large residuals and thus small standard deviation of residuals is 
considered to have relatively good accrual quality because the accrual behavior is 
predictable. However, time-series estimation of residuals requires firms to have 
sufficient time-series data points. For example, Dechow and Dichev (2002) require 
firms to have at least eight years of annual data to be included in the sample. Since 
the current study uses sample from an emerging capital market, this requirement 
would result in selecting only few established firms that are not representative of the 
population of firms in the capital market.  In addition to survivorship bias, there are 
other problems related to time-series estimation.  As noted by Saleh et al. (2005), the 
self-reversing property of accruals may induce specification problems, in terms of 
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serially correlated residuals (Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2000);  the coefficient 
estimates on the change in revenue (ΔREV), and the property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) variables in the modified model are unlikely to be stationary over time; and 
there may be confounding effects in the estimation period that are not related to 
intentional estimation error (Dechow et al., 1995; Guay, Kothari, and Watts, 1996).   
 
To avoid the problems related to time-series estimation of accrual quality, the current 
study uses a cross-sectional version of Dechow and Dichev (2002). Accrual quality is 
measured as the absolute value of residuals from industry-specific yearly regression 
of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, rather than the standard deviation 
of residuals
22
. In other words, this study focuses on the magnitude rather than the 
volatility of measurement errors. This is based on the intuition that larger residuals 
from the cross-sectional estimations of the model represent lower accrual quality.  
 
Using the model in equation (4.2),  the regressions are run cross-sectionally for each 
industry and year based on the Bursa Malaysia industry classification, to estimate the 
accrual quality (AQUALITY) values for each firm from the year 2003 to 2008. The 
regression is performed in each industry portfolio to minimise the effect of variation 
of accrual behavior in different industries, as well as the different impact that the 
economy may have on different industries. Following Francis et al. (2005), this study 
requires a minimum of 20 firms in each industry group to produce good estimates of 
                                               
22 Consistent with Baxter and Cotter (2009) and Srinidhi and Gul (2007), I do not use the standard deviation of the 
residuals from my cross-sectional industry model, as this would provide a measure of earnings quality across all 
companies in the industry group rather than just the company of interest.  
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residuals from the regressions. These regressions generate six yearly residuals for 
each firms, i,t, which represents measurement errors in total current accruals 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002) 
 
For an easier interpretation of the results of this study,  the absolute value of the 
residuals estimated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are 
multiplied by negative 1 to represent earnings quality (AQUALITY), so that higher 
value reflects better quality of earnings.  
4.6 Family and Nonfamily Firms Identification 
Extant studies on family firms use several characteristics of firms to define family 
firms, depending on the interest of their study. Some of the studies, (e.g. Chau and 
Gray, 2010; Morck et al., 1988), refer to the degree of ownership and /or management 
by family members based on the percentage of common shares held by the founding 
family and their relatives. Studies such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) measure the extent of family dominance as the proportion of family 
members on the board. Klai (2010) uses  both proxies, the percentage of family 
members on the board and the percentage of their shareholdings to represent family 
control. These studies emphasise the extent of family control, rather than the 
existence of significant family control in a firm. 
 
In addition, there are also studies that identify a firm as a family firm when family 
members hold shares greater than a certain level of the firm‟s share capital and/or 
when family members sits on the board of directors. For example, Chu and Cheah 
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(2006) classify firms with more than 20% substantial shareholdings by individual or 
private companies as family firms. Prencipe et al. (2008) define family firms as firms 
where the dominant family owns directly or indirectly more than 50% of the equity, 
or the dominant family controls the firm‟s strategic decisions. In Cascino et al. (2010) 
family firms are firms in which 50% of voting rights or outstanding shares (both 
direct and indirect) are held by family blockholders, and at least one family member 
holds a managerial position. Similarly, in Jiraporn and Dadalt (2009), family-owned 
firms are identified on the basis of the fractional equity ownership of the founding 
family and/or the presence of family members. In these studies, a binary variable is 
used to designate family control. 
 
Another group of studies differentiates between family control and ownership based 
on voting rights and cash flow rights. These studies measure the extent of family 
control by referring to their voting rights, whereas the extent of family ownership is 
based on cash-flow rights (Claessens et al., 2000).  However, due to pyramid 
structures, cross-sectional control and the use of nominee accounts, it is very hard to 
capture the exact percentage of the shares owned by the controlling family or other 
shareholders in Malaysia. Moreover, Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999) 
reported that there is no significant difference between cash flow rights  and voting 
rights in Malaysia. Therefore, the present study does not examine the extent of family 
influence based on the difference between cash flow rights and voting rights of the 
controlling family. 
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Whether a firm is controlled or owned by a family is identified from the disclosure of 
the directors profile and shareholders statistics in the corporate annual reports. Two 
criteria are used to classify a firm as a family firm. The first condition for a firm to be 
considered as a family firm is that the family members must own a total of more than 
twenty percent of the shares of the company. Similar to existing research on family 
firms (e.g. Claessens et al., 2000; Jaggi et al., 2009; La Porta et al., 1999; Yang, 
2010),this study assumes that a family that owns more than twenty percent of a firm‟s 
shares, has significant influence over the decisions made by the company. The second 
condition is that the firm must have at least two family members sitting on the board 
during the financial year. The family relationship includes father, mother, son, 
daughter, husband, wife, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, 
brothers, sisters, nieces and nephews. Therefore, a firm is considered as a family firm 
(FAMILY) only if the family members own more than 20 percent of firm‟s shares, 
and two or more members of the controlling family are directors. Following 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003), this study creates a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for family firms, otherwise 0. Even though it is possible to use the percentage 
of shares owned by the controlling shareholder, it is more appropriate to use a 
dichotomous variable due to the existence of pyramidal and cross-sectional control in 
Malaysia. In addition to that, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) argue that some 
families have the ability to exert control with a minimal fraction of ownership, while 
others require larger stakes for the same level of control due to differences in firm 
size, industry, business practices, and product placement. Thus, a binary variable 
represents a better measure of family ownership. 
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Dyer (2006) argues that research examining the effect of family influence should not 
treat family firms as one homogeneous group. He opposes the method of classifying 
firms into family and non-family groups, and claims that family firms should be 
identified based on the assortment of dynamics in families that own and manage 
them. Dyer (2006), proposes a typology which classifies each family firm as either a 
clan firm, a professional firm, a mom and pop firm or a self-interested firm. However, 
the typology is hard to apply in the present research since the information required is 
unavailable. Nevertheless, since the current study focuses on publicly listed firms, it 
is most likely that all of the companies could be classified as professional family 
firms. Based on Dyer‟s (2006) typology, a professional family firm is characterised 
by having formal monitoring mechanisms that help ensure that the family‟s assets are 
protected. 
 
Studies such as Villalonga and Amit (2010) and Anderson et al. (2009) classify 
family firms into founding family firms, in which the company founder serves as one 
of firm‟s top management; and non-founding family firms, in which firms are 
controlled and/or managed by the founder‟s heirs. Villalonga and Amit (2010) point 
out that distinguishing the effect of founding and other controlling families  is 
important because the effect of family ownership and control differs across these two 
group of companies. They argue that even though founding families may be more 
inclined to appoint their descendents as company CEOs, they are more likely to have 
greater emotional attachment and commitment to the company, and a longer 
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investment horizon. Their study found that the firms‟ competitive advantage 
dominates when founding families are in control, whereas extraction of private 
benefits prevails when the family heirs are in charged. Nevertheless, according to 
Burkart et al. (2003), the patterns and structure of family firms and their 
characteristics varies across countries. Burkart et al. (2003, p. 2168) states that: 
In the United States, founders often hire professional managers early on. 
By the time a founder retires, his family retains only marginal 
ownership. In such Berle and Means (1932) corporations, professional 
managers exercise nearly full control. In Western Europe, significant 
ownership typically stays with the family after the founder retires. His 
children either hire a manager, as in BMW or Fiat, or run the firm 
themselves, as in Peugeot. In emerging markets, both management and 
ownership tend to stay with the family when the founder retires. 
 
Therefore, in an emerging market like Malaysia, the question of whether there are 
differences between founder and non-founder family firms is not as important as in 
the US. Thus, this study does not examine whether family firms are managed by their 
founders or heirs/ descendants. 
 
4.7 Measurement of Corporate Governance Variables 
This section presents the measures of the corporate governance variables used in the 
study. In accordance with the hypotheses developed in Section 4.3.2, the proxies for 
seven corporate governance variables: audit committee size, audit committee 
independence, audit committee meeting, audit committee financial expertise, board 
size, board independence and CEO duality, are explained in subsections 4.7.1 to 
4.7.7. 
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4.7.1 Audit Committee Size 
In Malaysia, the stock exchange listing requirements require all publicly listed 
companies to form an audit committee and appoint at least three members from the 
board of directors (Bursa Malaysia, 2005). Previous studies such as Yang and 
Krishnan (2005) and Lin et al. (2006) show that a larger audit committee is related to 
less management of quarterly earnings and fewer occurrences of earnings 
restatements. Yang and Krishnan (2005) use the number of directors on the audit 
committee as the proxy for audit committee size, while Lin et al. (2006) use a binary 
variable to distinguish between large and small audit committees. In Lin et al. (2006), 
audit committees that have at least four members are coded as 1, indicating a large 
committee, otherwise, 0. Following Yang and Krishnan (2005), the present study 
measures the size of the audit committee (ACSIZE) by the total number of audit 
committee members. 
 
4.7.2 Audit Committee Independence 
The Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements stipulate that a majority of the audit 
committee members must be independent directors.  This is because independent 
directors are perceived to be able to provide more objective and effective monitoring. 
Existing studies, which show that a more independent audit committee is more 
effective in performing its oversight role and ensuring high quality of financial 
reporting, use several proxies to measure audit committee independence. 
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Persons (2005) and Abbott et al. (2004) use a binary variable to represent audit 
committee independence. The binary variable is coded 1 if all of the audit committee 
members are independent and 0 otherwise. Bédard et al. (2004) measures the 
independence of audit committee using two dummy variables. The first dummy 
variable is coded 1 when the audit committee is composed of more than 50% but less 
than 100% nonrelated outside directors and 0 otherwise; while the second dummy 
variable is coded 1 if the audit committee is composed solely of nonrelated outside 
directors and 0 otherwise. Bradbury et al.(2006) measures audit committee 
independence by the proportion of independent directors. This measure is also used in 
Klein et al. (2002), along with two other proxies based on majority and full 
independence of audit committee. Similar to Bradbury et al.(2006) and Klein et al. 
(2002),  this study measures audit committee independence (ACIND) as the 
proportion of independent audit committee  members.  
 
4.7.3 Audit Committee Meeting Frequency 
Audit committee meetings represent the time devoted by audit committee members to 
monitoring the company‟s management and financial affairs. Menon and Williams 
(1994) highlight that audit committees that do not meet or meet only once are 
unlikely to be effective monitors, whereas audit committees that have more frequent 
meetings exert more serious effort into overseeing management. The Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (2007) suggests that audit committees should meet 
regularly. The revised code states that audit committee meetings should be attended 
by the finance director, the head of internal audit and a representative of the 
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company‟s external auditors, while the other board members may only attend audit 
committee meetings upon invitation. The code also states that the audit committee 
should have meetings with the external auditors at least twice a year without the 
presence of executive board members so as to encourage free and honest exchange of 
views and opinions between the parties.  
 
Previous studies use the exact number of yearly audit committee meetings or a binary 
variable to represent the frequency of the meetings. For example, Abbott et al. (2004) 
measure the level of committee activity using a binary variable taking the value of 
one if the audit committee held more than four meetings a year, otherwise, 0. The 
threshold of four meetings a year is based on the recommendation of the National 
Association of Corporate Directors (1999), PricewaterhouseCoopers/IIA (2000) and 
the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999). Other studies such as Bédard et al. (2004), 
Vafeas (2005), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), Larcker et al. (2007) and Mangena 
and Tauringana (2008) measure the frequency of audit committee meetings as the 
total number of meetings in a year. Drawing on prior studies, this study measures 
audit committee meeting (ACMEET) as the number of meetings that a company‟s 
audit committee has in an accounting year. 
 
4.7.4 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
The revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007) recommends that all 
members of the audit committee should be financially literate and at least one audit 
committee member should be a member of an accounting association or body.  The 
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code also specifies that all audit committee members should be able to read, analyse 
and interpret financial statements so that they are able to effectively discharge their 
functions. The recommendation that the audit committee have at least one director 
with membership of an accounting association or body is in line with one of the 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirements. The listing requirement states that publicly 
listed companies must have an audit committee with at least one member with 
financial expertise, who is a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
or possesses sufficient accounting experience and qualification, or is deemed 
“financially literate” by Bursa Malaysia. According to the Bursa Malaysia Corporate 
Governance Guide (2009), audit committee financially literacy refers to the ability to 
(i) read and understand financial statements, including a company‟s balance sheet, 
income statement and cash flow statements, (ii) analyse financial statements and ask 
pertinent questions about the company‟s operations against internal controls and risk 
factors, and (iii) understand and interpret the application of approved accounting 
standards.  
 
In this study, the audit committee financial expertise variable, ACFIN, is measured as 
the proportion of audit committee directors who qualify as financial experts.A 
financial expert is defined as a director with working experience in accounting, 
auditing, or finance, and is a member of a local or overseas accounting 
association/body. 
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4.7.5 Board Size 
In Malaysia, the minimum number of directors on a board is specified in the 
Company‟s Act 1965 as three, while the maximum number of directors on a board is 
set at 15 under one of the Bursa Malaysia listing requirements. The Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance (2000) does not suggest an optimum board size for 
companies. However, the Code stresses that every board should examine its size, and 
determine the impact of the number upon its effectiveness. According to the Bursa 
Malaysia Corporate Governance Guide (2009), when determining the number of seats 
on a board, a company should consider the evolving circumstances and need of the 
company in terms of its size, scope and geography; and the need to achieve an 
appropriate balance of executive and non-executive directors and the independence of 
the directors to ensure that no individual or group of individuals could dominate 
decision-making.  The guide also suggests that companies should consider other 
issues such as whether the director/s represent the interests of certain shareholders or 
groups of shareholders, whether the director/s have the technical know-how or 
experience in the relevant industry, and whether the board reflect a diversity of 
professional experience, race and gender. As in prior studies (e.g. Mak and Kusnadi, 
2005; Vafeas, 2005; Yermack, 1996), this study uses the number of directors at the 
end of the financial year to measure board size (BODSIZE). 
 
4.7.6 Board Independence  
According to the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007), a company‟s 
board should include a balance of executive directors, and nonexecutive directors 
including those that are independent, such that no individual or small group of 
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individuals can dominate the board‟s decision making. It is compulsory for a listed 
company to ensure that at least two directors or one-third of the board (whichever is 
higher) are independent directors
23
. The independent directors are expected to 
strengthen the role of board by bringing an unbiased opinion that non-independent 
directors cannot provide (Bursa Malaysia, 2009, p. 21). The Bursa Malaysia 
Corporate Governance Guide states that: 
Independent directors are essential for protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders and can make significant contributions to a company‟s 
decision making by bringing in the quality of detached impartiality. Since 
an independent director has no conflict of interest in the discharge of his 
duties, he ought to approach any approval that is being sought at board 
level for a transaction or any matter with a watchful eye and with an 
inquiring mind. 
 
I define board independence according to Paragraph 1.01 of the Bursa Malaysia 
Listing Requirements (Bursa Malaysia, 2005), which refers to the proportion of 
directors who are independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship (e.g. family relationship) that could interfere with the exercise of 
independent judgment. In short, other than not being an executive director, an 
independent director does not own any shares in the company and does not have any 
relationship with any major shareholders, officers and executive directors in the 
company. The board independence (BODIND) is measured as the proportion of 
independent directors. 
 
                                               
23 Paragraph 15.02 of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. 
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4.7.7 CEO Duality 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007) does not encourage a company 
to appoint its CEO as the board chairman. The code specifies that there should be a 
clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of the company to ensure a 
balance of power and authority. Thus the role of CEO and chairman should be clearly 
separated
24
. This is so that no one individual has unfettered power of decision 
making. The stock exchange (Bursa Malaysia) also recommends that an independent 
non-executive director be appointed as the chairman to provide balance to the 
influence of the company‟s CEO. However, in a situation where a company‟s CEO is 
also the chairman, it is recommended that the board of directors demonstrate strong 
independence in their decision-making. The decision to combine the roles of the CEO 
and chairman should also be explained in the annual report (Securities Commission, 
2007).This study uses a dummy variable for CEO duality (DUALITY), taking the 
value one if the firm‟s chairman also performs the role of CEO, otherwise zero. 
 
4.8 Control Variables 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) explain that accrual quality could be jointly determined 
by a number of firm characteristics, such as a firm‟s business model and the operating 
environment. Specifically, they document that accrual quality is positively associated 
with firm size, and negatively associated with the variability of cash flows from 
operations, the variability of sales revenue, the length of the operating cycle and the 
frequency of reporting negative earnings. Their findings are consistent with existing 
                                               
24 Paragraph 4.18 the Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (2007). 
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theories, evidence and intuition. For example, accrual quality is higher in large firms 
as they have more stable and predictable operations, and a more diversified portfolio 
which results in smaller estimation errors. Higher variability of cash flows from 
operations and sales and longer operating cycles indicate more uncertainties, and a 
more volatile operating environment. Thus, a greater use of approximation and 
estimation, a higher probability of estimation error, and therefore lower quality of 
accruals. Similarly, firms that report frequent negative earnings are more likely to 
have lower accrual quality as an accrual made in response to negative shocks in 
earnings are likely to involve substantial estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev, 
2002). In addition to the firms characteristics, Francis et al. (2004) include other 
intrinsic factors shown in previous research to influence earnings quality, via, lower 
intensity of intangibles and higher capital intensity.  
 
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2004), this study controls 
for the factors that could potentially influence a firm‟s accrual quality. It is expected 
that the quality of accruals is positively associated with firm size (SIZE) and capital 
intensity (CAPINT); and negatively associated with volatility of cash flow from 
operations (CFOVAR), volatility of sales revenue (SALESVAR), the operating cycle 
(OCYCLE), reporting of negative earnings (LOSS), and intangible asset intensity 
(ININT). 
 
It is widely accepted that highly reputable auditors provide higher quality work than 
do other auditors (DeAngelo, 1981). According to Krishnan (2003), since auditors 
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with a larger client base have a bigger reputation to lose, they would perform a higher 
quality of audit, therefore resulting in a higher quality of reported earnings. Prior 
studies suggest that high quality external auditors are associated with higher quality 
of financial statements as they are able to forestall insiders‟ incentives from 
exploiting accounting-based contractual constraints and are (i) less likely to allow 
earnings management (Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003; Becker, Defond, 
Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Francis, 
Maydew, and Sparks, 1999; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; Gul, Lynn, and 
Tsui, 2002), and (ii) more likely to detect accounting error (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1991). To control for the effect of external auditor quality, this study uses a dummy 
variable for auditor quality (BIG4), taking the value 1 if the firm was audited by a Big 
4 auditor, otherwise 0.  
 
Previous studies have also found that other firms characteristics such as firm growth 
(Johnson et al., 2002), financial distress (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Dechow et 
al., 1996; Saleh and Ahmed, 2005) and tightness of debt constraints (Carlson and 
Bathala, 1997; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jaggi and Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994) 
may affect the quality of earnings. However, the results of these studies are mixed.  
 
According to Summers and Sweeney (1998), unethical managers are motivated to 
misstate financial statements when growth slows or reverses, to maintain a firm‟s 
consistent growth. Therefore, firms with lower rate of growth are more likely to be 
associated with lower earnings quality. In contrast, AlNajjar and Riahi-Belkaoui 
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(2001) show that earnings management, measured by discretionary accruals, is higher 
in high growth firms, consistent with the political cost hypothesis of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978).  
 
Rosner (2003) and García-Lara et al. (2009) show that financially distressed firms are 
more likely to manipulate earnings before bankruptcy. Distressed firms are motivated 
by a desire to conceal signs of distress, leading them to manipulate earnings upwards 
(Rosner, 2003), in an attempt to pass through what management perceived as being a 
temporary bad period (García-Lara et al., 2009). Conversely, several studies have 
found that distressed firms do not manage earnings upward (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Skinner, 1994; Saleh and Ahmed, 2005), as managers prefer to disclose the 
firm‟s financial troubles to show their willingness to deal with them (DeAngelo et al., 
1994), or to obtain consideration from labour unions and assistance from the 
government (García-Lara et al., 2009).  DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) show that 
managers of firms with tight debt constraints have incentives to increase income 
using discretionary accruals to avoid debt covenant violation. However, Becker et al. 
(1998) find that leverage is negatively associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. This could be due to the fact that the presence of debt-holders 
offers additional monitoring of managerial activities. As external capital providers, 
debt-holders have the incentive and ability to monitor firm activity to protect their 
invested principal (Larcker et al., 2007).  
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Based on the empirical evidence on the association between firm‟s characteristics and 
earnings quality, this study include firm‟s growth (GROWTH), financial distress 
(DISTRESS), and tightness of debt constraints (LEVERAGE) as additional control 
variables. However, as shown in Table 4.2, no specific signs are predicted for these 
control variables.  
 
The control variables are measured as follows. Firm size, (SIZE), is measured as the 
log of average total assets. Volatility of cash flows from operation, (CFOVAR), is 
proxied by the standard deviation of the firm‟s cash flow from operations scaled by 
total assets, over a lag of a six year period. Volatility of sales, (SALESVAR), is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the firm‟s sales revenue scaled by total assets, 
over a lag of a six year period. Operating cycle, (OPCYCLE), is the sum of days 
accounts receivable and sum of days inventory divided by 30. The reporting of 
negative earnings, (LOSS), is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm 
reported negative earnings at the end of the financial year, otherwise, 0. Intangible 
intensity, (ININT), equals the ratio of R&D and advertising expenses to total sales 
revenue with any missing values of R&D and advertising expenses set to zero. 
Capital intensity (CAPINT) is measured as the ratio of the net book value of plant, 
property and equipment to total assets. Growth (GROWTH) equals the market-to 
book ratio, calculated as the end-of-year share price divided by book value per share. 
Tightness of debt constraints (LEVERAGE) equals the ratio of total debt to total 
assets, measured as the end of year total debt divide by total assets. Firm‟s financial 
distress (DISTRESS) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the sample firm 
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experiences financial distress during the financial year, otherwise 0. To identify 
whether a firm is financially distressed during the period, each firm‟s Z-Score is 
calculated using the Altman (1968) model. A firm with an average Z-Score of below 
1.81 is considered to be financially distressed
25
.  
 
4.9 Regression Models 
4.9.1 Direct Effect of Family Influence and Corporate Governance Variables on 
Earnings Quality.  
To test the hypotheses of this study,  several multiple regression analysis are 
performed using ordinary least square regressions.  As explained in the previous 
section, the models employ the absolute value of residuals from the modified Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) cross-sectional accrual quality model, multiplied by negative one, 
as a proxy for accrual quality (AQUALITY). This measure represents the extent of 
accrual quality, where higher AQUALITY implies higher accrual quality. The 
following multiple regression model is used to test the Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 
2: 
 
AQUALITYi,t = β0 + β1 FAMILYi,t + β2ACSIZEi,t + β3ACINDi,t + β4ACMEETi,,t  
+ β5ACFINi,t + β6BODSIZEi,t + β7BODINDi,t +β8DUALITYi,t 
 
 
                                               
25 Altman Z-Scores are calculated annually using the following formula: (1.2 x working capital / total assets ) + 
(1.4 x retained earnings/ total assets) + (3.3 x EBIT/total aseests) + (0.6 x market capitalisation) + (0.999 x 
sales/total assets). According to Altman (1968), firms with a Z-Score below 1.81 are likely to fall into bankruptcy 
within two years. 
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+ β9BIG4i,t+ β10GROWTHi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12SIZEi,t  
+ β13LOSSi,t + β14SALESVARi,t+ β15CAPINTi,t  
+ β16OPCYCLEi,t + β17CFOVARi,t + β18INTINTi,t 
+ β19DISTRESSi,t +  i,t 
 
 
 
(4.3) 
where: 
AQUALITYi,t  = additive inverse of the absolute value of residuals from the 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) cross-sectional series 
model; 
FAMILYi,t = dummy variable taking the value 1 if the family members own 
more than 20 percent of the firm‟s shares, and two or more 
members of the controlling family are appointed as directors, 
otherwise 0; 
ACSIZEi,t = number of audit committee members; 
ACINDi,t = proportion of independent directors on the audit committee; 
ACMEETi,t = number of audit committee meetings during the financial year; 
ACFINi,t = number of audit committee members with financial expertise; 
BODSIZEi,t = number of board members; 
BODINDi,t = proportion of independent directors on the board; 
DUALITYi,t = dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm‟s CEO is the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors, otherwise 0; 
BIG4i,t = a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm was audited by 
a Big 4 auditor, otherwise 0; 
GROWTHi,t = end-of-year share price divided by book value per share; 
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LEVERAGEi,t = total debt divided by total assets at the end of the financial year; 
SIZEi ,t = log of total assets at the end of the financial year; 
LOSSi,t = a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reported 
negative earnings at the end of the financial year, otherwise, 0; 
SALESVARi,t  = standard deviation of sales revenue for a lag of six-year period; 
CAPINTi,t = ratio of net book value of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets at the end of financial year; 
OPCYCLEi,t = sum of days accounts receivable and sum of days inventory 
divided by 30; 
CFOVARi,t = standard deviation of cash flows from operation during a lag six-
year period; 
INTINTi,t = ratio of reported R&D and advertising expenses to total sales 
revenue at the end of financial year; 
DISTRESSi,t = a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm‟s Altman Z 
Score signaled financial distress, otherwise 0; 
 
In equation (4.3), the coefficient for FAMILY, (β1), signals the difference between 
earnings quality of family firms and nonfamily firms. If the coefficient is 
significantly positive (negative), family firms have significantly higher (lower) 
earnings quality than nonfamily firms. A significant positive or negative coefficient 
for FAMILY, (β1), suggests rejection of the null hypotheses (H1), that there is no 
difference between earnings quality of family and nonfamily firms. The coefficients 
of ACSIZE (β2), ACIND (β3), ACMEET (β4), ACFIN (β5), BODSIZE (β6), BODIND 
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(β7) and DUALITY (β8), show whether these corporate governance variables are 
associated with earnings quality. For example, a significant positive (negative) 
coefficient of ACSIZE, (β2) indicates that a bigger (smaller) audit committee size is 
associated with higher (lower) earnings quality. Based on the argument in Sections 
4.3 and 4.8, the expected relationship between AQUALITY and the independent 
variables are illustrated in Table 4.2. Significant positive coefficients on ACSIZE, 
(β2), ACIND (β3), ACMEET (β4), ACFIN (β5) and BODIND (β7) suggest support for 
hypotheses H2A, H2B, H2C, H2D and H2F, respectively. While, significant negative 
coefficients of BODSIZE (β6) and DUALITY (β8) will support hypotheses H2E and 
H2G, respectively. 
 
Table 4.2: Expected Relations between Explanatory Variables and Earnings Quality 
Explanatory Variables  Expected Sign  Earnings Quality 
Family Firms  +/-  Undetermined 
Corporate Governance Variables     
Audit Committee Size  +  Higher earnings quality 
Audit Committee Independence  +  Higher earnings quality 
Audit Committee Meeting  +  Higher earnings quality 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise  +  Higher earnings quality 
Board Size  -  Lower earnings quality 
Board Independence  +  Higher earnings quality 
CEO Duality  -  Lower earnings quality 
Other Control Variables     
Audited by Big4  +  Higher earnings quality 
Growth  +/-  Undetermined 
Leverage  +/-  Undetermined 
Firm Size  +  Higher earnings quality 
Reporting Losses  -  Lower earnings quality 
Sales Variability  -  Lower earnings quality 
Capital Intensity  +  Higher earnings quality 
Operating Cycle  -  Lower earnings quality 
Cash Flows Variability  -  Lower earnings quality 
Intangible Intensity  -  Lower earnings quality 
Financial Distress  +/-  Undetermined 
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4.9.2 Mitigating Effect of Family Influence on the Relationship between Corporate 
Governance and Earnings Quality 
To examine the effect of family firms on the association between corporate 
governance and earnings quality, this study partitions the full sample into two 
subsamples of firms. One subsample consists of family firms, in which family 
members own more than 20 percent of firm‟s shares, and two or more members of the 
controlling family are appointed as directors. The other subsample consists of 
nonfamily firms, which are firms that do not meet the criteria of family firms. 
Hypothesis H3 is tested by estimating equation (4.3) for the two sub-samples 
separately after the deletion of the family variable (FAMILY). It is expected that the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality is stronger in 
nonfamily firms sample, compared to family firms. 
 
I also test the third hypothesis relating to whether the corporate governance-earnings 
quality relationship in family firms is weaker than in nonfamily firms, by estimating 
another ordinary least square regression using equation (4.4) as follows: 
 
AQUALITYi,t = β0 + β1 FAMILYi,t + β2ACSIZEi,t + β3ACINDi,t + β4ACMEETi,t  
+ β5ACFINi,t + β6BODSIZEi,t + β7BODINDi,t +β8DUALITYi,t 
+ β9ACSIZE*FAMILYi,t + β10ACIND*FAMILYi,t  
+ β11ACMEET*FAMILYi,t + β12ACFIN*FAMILYi,t  
+ β13BODSIZE*FAMILYi,t + β14BODIND*FAMILYi,t  
+β15DUALITY*FAMILYi,t+ β16BIG4i,t+ β17GROWTHi,t 
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+ β18LEVERAGEi,t + β19SIZEi,t + β20LOSSi,t + β21SALESVARi,t 
+ β22CAPINTi,t + β23OPCYCLEi,t + β24CFOVARi,t + β25INTINTi,t 
+ β126DISTRESSi,t +  i,t 
 
 
 
 
(4.4) 
 
Equation (4.4) includes seven interaction variables of corporate governance measures 
and family firms. The variables are ACSIZE*FAMILY, ACIND*FAMILY, 
ACMEET*FAMILY, ACFIN*FAMILY, BODSIZE*FAMILY, BODIND*FAMILY and 
DUALITY*FAMILY. These variables measure the incremental effect of each 
corporate governance-earnings quality relationship in family firms. If the coefficient 
of ACSIZE*FAMILY, ACIND*FAMILY, ACMEET*FAMILY, ACFIN*FAMILY and 
BODIND*FAMILY is positive, and the coefficient of BODSIZE*FAMILY and 
DUALITY*FAMILY is negative; family firms have significantly stronger corporate 
governance-earnings quality relationships than in nonfamily firms. On the other hand, 
a significant opposite sign on the coefficients would indicate weaker corporate 
governance-earnings quality relationships in family firms.  
 
4.10 Sensitivity and Robustness Test 
Several sensitivity and robustness tests are carried out in this study. This includes 
correcting t-statistics using the method introduced by White (1980) to adjust for 
potential heteroscedasticity problems, using industry and year dummies to control for 
industry and year fixed effects, adopting Fama & MacBeth regressions to mitigate 
potential time-series correlations of pooled data, and using alternative measures for 
the family firm and earnings quality. 
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4.10.1 Controlling for Potential Heteroscedasticity Problem  
According to Chai and Hayes (2008), among the assumptions of the ordinary least 
squares OLS regression model, homoscedasticity is a rather stringent one that is 
unlikely to hold in many applied settings. The variance of the dependent variable is 
often related to the values of one or more explanatory variables, resulting in 
heteroscedasticity (Chai and Hayes, 2008). Therefore, White (1980) corrected t-
statistics are estimated to account for potential heteroscedasticity problem.  
 
4.10.2 Controlling for Potential Time-series Correlations of Pooled Data 
As this study use panel data, in which 527 companies are observed over a six-year 
period of 2003-2008, there is the possibility of serial correlation of residuals. Fama 
and French (2002) highlighted the inference problem due to correlation of the 
residuals across firms in panel data. They emphasise that when the residuals are 
correlated across years, the cross-correlation problem and the bias in the standard 
errors of regression slopes arise. To tackle this problem, controls for industry and 
year fixed effects on earnings quality are included in equation (4.3) and the equation 
is re-estimated. This study creates industry dummies, based on the Malaysian Stock 
Exchange industry classification, and year dummies as in equation (4.5). 
 
AQUALITYi,t = β0 + β1 FAMILYi,t + β2ACSIZEi,t + β3ACINDi,t + β4ACMEETi,t  
+ β5ACFINi,t + β6BODSIZEi,t + β7BODINDi,t +β8DUALITYi,t 
+ β9BIG4i,t+ β10GROWTHi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12SIZEi,t  
+ β13LOSSi,t + β14SALESVARi,t+ β15CAPINTi,t  
+ β16OPCYCLEi,t + β17CFOVARi,t + β18INTINTi,t 
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+ β19DISTRESSi,t + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies+  i,t (4.5) 
 
Accordingly, the control for industry and year fixed effect are also included in 
equation (4.4) to ensure that the result of the mitigating effect of family on the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality does not suffer from 
the problem of serially correlated residuals. The relationship is re-estimated using 
equation (4.6), in which the industry and year dummies are included to control for 
industry and year fixed effects. 
AQUALITYi,t = β0 + β1 FAMILYi,t + β2ACSIZEi,t + β3ACINDi,t + β4ACMEETi,t  
+ β5ACFINi,t + β6BODSIZEi,t + β7BODINDi,t +β8DUALITYi,t 
+ β9ACSIZE*FAMILYi,t + β10ACIND*FAMILYi,t  
+ β11ACMEET*FAMILYi,t + β12ACFIN*FAMILYi,t  
+ β13BODSIZE*FAMILYi,t + β14BODIND*FAMILYi,t  
+β15DUALITY*FAMILYi,t+ β16BIG4i,t+ β17GROWTHi,t 
+ β18LEVERAGEi,t + β19SIZEi,t + β20LOSSi,t + β21SALESVARi,t 
+ β22CAPINTi,t + β23OPCYCLEi,t + β24CFOVARi,t + β25INTINTi,t 
+ β26DISTRESSi,t + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies+  i,t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.6) 
 
As an alternative to mitigate potential time-series correlations of pooled data, the 
study also performs the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression approach as in the 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Wang (2006) studies.  
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4.10.3 Alternative Measures of Earnings Quality 
The accrual quality measure used in this study is based on the absolute value of the 
residuals generated from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality model with 
some modifications as suggested by McNichols (2002). The difference between the 
original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and the modified version is that the 
original model captures both intentional and unintentional accrual estimation error by 
management (Hermanns, 2006). The modified version of the model captures only the 
intentional accrual estimation error by including some variables from Jones‟ (1991) 
earnings management model, viz, the PPE and ∆REV. To check whether the results 
are robust to alternative measures of accrual quality, estimation of equations (4.3) to 
(4.6)  is repeated using an alternative accrual quality measures, the absolute value of 
residuals from the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
 
Similar to the previous approach,  regression (4.1) is performed cross-sectionally for 
each industry and year based on the Bursa Malaysia industry classification to estimate 
the accrual quality values for each firm from the year 2003 to 2008. The absolute 
value of the residuals estimated from the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
are then multiplied by negative 1 to represent the alternative measure for accrual 
quality (AQ2). A higher value of AQ2 reflects better quality of earnings. 
  
4.10.4 Alternative Measures of Family Influence 
As explained in Section 4.6, existing studies such as Chau and Gray (2010) and Chu 
and Cheah (2006), identify family firms based on common shares held by the 
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founding family and their relatives. Other studies, such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) measure family dominance based on the control of 
family members over the firm‟s board. In Wang (2006), family ownership and family 
control of the board are separated and identified as two different variables. 
 
Based on the existing studies, alternative measures for family firms are used to 
provide additional evidence on the effect of family firms on the quality of earnings 
and the corporate governance-earnings quality relationship. First, the variable 
FAMILY is replaced by FAM20, a binary variable for family firms that is coded one if 
family members own more than 20% of the firm‟s shares, and coded zero otherwise. 
This variable, (FAM20), measures the effect of family firms due to ownership of the 
firm‟s equity by family members, regardless of control through the board of directors. 
Second, the variable FAMILY is replaced by FAMBOD, a binary variable for family 
firms that is coded one if there are two or more family members on the board, and 
coded zero otherwise. This variable, (FAMBOD), measures the effect of family firms 
due to control of the board by family members irrespective of the level of family 
common stock ownership. Wang (2006) justifies this variable on the basis that family 
influence exerted on the firm, represented by voting power, may go beyond the 
percentage of shares owned by family members. 
4.11 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the study and explains the 
expected links between family firms, corporate governance and earnings quality 
based on agency theory. With reference to the theoretical framework, this chapter 
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develops the hypotheses predicting the relationship between the three main variables. 
First, it is hypothesised that there is a relationship between earnings quality and 
family firms. Second, the study hypothesises that better quality of earnings is 
associated with stronger corporate governance; as manifest by bigger size of the audit 
committee, a more independent audit committee, more frequent audit committee 
meetings, greater audit committee financial expertise, smaller size of the board of 
directors, a more independent board of directors, and the absence of CEO duality. 
Third, it is hypothesised that family influence mitigates the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings quality. 
 
This chapter also describes the research methodology; including the sample selection 
process, the measures for the dependent, independent and control variables, and the 
quantitative analyses used to test the hypotheses. The results of the application of this 
research methodology are reported in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the study. Section 5.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the sample. The correlation analysis of the variables examined in the 
study is presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides the findings from the analysis 
of the direct effect of family ownership and corporate governance variables on 
earnings quality. The findings from the analysis the mitigating effect of family 
ownership effect on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
quality are reported in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 outlines the results from the sensitivity 
analyses. Section 5.7 provides a discussion of the analyses.  
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports the mean values of earnings quality (AQUALITY), which is 
measured as the additive inverse of the absolute value of residuals from industry-
specific yearly regression of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2000) accrual quality 
model, for each industry and year during the period under study. In general, the mean 
value of earnings quality does not vary greatly between the years. The highest 
(lowest) mean value of AQUALITY occurred in 2006 (2004), with a value of -0.054 (-
0.067). In particular, the year 2006 recorded the highest mean of AQUALITY for all 
industries, except for the properties sector. Across industries, the table shows that on 
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average, the plantation sector had the highest earnings quality, while the technology 
sector had the lowest quality of earnings during the sample period.  
 
Table 5.1: Description of Earnings Quality by Industry and Year 
Industry Mean values of Earnings Quality (AQUALITY) 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total Period 
Construction -0.077 -0.067 -0.058 -0.051 -0.076 -0.060 -0.065 
Consumer Product -0.052 -0.059 -0.057 -0.049 -0.057 -0.052 -0.054 
Industrial Product -0.069 -0.074 -0.056 -0.055 -0.066 -0.056 -0.063 
Plantation -0.045 -0.063 -0.052 -0.029 -0.044 -0.043 -0.046 
Properties -0.061 -0.049 -0.049 -0.066 -0.061 -0.062 -0.058 
Technology -0.085 -0.111 -0.069 -0.064 -0.057 -0.080 -0.078 
Trading/Services -0.068 -0.061 -0.059 -0.056 -0.079 -0.073 -0.066 
All companies -0.065 -0.067 -0.056 -0.054 -0.065 -0.060 -0.061 
Note: The sample covered a total of 527 companies. Earnings quality (AQUALITY) is measured as the additive 
inverse of the absolute value of residual from the cross-sectional modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual 
quality model over 2003-2008. Companies are categorised based on the Bursa Malaysia industry classification. 
 
With regard to family and nonfamily firms, the industry distribution based on Bursa 
Malaysia industry classification and description of earnings quality are shown in 
Table 5.2. Overall, the table shows that both groups of firms in the sample have 
similar industry distributions. The proportion of family firms is higher than nonfamily 
firms in all sectors, other than properties, technology and trading/services. In total, 
the percentage of family firms in the sample is 51.23%. This is slightly lower than the 
percentage reported in previous studies on family firms in Malaysia
26
. However, this 
difference is to be expected as the current study use stricter criteria for family firm 
identification.  
                                               
26 Claessens et al. (2000) shows that 57.5% and 67.2% of publicly listed firms in Malaysia as of the end of fiscal 
year 1996 are owned by family based on 10% and 20% equity ownership, respectively. Similarly, Cheung and 
Chan (2004) states that based on 20 percent cut off level, 67.2% of total market capitalization in Malaysia is 
controlled by family. 
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Table 5.2: Description of Family and Nonfamily Firms by Industry 
Industry  Description of Family and 
Nonfamily Firms by Industry 
  Earnings Quality (AQUALITY) of 
Family and Nonfamily Firms  
  No. of 
nonfamily 
firms 
No. of 
family 
firms 
Percentage 
of family 
firms 
 
Nonfamily firms Family firms 
    Mean Median Mean Median 
Construction 15 20 57.14 
 
-0.061 -0.050 -0.068 -0.049 
Consumer Product 36 58 61.70 
 
-0.065 -0.045 -0.048 -0.037 
Industrial Product 90 96 51.61 
 
-0.070 -0.045 -0.055 -0.037 
Plantation 11 17 60.71 
 
-0.048 -0.034 -0.045 -0.031 
Properties 33 32 49.23 
 
-0.065 -0.041 -0.051 -0.035 
Technology 19 10 34.48 
 
-0.082 -0.067 -0.070 -0.059 
Trading/Services 53 37 41.11 
 
-0.070 -0.047 -0.060 -0.040 
Total 257 270 51.23   -0.068 -0.046 -0.055 -0.039 
Note: The sample covered a total of 527 companies. The study divided the sample into two groups: family and 
nonfamily firms. Family firms are firms firm where family members own more than 20 percent of the firm‟s 
shares, and two or more members of the controlling family are appointed as directors. Earnings quality 
(AQUALITY) is measured as the additive inverse of the absolute value of residual from modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) cross-sectional accrual quality model over 2003-2008. Companies are categorised based on the 
Bursa Malaysia industry classification.  
 
Table 5.2 illustrates that the overall mean of earnings quality in family firms is higher 
than nonfamily firm. Across the full sample, earnings quality (AQUALITY) in family 
firms has a mean of -0.055 and a median of -0.039, while AQUALITY in nonfamily 
firms has a mean of -0.068 and a median of -0.046. The table also shows that the 
quality of earnings in family firms is on average higher than nonfamily firms in all 
industries except for the construction sector where it is marginally lower. 
Specifically, AQUALITY in family (nonfamily) firms within the construction industry 
has a mean of -0.068 (- 0.061) and a median of -0.049 (-0.050), respectively. The 
mean of AQUALITY for family (nonfamily) firms is -0.048 (-0.065) in consumer 
product, -0.055 (-0.070) in industrial product, -0.045 (-0.048) in plantation, -0.051 (-
0.065) in property, -0.070 (-0.082) in technology and -0.060 (-0.070) in 
trading/services, respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 5.3 presents the summary statistics of all continuous variables, and 
univariate analysis of mean differences in earnings quality, corporate governance and 
firm‟s characteristics between family and nonfamily firms. As reported in the table, 
the mean and median value of earnings quality (AQUALITY) is -0.061 and -0.042 
respectively. The univariate analysis shows that the mean difference between the 
earnings quality of family and nonfamily firms is statistically different at 0.01 percent 
level.  
 
With respect to the corporate governance variables, Table 5.3 shows that not all 
variables have a statistically different mean values between family and nonfamily 
firms. For the size of audit committee (ACSIZE), the descriptive statistics shows the 
smallest and biggest audit committee of firms in the sample has 2 and 10 members, 
respectively. On average, the audit committee of firms in the sample has 3 to 4 
members. The same range applies to the average size of audit committee in family 
and nonfamily firms. While the smallest audit committee in both types of firms have 
2 members, the biggest audit committee in family (nonfamily firms) has 6 (10) 
members. However, the test of mean difference between the size of audit committee 
in family and nonfamily firms shows no significant result. 
 
In terms of audit committee independence (ACIND), surprisingly, not all companies 
meet the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement that a majority of the audit committee 
members should be independent. As reported in Table 5.3, the minimum and average 
percentage of independent audit committee members in the sample is 25% and 74%, 
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respectively. The table also shows that the mean proportion of independent audit 
committee in family firms is marginally lower than in nonfamily firms but this 
difference is significant. This indicates that audit committees members in family 
firms are more likely to have a greater proportion of non-independent audit 
committee members, signaling the potential involvement of family members in the 
audit committee.  
 
Table 5.3 shows that the average number of audit committee meetings (ACMEET) is 
4 to 5 times in year. Both family and nonfamily data sets show that the minimum 
number of audit committee meeting is 0. But, the maximum number of audit 
committee meetings in a year is 10 for family firms and 13 for nonfamily firms. The 
analysis of the mean difference between the number of audit committee meetings in 
the two groups of firms shows a significantly higher average in nonfamily firms. 
 
With regards to audit committee financial expertise (ACFIN), the table shows that the 
companies in the sample range from those without any financial expert in the audit 
committee to those with 100% financial experts in the audit committee. Both family 
and nonfamily groups show similar distributions. The average proportions of 
financial expertise in audit committee in the full sample, family and nonfamily are 
37.7%, 37.3% and 38.1% respectively. There is no significant difference between the 
mean values of the proportion of audit committee financial experts in family and 
nonfamily firms. 
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics and Analysis of Mean Differences in Earnings Quality, 
Corporate Governance and Firm Characteristics between Family and Nonfamily Firms 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
      Firms     Mean difference (2)-(3) 
    All (1) Non-family (2) Family (3)  (t-value) 
AQUALITY Mean -0.061 -0.068 -0.055 
 
-0.013* 
 
Median -0.042 -0.046 -0.039 
 
(-5.917) 
 
SD 0.063 0.070 0.055 
  
 
Min -0.429 -0.429 -0.387 
  
  Max -0.000 -0.000 -0.000     
ACSIZE Mean 3.433 3.429 3.436 
 
-0.008 
 
Median 3.000 3.000 3.000 
 
(-0.327) 
 
SD 0.666 0.698 0.635 
  
 
Min 2.000 2.000 2.000 
  
  Max 10.000  10.000 6.000     
ACIND Mean 0.740 0.745 0.735 
 
0.010** 
 
Median 0.670 0.670 0.670 
 
(2.366) 
 
SD 0.121 0.126 0.116 
  
 
Min 0.250 0.330 0.250 
  
  Max 1.000  1.000 1.000     
ACMEET Mean 4.690 4.754 4.630 
 
0.123* 
 
Median 5.000 5.000 5.000 
 
(3.178) 
 
SD 1.092 1.171 1.009 
  
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
  Max 13.000  13.000 10.000     
ACFIN Mean 0.377 0.381 0.373 
 
0.009 
 
Median 0.330 0.330 0.330 
 
(1.345) 
 
SD 0.184 0.186 0.182 
  
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
  Max 1.000  1.000 1.000     
BODSIZE Mean 7.415 7.265 7.557 
 
-0.292* 
 
Median 7.000 7.000 7.000 
 
(-4.412) 
 
SD 1.863 1.857 1.858 
  
 
Min 3.000 3.000 4.000 
  
  Max 15.000 14.000 15.000     
BODIND Mean 0.420 0.431 0.409 
 
0.022* 
 
Median 0.400 0.400 0.400 
 
(5.830) 
 
SD 0.107 0.117 0.096 
  
 
Min 0.143 0.167 0.143 
  
  Max 1.000 1.000  1.000     
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GROWTH Mean 1.020 1.094 0.949 
 
0.144* 
 
Median 0.770 0.820 0.740 
 
(5.099) 
 
SD 0.798 0.856 0.733 
  
 
Min 0.170 0.170 0.170 
  
  Max 3.640  3.640 3.640     
LEVERAGE Mean 0.225 0.225 0.225 
 
0.000 
 
Median 0.210 0.217 0.204 
 
(0.012) 
 
SD 0.175 0.172 0.179 
  
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
  Max 0.672  0.672 0.672     
SIZE Mean 8.453 8.473 8.433 
 
0.040** 
 
Median 8.387 8.432 8.359 
 
(2.141) 
 
SD 0.524 0.555 0.491 
  
 
Min 7.496 7.496 7.496 
  
  Max 9.930 9.930  9.930     
SALESVAR Mean 0.260 0.287 0.235 
 
0.051* 
 
Median 0.215 0.233 0.201 
 
(8.245) 
 
SD 0.177 0.198 0.150 
  
 
Min 0.043 0.043 0.043 
  
  Max 1.003 1.003  1.003     
CAPINT Mean 0.385 0.371 0.399 
 
-0.028* 
 
Median 0.383 0.371 0.395 
 
(-3.905) 
 
SD 0.202 0.204 0.199 
  
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
  Max 0.955  0.942 0.955     
OPCYCLE Mean 0.320 0.332 0.309 
 
0.023 
 
Median 0.196 0.181 0.206 
 
(1.385) 
 
SD 0.460 0.497 0.421 
  
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
  Max 2.693  2.693 2.693     
CFOVAR Mean 0.059 0.063 0.055 
 
0.008* 
 
Median 0.048 0.052 0.044 
 
(5.032) 
 
SD 0.045 0.048 0.042 
  
 
Min 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  
  Max 0.264 0.264  0.264     
INTINT Mean 0.022 0.020 0.025 
 
-0.005 
 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(-1.256) 
 
SD 0.108 0.103 0.113 
  
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
  Max 0.682 0.682  0.682     
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Panel B: Dichotomous Variables   
 
  
Firms  Mean 
difference 
(2)-(3) 
(t-value) 
 
  
All (1) 
 
Family (3) 
 
Nonfamily (2)  
  
1 0 
 
1 0 
 
1 0  
DUALITY Frequency 472 2,690 
 
264 1,356 
 
208 1,334  -0.028** 
 
Percentage 14.93 85.07 
 
16.30 83.70 
 
13.49 86.51  (-2.215) 
BIG4 Frequency 2004 1158 
 
1084 536 
 
920 622  -0.073* 
 
Percentage 63.38 36.62 
 
66.91 33.09 
 
59.66 40.34  (-4.241) 
LOSS Frequency 736 2426 
 
302 1318 
 
434 1108  0.095* 
 
Percentage 23.28 76.72 
 
18.64 81.36 
 
28.15 71.85  (6.359) 
DISTRESS Frequency 1363 1799 
 
646 974 
 
717 825  0.066* 
 
Percentage 43.11 56.89 
 
39.88 60.12 
 
46.50 53.50  (3.765) 
Note: * and ** represents statistical significance at 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The sample covered a 
total of 527 companies over 2003-2008. Family firms are firms that have family members owning more than 20 
percent of firm‟s shares and two or more members of the controlling family are appointed as directors. 
AQUALITY is the additive inverse of the absolute value of residual from modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
cross-sectional accrual quality model over 2003-2008.  ACSIZE is the total number firm‟s audit committee 
members. ACIND is the proportion of independent audit committee members to the total number of audit 
committee members. ACMEET is the number of firm‟s audit committee meeting during the year financial year.  
ACFIN is the proportion of audit committee members with financial/accounting expertise to the total number of 
audit committee members. BODSIZE is the total number of directors in the board. BODIND is the proportion of 
independent directors to the total number of board of directors. GROWTH equals the end-of-year share price 
divided by book value per share. LEVERAGE is measured as end of the year total debt divide by total assets. 
SIZE is the log of total assets. SALESVAR is the standard deviation of sales revenue over a lag of six years 
period. CAPINT is a measure of capital intensity, equal to the ratio of net book value of property, plant and 
equipment to total assets. OPCYCLE is the sum of days account receivable and sum of days inventory divided 
by 30. CFOVAR is the standard deviation of cash flows from operation over a lag of six years period. INTINT is 
a measure of intangible intensity, equal to the ratio of reported R&D and advertising expenses to total sales 
revenue. DUALITY is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm‟s chairman also performs the role of 
CEO, otherwise 0. BIG4 is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm was audited by a Big 4 auditor, 
otherwise 0. LOSS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if firm reported negative earnings at the end of 
financial year, otherwise, 0. DISTRESS is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the firm‟s Altman Z Score 
signalled financial distress, otherwise 0.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the board size variables (BODSIZE) and board independence 
(BODIND) show that on average, companies in the full sample have between 7 to 8 
directors on the board, on average, with 42% of the directors being independent. The 
analysis of mean difference of BODSIZE and BODIND between family and 
nonfamily firms reveals that family firms have higher mean values for BODSIZE, but 
lower mean values for BODIND. This is logical since in family firms, family 
members are usually appointed as company directors, making the overall size of 
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board of directors in family firms bigger, compared to nonfamily firms. The 
involvement of family members as company directors also contributes to relatively 
lower proportion of independent directors in these firms. 
 
As regards the continuous control variables, Panel A shows that firms in the sample 
have mean (median) market to book ratio of 1.02 (0.770); the mean (median) of firms 
leverage, as measured by total debts to total assets is 22.5% (21.0%), with a standard 
deviation of 0.175; the mean (median) of firm size, as measured by log of total assets 
is 8.453 (8.387) with a standard deviation of 0.524; the mean values for sales 
variability, capital intensity, operating cycle, cash flows variability and intangible 
intensity are 0.26, 0.385, 0.320, 0.059 and 0.022 respectively. The test of mean 
difference shows that there are significant difference between the mean values of firm 
growth, size, sales variability, capital intensity and cash flows variability between 
family and nonfamily firms. 
 
Panel B of Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics of dichotomous variables used 
in the study. The table shows that only 14.93% of the sample observations are 
characterised by CEO duality. Specifically, 16.30% of family firms and 13.49% of 
nonfamily firms have a chairman who is also the chief executive officer. This implies 
that for the majority of the sample firms, CEO and board chair positions are occupied 
by different individuals. In total, 63.38% firms in the sample are audited by Big4 
companies. The percentage of firms audited by Big4 in family firms, 66.91%, is 
slightly higher than for nonfamily firms, 59.66. Overall, 23.28% percent of the 
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sample observations reported negative earnings (LOSS) and 43.11% are in financial 
distress during the six-year period of 2003-2008. Family firms recorded a lower 
frequency of reporting losses and lower percentage of firms in financial distress, 
compared to non family firms.  
 
5.3 Correlation Analysis of Variables 
To examine the correlation among the dependent and independent variables in the 
regression tests, a correlation analysis for all variables is performed, except for the 
year and industry dummies. According to Pallant (2007), a serious multi-collinearity 
problem might exists among independent variables if the univariate correlation 
coefficient is significant and greater than 0.7. The Pearson product momentum 
correlations and Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported in Table 5.4. 
Although most correlations are statistically significant, the correlations are not large 
enough to prohibit the use of multivariate regression analysis. However, since a large 
number of independent variables are used in the regression tests, there are still 
possibilities of the independent variables being collectively correlated with other 
variables. The univariate Pearson and Spearman correlation results are not able to 
detect the collective multiple correlations (Berry and Feldman, 1985). Therefore, this 
study examines the variance inflation factors of variables used in the regression tests 
to determine if such multiple correlations exist between independent variables. The 
variance inflations factors, as shown in Table 5.5, are less than 10, indicating there is 
no serious multicollinearity problem.  
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The correlation matrix in Table 5.4 shows that the various measures of family firms 
are all positively correlated with the measures of accrual quality. Thus family firm is 
associated with higher earnings quality. The degree of the correlations is in general 
consistent with those reported in Wang (2006).  
 
The control variables, firm growth (GROWTH), firms size (SIZE), reporting of 
negative earnings (LOSS), sales variability (SALESVAR), capital intensity (CAPINT), 
operating cycle (OPCYCLE), cash flow variability (CFOVAR), and intangible 
intensity (INTINT) also show significant correlations with the dependent variable 
(AQUALITY). The sign of the significant correlations is consistent with the expected 
sign as noted in Table 4.2. Surprisingly, the corporate governance variables do not 
show significant correlations with earnings quality in the sample. 
 
Consistent with the analysis of mean difference in the previous section, the 
correlation matrix in Table 5.4 shows that the family firm variable is significantly 
related to lower audit committee independence (ACIND), lower number of audit 
committee meetings (ACMEET), bigger board size (BODSIZE), lower board 
independence (BODIND), lower growth (GROWTH), smaller firm size (SIZE), lower 
sales variability (SALESVAR), higher capital intensity (CAPINT) and lower cash flow 
variability (CFOVAR). The family firm variable is also found to be positively 
correlated with CEO duality (DUALITY) and appointment of Big4 auditors (BIG4) 
and negatively related to the reporting of negative earnings (LOSS).  
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Table 5.4: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix for Family, Corporate Governance and Control Variables 
 
AQUALITY AQ2 FAMILY FAM20 FAMBOD ACSIZE ACIND ACMEET ACFIN BODSIZE 
AQUALITY 
 
0.820** 0.088** 0.062** 0.078** 0.014 0.012 0.027 -0.010 0.000 
AQ2 0.919** 
 
0.090** 0.051** 0.090** 0.040* 0.023 .037* -0.029 -0.004 
FAMILY 0.105** 0.103** 
 
0.599** 0.874** 0.022 -0.021 -0.040* -0.036* 0.074** 
FAM20 0.066** 0.063** 0.599** 
 
0.376** 0.038* -0.024 0.040* 0.018 0.051** 
FAMBOD 0.102
**
 0.105
**
 0.874
**
 0.376
**
 
 
0.030 -0.018 -0.056
**
 -0.042
*
 0.085
**
 
ACSIZE 0.018 0.032 0.006 0.030 0.007 
 
0.245** 0.035 -0.458** 0.367** 
ACIND 0.027 0.028 -0.042* -0.042* -0.043* -0.081** 
 
0.033 -0.079** 0.167** 
ACMEET 0.004 0.019 -0.056** 0.029 -0.066** 0.018 0.063** 
 
-0.029 0.001 
ACFIN 0.001 -0.010 -0.024 0.043* -0.030 -0.285** 0.043* -0.013 
 
-0.145** 
BODSIZE 0.006 0.012 0.078** 0.061** 0.087** 0.369** 0.092** 0.013 -0.076** 
 
BODIND -0.031 -0.023 -0.103** -0.046* -0.118** 0.085** 0.279** 0.080** -0.066** -0.276** 
DUALITY 0.013 0.019 0.039* 0.043* 0.027 -0.035* -0.063** 0.025 -0.048** -0.093** 
BIG4 0.014 0.009 0.075** 0.046** 0.056** 0.037* -0.047** -0.017 -0.022 0.042* 
GROWTH -0.134** -0.151** -0.090** -0.113** -0.122** 0.013 -0.039* -0.060** 0.019 0.050** 
LEVERAGE -0.005 -0.029 0.000 -0.004 0.019 -0.050** -0.026 0.047** 0.017 -0.038* 
SIZE 0.056** 0.071** -0.038* 0.000 -0.058** 0.034 0.041* 0.215** -0.029 0.116** 
LOSS -0.101** -0.118** -0.112** -0.063** -0.091** -0.060** 0.031 0.038* -0.043* -0.166** 
SALESVAR -0.124** -0.137** -0.145** -0.031 -0.127** -0.071** 0.056** 0.103** -0.108** -0.097** 
CAPINT 0.128** 0.143** 0.069** 0.049** 0.062** 0.048** -0.088** -0.035 -0.005 0.030 
OPCYCLE -0.040* -0.042* -0.025 -0.016 0.017 -0.036* 0.017 0.028 0.014 -0.067** 
CFOVAR -0.186** -0.197** -0.089** -0.073** -0.069** 0.005 0.036* -0.038* 0.001 -0.002 
INTINT -0.036* -0.030 0.022 0.039* -0.001 0.039* -0.032 -0.005 0.011 0.023 
DISTRESS -0.021 -0.016 -0.067** -0.008 -0.049** -0.059** 0.015 0.070** 0.010 -0.076** 
Note: * and ** represents statistical significance at 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Values in the below (above) diagonal are Pearson (Spearman) pairwise correlations. All 
variables are as defined in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.4: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix for Family, Corporate Governance and Control Variables (con‟t) 
 
BODIND DUALITY BIG4 GROWTH LEVERAGE SIZE LOSS SALESVAR CAPINT OPCYCLE 
AQUALITY -0.015 0.018 0.005 -0.100** 0.015 0.068** -0.102** -0.093** 0.138** -0.061** 
AQ2 0.000 0.021 -0.009 -0.116** -0.019 0.086** -0.142** -0.101** 0.155** -0.071** 
FAMILY -0.079** 0.039* 0.075** -0.075** -0.006 -0.037* -0.112** -0.112** 0.070** 0.047** 
FAM20 -0.029 0.043* 0.046** -0.088** -0.006 -0.006 -0.063** -0.028 0.050** 0.071** 
FAMBOD -0.098
**
 0.027 0.056
**
 -0.119
**
 0.019 -0.056
**
 -0.091
**
 -0.099
**
 0.066
**
 0.091
**
 
ACSIZE 0.117** -0.026 0.047** 0.023 -0.040* 0.045* -0.064** -0.053** 0.059** 0.012 
ACIND 0.274** -0.058** -0.034 -0.028 -0.016 0.069** 0.014 0.047** -0.039* -0.007 
ACMEET 0.086** 0.014 -0.031 -0.078** 0.041* 0.139** 0.061** 0.102** -0.058** 0.035* 
ACFIN -0.067** -0.033 -0.037* 0.001 -0.006 -0.048** -0.019 -0.084** -0.018 -0.036* 
BODSIZE -0.255** -0.097** 0.045* 0.062** -0.051** 0.077** -0.164** -0.101** 0.019 -0.031 
BODIND 
 
0.011 -0.022 -0.016 0.013 0.031 0.091** 0.128** -0.013 -0.046** 
DUALITY -0.007 
 
0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.009 -0.006 0.008 0.039* -0.058** 
BIG4 -0.028 0.003 
 
0.008 -0.003 0.085** -0.063** -0.073** 0.056** -0.029 
GROWTH -0.024 0.007 -0.004 
 
-0.142** -0.040* -0.168** 0.028 -0.110** -0.112** 
LEVERAGE 0.016 0.004 -0.007 -0.090** 
 
0.227** 0.206** 0.060** 0.194** 0.030 
SIZE 0.005 0.012 0.091** 0.000 0.216** 
 
-0.215** 0.066** 0.065** -0.125** 
LOSS 0.112** -0.006 -0.063** -0.110** 0.218** -0.206** 
 
0.151** 0.078** 0.110** 
SALESVAR 0.187** -0.015 -0.100** 0.041* 0.027 0.042* 0.170** 
 
-0.073** 0.110** 
CAPINT -0.033 0.028 0.056** -0.117** 0.186** 0.079** 0.082** -0.085** 
 
-0.138** 
OPCYCLE 0.005 -0.068** -0.065** -0.120** 0.007 0.010 0.144** 0.269** -0.022 
 
CFOVAR 0.039* -0.073** -0.047** 0.114** -0.021 -0.165** 0.006 0.173** -0.240** -0.020 
INTINT -0.011 0.049** 0.033 0.132** -0.031 0.067** -0.051** -0.089** 0.024 0.057** 
DISTRESS 0.104** -0.013 -0.097** -0.305** 0.514** 0.084** 0.383** 0.177** 0.237** 0.146** 
Note: * and ** represents statistical significance at 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Values in the below (above) diagonal are Pearson (Spearman) pairwise correlations. All 
variables are as defined in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.4: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix for Family, Corporate Governance and Control Variables (con‟t) 
 
CFOVAR INTINT DISTRESS 
AQUALITY -0.157** -0.013 -0.004 
AQ2 -0.166** -0.001 -0.002 
FAMILY -0.098** 0.012 -0.067** 
FAM20 -0.076** 0.026 -0.008 
FAMBOD -0.087
**
 -0.007 -0.049
**
 
ACSIZE -0.032 -0.003 -0.045* 
ACIND -0.011 -0.040* 0.016 
ACMEET -0.053** -0.009 0.083** 
ACFIN 0.017 0.005 0.012 
BODSIZE 0.012 0.000 -0.086** 
BODIND -0.017 -0.019 0.090** 
DUALITY -0.076** 0.094** -0.013 
BIG4 -0.035 0.024 -0.097** 
GROWTH 0.142** 0.107** -0.373** 
LEVERAGE -0.011 0.007 0.518** 
SIZE -0.188** 0.091** 0.086** 
LOSS -0.040* -0.049** 0.383** 
SALESVAR 0.058** -0.090** 0.180** 
CAPINT -0.232** 0.020 0.232** 
OPCYCLE -0.004 0.008 0.094** 
CFOVAR 
 
-0.078** -0.122** 
INTINT -0.031 
 
-0.036* 
DISTRESS -0.037* -0.037* 
 
Note: * and ** represents statistical significance at 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Values in the below (above) diagonal are Pearson 
(Spearman) pairwise correlations. All variables are as defined in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.5: Variance Inflation Factors of Variables Used in Regression Tests 
   
Equation (4.3) 
  
Equation (4.5) 
Sample 
 
Full Nonfamily Family Full Nonfamily Family 
ACSIZE 
 
1.38 1.37 1.37 
 
1.40 1.40 1.40 
ACIND 
 
1.19 1.19 1.19 
 
1.34 1.34 1.34 
ACMEET 
 
1.08 1.08 1.08 
 
1.10 1.10 1.10 
ACFIN 
 
1.12 1.12 1.12 
 
1.14 1.13 1.13 
BODSIZE 
 
1.45 1.44 1.44 
 
1.47 1.46 1.46 
BODIND 
 
1.36 1.35 1.35 
 
1.37 1.37 1.37 
DUALITY 
 
1.03 1.03 1.03 
 
1.04 1.04 1.04 
FAMILY 
 
1.07 
   
1.10 
  BIG4 
 
1.04 1.04 1.04 
 
1.05 1.05 1.05 
GROWTH 
 
1.20 1.18 1.18 
 
1.28 1.27 1.27 
LEVERAGE 1.48 1.47 1.47 
 
1.28 1.27 1.27 
SIZE 
 
1.28 1.27 1.27 
 
1.51 1.50 1.50 
LOSS 
 
1.34 1.33 1.33 
 
1.35 1.34 1.34 
SALESVAR 1.29 1.28 1.28 
 
1.33 1.32 1.32 
CAPINT 
 
1.17 1.16 1.16 
 
1.33 1.33 1.33 
OPCYCLE 
 
1.15 1.15 1.15 
 
1.21 1.21 1.21 
CFOVAR 
 
1.15 1.14 1.14 
 
1.17 1.17 1.17 
INTINT 
 
1.05 1.05 1.05 
 
1.10 1.10 1.10 
DISTRESS 
 
1.80 1.79 1.79 
 
1.88 1.88 1.88 
IND_1 
     
3.46 3.46 3.46 
IND_2 
     
4.55 4.53 4.53 
IND_3 
     
1.95 1.95 1.95 
IND_4 
     
2.79 2.78 2.78 
IND_5 
     
1.93 1.91 1.91 
IND_6 
     
3.18 3.16 3.16 
YR_2004 
     
1.68 1.68 1.68 
YR_2005 
     
1.71 1.71 1.71 
YR_2006 
     
1.71 1.71 1.71 
YR_2007 
     
1.76 1.76 1.76 
YR_2008 
     
1.98 1.98 1.98 
Note: All variables are as defined in Table 5.3 and Table 5.6. 
  
173 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis on the Direct Effect of Family Influence and 
Corporate Governance Variables on Earnings Quality.  
Column 1 of Table 5.6 presents the results from the estimation of equation (4.3), 
where the quality of earnings (AQUALITY) is regressed on the measures for family 
firm (FAMILY), corporate governance and other control variables. The corporate 
governance variables are the size of audit committee (ACSIZE), audit committee 
independence (ACIND), audit committee meeting (ACMEET), audit committee 
financial expertise (ACFIN), size of the board of directors (BODSIZE), board 
independence (BODIND) and CEO duality (DUALITY).  
 
As explained in Section 4.5 in the previous chapter, earnings quality in this regression 
is estimated using the absolute value of residuals from the modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) cross-sectional accrual quality model. Three other regression results 
are also presented in Table 5.6. The second column shows the regression estimates of 
equation (4.3) after adjusting for heteroscedasticity using White‟s (1980) consistent 
covariance matrix, the third column presents the results of regression estimates after 
controlling for industry and year fixed effects that is in equation (4.5), and the fourth 
column presents the results of regression estimates of equation (4.3) using the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) procedure to mitigate the potential time-series correlations of 
panel data.  
 
The F-values from all four regression models are statistically significant at 1% level. 
The adjusted R
2
 for the basic OLS, White adjusted, and Industry & Year adjusted 
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regressions is 8 %; while the adjusted R
2
 for Fama-MacBeth regression is 11%. Even 
though the explanatory power of the models is low, they are higher than those 
reported in a study examining  earnings quality and board independence in Malaysia 
by Abdullah and Nasir (2004) that report an R
2
 of 5.33%. Other studies such as 
Rahman and Ali (2006) that examined earnings management and corporate 
governance in Malaysia, and Wang (2006) that examined abnormal accruals and 
family ownership in the US also reported similar values of R
2
, viz, 12.8% and 13% 
respectively.  
 
The results from the basic regression reported in Table 5.6 show that the family firm 
variable (FAMILY) has a significant positive association with earnings quality 
(AQUALITY) at 1% level with a t-statistics of 3.398. This indicates that the null 
hypothesis (H1) that there is no difference between earnings quality in family and 
nonfamily firms is not supported. This result suggests that the influence of family in 
firms, through significant ownership of firms equity and control over firm board of 
directors, results in higher quality of earnings. The positive and significant relation 
between family influence and earnings quality is consistent with Wang (2006) 
findings on earnings quality of the US family firms. It supports the agency theory 
prediction based on the alignment effect of family.  
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Table 5.6: Regression Results of Family Firms and Corporate Governance on 
Earnings Quality (Earnings Quality=AQUALITY). 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.076* -3.561 
 
-0.076* -3.331 
 
-0.073* -3.029 
 
-0.080*** -2.189 
FAMILY 0.008* 3.398 
 
0.008* 3.356 
 
0.007* 3.040 
 
0.008* 4.733 
ACSIZE 0.002 1.283 
 
0.002 1.318 
 
0.002 0.883 
 
0.002 1.281 
ACIND 0.029* 2.954 
 
0.029* 3.326 
 
0.031* 2.975 
 
0.020 1.527 
ACMEET 0.000 0.284 
 
0.000 0.265 
 
0.000 0.483 
 
0.001 0.358 
ACFIN -0.001 -0.230 
 
-0.001 -0.235 
 
-0.003 -0.419 
 
-0.002 -0.431 
BODSIZE -0.001** -2.135 
 
-0.001** -2.039 
 
-0.001** -1.969 
 
-0.001** -2.793 
BODIND -0.015 -1.293 
 
-0.015 -1.219 
 
-0.015 -1.296 
 
-0.014 -0.818 
DUALITY -0.001 -0.170 
 
-0.001 -0.170 
 
0.000 0.013 
 
-0.001 -0.361 
BIG4 -0.002 -0.960 
 
-0.002 -0.963 
 
-0.002 -0.800 
 
-0.002 -1.204 
GROWTH -0.009* -6.127 
 
-0.009* -5.039 
 
-0.009* -5.733 
 
-0.007** -3.120 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.028 
 
0.000 0.025 
 
0.002 0.289 
 
0.002 0.241 
SIZE 0.002 1.065 
 
0.002 1.012 
 
0.002 0.854 
 
0.003 0.839 
LOSS -0.013* -4.554 
 
-0.013* -4.192 
 
-0.013* -4.510 
 
-0.013** -3.946 
SALESVAR -0.021* -3.079 
 
-0.021* -2.611 
 
-0.023* -3.332 
 
-0.021*** -2.111 
CAPINT 0.029* 5.032 
 
0.029* 4.880 
 
0.027* 4.331 
 
0.030** 3.303 
OPCYCLE -0.003 -1.157 
 
-0.003 -1.118 
 
-0.002 -0.873 
 
-0.003 -1.300 
CFOVAR -0.189* -7.425 
 
-0.189* -5.798 
 
-0.187* -7.270 
 
-0.196* -7.218 
INTINT -0.022** -2.141 
 
-0.022*** -1.724 
 
-0.026** -2.460 
 
-0.025* -4.253 
DISTRESS -0.005 -1.586 
 
-0.005 -1.578 
 
-0.004 -1.427 
 
-0.005 -1.349 
IND_1 
      
0.002 0.384 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.004 -0.901 
   
IND_3 
      
0.007 1.013 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.004 -0.682 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.003 -0.384 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.005 -1.079 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.003 -0.710 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.005 1.401 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.007** 1.986 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.002 -0.421 
   
YR_2008 
      
-0.000 -0.098 
   
Adj.R2 0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.11 
 
Obs 3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
 
F-stat 14.716 
  
10.446 
  
10.045 
  
119.456 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. IND_1 is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the firm is under the consumer product based on the Bursa Malaysia industry 
classification, otherwise, 0. IND_2 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm is under the industrial 
product based on the Bursa Malaysia industry classification, otherwise, 0. IND_3 is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if the firm is under the plantation sector based on the Bursa Malaysia industry classification, otherwise, 0. 
IND_4 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm is under the properties sector based on the Bursa 
Malaysia industry classification, otherwise, 0. IND_5 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm is under 
the technology sector based on the Bursa Malaysia industry classification, otherwise, 0.  IND_6 is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the firm is under the trading/services sector based on the Bursa Malaysia industry 
classification, otherwise, 0. YR_2004, YR_2005, YR_2006, YR_2007 and YR_2008 are dummy variables to control 
for year effect. All other variables are as defined in Table 5.3. 
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Only two out of the seven corporate governance variables are found to be associated 
with earnings quality. Specifically, audit committee independence is found to be 
significantly positively associated with earnings quality at 1% level with t-statistics of 
2.954, which supports hypothesis H2F. This result indicates that firms with higher 
audit committee independence have higher quality of earnings. The result is 
consistent with the findings in the Bédard et al. (2004), Xie, at al. (2003) and Klein 
(2002) studies, which shows that audit committee independence promotes better 
quality of earnings by reducing earnings management. In line with Yermack (1996) 
and Vafeas (2000), the results also show that board size (BODSIZE) has a significant 
negative association with earnings quality at 5% level with a t-statistics of -2.135, 
supporting hypothesis H2E. This suggests that firms with bigger board size have lower 
earnings quality.  
 
The coefficients for the other corporate governance variables, ACSIZE, ACMEET, 
ACFIN, BODIND and DUALITY are not significant (p>0.10), providing no evidence 
for the existence of associations between the variables and earnings quality 
(AQUALITY). This result shows that hypotheses H2A, H2B, H2C, H2D and H2G are not 
supported. The results also show that the control variables, firm growth (GROWTH), 
the reporting of negative earnings (LOSS), sales variability (SALESVAR), cash flows 
variability (CFOVAR) and intangible intensity (INTINT) have significant negative 
associations with earnings quality (AQUALITY). This suggests that firms with higher 
growth, negative earnings, higher sales variability, higher cash flows variability and 
higher intangible intensity have lower quality of earnings, and vice versa.  In 
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addition, as expected, capital intensity (CAPINT) has significant positive association 
with earnings quality, indicating that firms with higher capital intensity have higher 
quality of earnings. However, big 4 auditor (BIG4), firms leverage (LEVERAGE), 
firms size (SIZE), operating cycle (OPCYCLE) and financial distress (DISTRESS) do 
not have a significant association with earnings quality. 
 
Column 2 in Table 5.6 summarises the regression estimates based on the procedure 
suggested by White (1980) to adjust for heteroscedasticity. The coefficients remain 
the same but, as expected, the t values decrease. However, the results are qualitatively 
unchanged.  
 
To control for the possibility of serial correlation of residuals in the pooled 
regression, equation (4.4) is estimated. In addition,  the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
procedure is also performed on equation (4.3). The results are presented in columns 3 
and 4 of Table 5.6. The results remain qualitatively unchanged except that audit 
committee independence is not significant in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression.  
 
5.5 Multivariate Analysis on the Mitigating Effect of Family Influence on the 
Relationship between Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality  
To examine the effect of family firms on the association between corporate 
governance and earnings quality, this study partitions the full sample into two 
subsamples of firms. One subsample consists of family firms, in which family 
members own more than 20 percent of firm‟s shares, and two or more members of the 
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controlling family are appointed as directors. The other subsample consists of 
nonfamily firms, which are firms that do not meet the criteria for being classified as a 
family firm. Hypothesis H3 is tested by estimating equation (4.3) for the two sub-
samples separately after deletion of the family firm variable (FAMILY). The results 
are reported in Section 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 below. The estimation results of equation 
(4.4), which tests the significance of the difference between the relationship of 
corporate governance and earnings quality in family and nonfamily firms are reported 
in Section 5.5.3. 
 
5.5.1 Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality Relationship in Nonfamily Firms 
Table 5.7 presents the regression estimates of the association between corporate 
governance variables and earnings quality for the four regression models using the 
nonfamily sample. The regression models are the same as used earlier for the full 
sample, that is, the basic regression, White (1980) model, controlling for industry and 
year effects, and the Fama-MacBeth (1973) model.  
 
The results from the basic regression are reported in column 1 of Table 5.7. The 
results as for the full sample, audit committee independence (ACIND) and board size 
(BODSIZE) are associated with earnings quality. However, in contrast to the full 
sample case for nonfamily firms, audit committee size (ACSIZE) is also positively 
associated with earnings quality.  
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Table 5.7: Regression Results of Corporate Governance on Earnings Quality in Non-Family 
Firms (Earnings Quality=AQUALITY and FAMILY=0). 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.107* -3.209 
 
-0.107* -3.048 
 
-0.093** -2.537 
 
-0.108 -1.902 
ACSIZE 0.006** 2.223 
 
0.006** 2.488 
 
0.005*** 1.805 
 
0.006*** 2.103 
ACIND 0.044* 2.901 
 
0.044* 3.546 
 
0.046* 2.855 
 
0.045* 5.696 
ACMEET -0.000 -0.095 
 
-0.000 -0.085 
 
0.000 0.003 
 
0.000 0.177 
ACFIN -0.000 -0.033 
 
-0.000 -0.033 
 
-0.001 -0.135 
 
-0.002 -0.206 
BODSIZE -0.002** -2.055 
 
-0.002** -2.005 
 
-0.002** -1.965 
 
-0.003** -2.615 
BODIND -0.013 -0.737 
 
-0.013 -0.697 
 
-0.014 -0.790 
 
-0.014 -0.632 
DUALITY -0.003 -0.671 
 
-0.003 -0.647 
 
-0.003 -0.626 
 
-0.003 -0.685 
BIG4 -0.004 -1.038 
 
-0.004 -1.049 
 
-0.004 -0.998 
 
-0.003 -0.868 
GROWTH -0.011* -5.116 
 
-0.011* -4.349 
 
-0.011* -4.863 
 
-0.009** -2.883 
LEVERAGE 0.010 0.792 
 
0.010 0.715 
 
0.016 1.241 
 
0.014 1.453 
SIZE 0.005 1.329 
 
0.005 1.266 
 
0.004 1.018 
 
0.005 0.745 
LOSS -0.011** -2.557 
 
-0.011** -2.425 
 
-0.011** -2.538 
 
-0.012*** -2.264 
SALESVAR -0.029* -2.917 
 
-0.029** -2.553 
 
-0.033* -3.162 
 
-0.030*** -2.278 
CAPINT 0.021** 2.363 
 
0.021** 2.354 
 
0.020** 2.025 
 
0.021** 3.183 
OPCYCLE -0.001 -0.318 
 
-0.001 -0.323 
 
0.000 0.090 
 
-0.002 -0.312 
CFOVAR -0.158* -4.080 
 
-0.158* -3.485 
 
-0.154* -3.933 
 
-0.167* -5.339 
INTINT -0.015 -0.850 
 
-0.015 -0.705 
 
-0.016 -0.878 
 
-0.022 -1.835 
DISTRESS -0.010** -2.206 
 
-0.010** -2.124 
 
-0.011** -2.256 
 
-0.011** -2.654 
IND_1 
      
-0.004 -0.446 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.011 -1.347 
   
IND_3 
      
0.009 0.732 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.009 -1.029 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.008 -0.762 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.009 -1.107 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.001 -0.207 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.007 1.107 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.011*** 1.831 
   
YR_2007 
      
0.001 0.131 
   
YR_2008 
      
-0.001 -0.091 
   
Adj.R2 0.06 
  
0.06 
  
0.07 
  
0.13 
 
Obs 1542 
  
1542 
  
1542 
  
1542 
 
F-stat 6.877 
  
5.572 
  
4.736 
  
174.820 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All 
variables are as previously defined.  
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The coefficients for the other corporate governance variables, ACMEET, ACFIN, 
BODIND and DUALITY remain insignificant (p>0.10), consistent with the results 
from the full sample. The same control variables remain significant except that 
intangibles intensity (INTINT) is no longer significant while DISTRESS becomes 
significant. Qualitatively similar results are obtained from estimation of the other 
three models. 
 
5.5.2 Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality Relationship in Family Firms 
Table 5.8 presents the regression estimates of the association between corporate 
governance variables and earnings quality for family firms, using each of the four 
regression models.  
 
Unlike the results in the nonfamily sample, the regression estimates from all the 
models in Table 5.8 shows that none of the corporate governance variables, including 
ACSIZE, ACIND and BODSIZE, are significantly related to AQUALITY, other than 
ACSIZE being weakly significant (p=0.10) in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation. 
This suggests that in family firms, various corporate governance mechanisms do not 
improve the quality of earnings. 
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Table 5.8: Regression Results of Corporate Governance on Earnings Quality in Family Firms 
(Earnings Quality=AQUALITY and FAMILY=1) 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.024 -0.890 
 
-0.024 -0.883 
 
-0.028 -0.889 
 
-0.023 -1.131 
ACSIZE -0.002 -0.978 
 
-0.002 -0.932 
 
-0.003 -1.107 
 
-0.003*** -2.275 
ACIND 0.013 1.024 
 
0.013 1.021 
 
0.013 1.011 
 
-0.005 -0.231 
ACMEET 0.001 0.694 
 
0.001 0.778 
 
0.001 0.710 
 
0.001 0.292 
ACFIN -0.004 -0.534 
 
-0.004 -0.581 
 
-0.005 -0.608 
 
-0.003 -0.684 
BODSIZE -0.001 -0.798 
 
-0.001 -0.750 
 
-0.000 -0.541 
 
-0.001 -0.842 
BODIND -0.018 -1.189 
 
-0.018 -1.160 
 
-0.018 -1.132 
 
-0.015 -1.479 
DUALITY 0.002 0.603 
 
0.002 0.645 
 
0.003 0.697 
 
0.002 0.914 
BIG4 -0.000 -0.147 
 
-0.000 -0.149 
 
-0.000 -0.038 
 
-0.001 -0.271 
GROWTH -0.006* -3.247 
 
-0.006* -2.691 
 
-0.006* -2.796 
 
-0.005 -1.795 
LEVERAGE -0.008 -0.847 
 
-0.008 -0.751 
 
-0.009 -0.957 
 
-0.008 -0.707 
SIZE -0.001 -0.349 
 
-0.001 -0.343 
 
-0.001 -0.277 
 
0.000 0.078 
LOSS -0.016* -4.123 
 
-0.016* -3.782 
 
-0.016* -4.001 
 
-0.017* -4.992 
SALESVAR -0.010 -0.979 
 
-0.010 -0.886 
 
-0.011 -1.068 
 
-0.010 -1.036 
CAPINT 0.034* 4.581 
 
0.034* 4.387 
 
0.029* 3.635 
 
0.034** 2.641 
OPCYCLE -0.006*** -1.687 
 
-0.006 -1.552 
 
-0.005 -1.576 
 
-0.005 -1.733 
CFOVAR -0.213* -6.364 
 
-0.213* -4.586 
 
-0.209* -6.136 
 
-0.209* -5.925 
INTINT -0.026** -2.171 
 
-0.026 -1.645 
 
-0.031** -2.523 
 
-0.026 -1.560 
DISTRESS 0.001 0.407 
 
0.001 0.425 
 
0.003 0.843 
 
0.003 0.440 
IND_1 
      
0.007 1.152 
   
IND_2 
      
0.002 0.304 
   
IND_3 
      
0.009 1.135 
   
IND_4 
      
0.001 0.110 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.001 -0.124 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.001 -0.212 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.004 -0.880 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.004 0.904 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.004 0.961 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.004 -0.910 
   
YR_2008 
      
0.000 0.091 
   
Adj.R2 0.07 
  
0.07 
  
0.07 
  
0.14 
 
Obs 1620 
  
1620 
  
1620 
  
1620 
 
F-stat 8.137 
  
5.066 
  
5.470 
  
60.849 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
previously defined. 
 
5.5.3 The Interaction Effect of Family Influence and Corporate Governance on 
Earnings Quality 
To test the third hypothesis of whether family firms mediate the corporate 
governance-earnings quality relationship, equation (4.4) which includes seven 
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interaction variables of corporate governance measures and family influence is 
estimated. The variables are ACSIZE*FAMILY, ACIND*FAMILY, 
ACMEET*FAMILY, ACFIN*FAMILY, BODSIZE*FAMILY, BODIND*FAMILY and 
DUALITY*FAMILY. These variables measure the incremental effect of each 
corporate governance mechanism in the earnings quality relationship in family firms. 
If the coefficients of ACSIZE*FAMILY, ACIND*FAMILY, ACMEET*FAMILY, 
ACFIN*FAMILY, BODSIZE*FAMILY, BODIND*FAMILY and DUALITY*FAMILY 
are positive, family firms have significantly stronger ACSIZE-AQUALITY, ACIND-
AQUALITY, ACMEET-AQUALITY, ACFIN-AQUALITY, BODSIZE-AQUALITY, 
BODIND-AQUALITY and DUALITY-AQUALITY relationship than do nonfamily 
firms. Alternatively, a negative coefficient on the variables indicates a weaker 
corporate governance-earnings quality relationship in family firms.  
 
Table 5.9 shows the regression estimates of equation (4.4) using again all four 
regression procedures. In the results from the basic regression, the coefficient for 
family firms (FAMILY) is positive and significant at 5% level. This is consistent with 
the result reported in Table 5.6 that family firms have significantly higher earnings 
quality than nonfamily firms.  
 
For audit committee size (ACSIZE), the coefficient is positive and significant but the 
coefficient on the interaction variable ACSIZE*FAMILY, is negative and significant. 
This result suggests that family influence weakens the impact of audit committee size 
on earnings quality. This is consistent with the results reported in Table 5.7 and 5.8, 
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which suggests that audit committee size is only a determinant of earnings quality in 
nonfamily firms.  
 
Similarly, for audit committee independence, the coefficient for ACIND is positive 
and significant but the interaction variable ACIND*FAMILY is negative and 
significant. This result is also consistent with the results reported in Table 5.7 and 5.8, 
which suggest that audit committee independence is only a determinant of earnings 
quality in nonfamily firms.  
 
The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction variables 
ACSIZE*FAMILY and ACIND*FAMILY shows that the results support H3, that the 
relationship between earnings quality and corporate governance is weaker in family 
owned firms compared to nonfamily firms. 
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Table 5.9: Regression Results of the Effect of Family Firms on the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality (Earnings Quality=AQUALITY) 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
Coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.097* -3.985 
 
-0.097* -3.615 
 
-0.089* -3.368 
 
-0.104*** -2.272 
FAMILY 0.050** 2.237 
 
0.050** 2.245 
 
0.047** 2.053 
 
0.060*** 2.068 
ACSIZE 0.007* 2.660 
 
0.007* 2.687 
 
0.006** 2.306 
 
0.007*** 2.527 
ACIND 0.047* 3.456 
 
0.047* 3.791 
 
0.048* 3.445 
 
0.042* 4.686 
ACMEET 0.000 0.018 
 
0.000 0.014 
 
0.000 0.216 
 
0.001 0.254 
ACFIN 0.001 0.087 
 
0.001 0.077 
 
-0.000 -0.052 
 
-0.001 -0.167 
BODSIZE -0.002** -2.364 
 
-0.002** -2.030 
 
-0.002** -2.322 
 
-0.003*** -2.509 
BODIND -0.017 -1.111 
 
-0.017 -0.939 
 
-0.018 -1.161 
 
-0.017 -0.780 
DUALITY -0.004 -0.810 
 
-0.004 -0.688 
 
-0.003 -0.697 
 
-0.003 -0.828 
ACSIZE*FAMILY -0.010** -2.512 
 
-0.010* -2.635 
 
-0.009** -2.407 
 
-0.010* -4.601 
ACIND*FAMILY -0.037*** -1.920 
 
-0.037** -2.143 
 
-0.036*** -1.832 
 
-0.049*** -2.220 
ACMEET*FAMILY 0.001 0.353 
 
0.001 0.347 
 
0.001 0.265 
 
-0.000 -0.125 
ACFIN*FAMILY -0.005 -0.427 
 
-0.005 -0.433 
 
-0.005 -0.414 
 
-0.002 -0.204 
BODSIZE*FAMILY 0.002 1.358 
 
0.002 1.272 
 
0.002 1.438 
 
0.002 1.605 
BODIND*FAMILY 0.003 0.131 
 
0.003 0.126 
 
0.004 0.174 
 
0.006 0.308 
DUALITY*FAMILY 0.006 0.980 
 
0.006 0.950 
 
0.006 0.983 
 
0.005 0.960 
BIG4 -0.002 -0.794 
 
-0.002 -0.793 
 
-0.001 -0.641 
 
-0.002 -0.905 
GROWTH -0.009* -6.040 
 
-0.009* -4.945 
 
-0.009* -5.641 
 
-0.007** -3.113 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.056 
 
0.000 0.050 
 
0.003 0.325 
 
0.003 0.302 
SIZE 0.003 1.082 
 
0.003 1.027 
 
0.002 0.793 
 
0.004 0.871 
LOSS -0.014* -4.606 
 
-0.014* -4.257 
 
-0.013* -4.555 
 
-0.014* -4.217 
SALESVAR -0.021* -3.070 
 
-0.021* -2.592 
 
-0.023* -3.341 
 
-0.021*** -2.081 
CAPINT 0.028* 4.897 
 
0.028* 4.748 
 
0.026* 4.214 
 
0.029** 3.203 
OPCYCLE -0.003 -1.336 
 
-0.003 -1.287 
 
-0.003 -1.063 
 
-0.003 -1.587 
CFOVAR -0.186* -7.259 
 
-0.186* -5.685 
 
-0.183* -7.110 
 
-0.192* -6.799 
INTINT -0.021** -2.020 
 
-0.021 -1.628 
 
-0.024** -2.285 
 
-0.023** -3.879 
DISTRESS -0.004 -1.509 
 
-0.004 -1.498 
 
-0.004 -1.390 
 
-0.005 -1.216 
IND_1 
      
0.001 0.241 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.005 -0.973 
   
IND_3 
      
0.007 0.972 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.004 -0.665 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.003 -0.483 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.005 -1.005 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.003 -0.723 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.005 1.401 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.008** 1.993 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.002 -0.423 
   
YR_2008 
      
-0.000 -0.058 
   
Adj.R2 0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.12 
 
Obs 3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
 
F-stat 11.186 
  
7.986 
  
8.421 
  
25.318 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
previously defined.  
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For board size (BODSIZE), the coefficient is negative and significant but the 
interaction variables of board size and family (BODSIZE*FAMILY), although 
positive is not significant. This result is consistent with the result in Table 5.6, but the 
variable family influence does not appear to have a mediating effect on the board 
size-earnings quality relationship. For the other corporate governance variables, 
ACMEET, ACFIN, BODIND and DUALITY, and their interaction variables with 
FAMILY, the coefficients are not significant, consistent with the earlier result.  
 
The results of estimation by the other three regression procedures are qualitatively 
similar. Overall, the result reported in Table 5.6 to 5.9 suggests that corporate 
governance in the form of audit committee size and independence and board size 
matter for nonfamily firms but not for family firms. 
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analyses 
This section provides the results for several sensitivity analyses using alternative 
measures for earnings quality and family influence. Specifically, Section 5.6.1 reports 
estimation results based on the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, as an 
alternative measure for earnings quality; and Section 5.6.2 presents the result of 
estimation using various alternative measures of family firms, including (i) family 
share ownership and (ii) family control of board.  
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5.6.1 Alternative Measure of Earnings Quality 
In this section, equations (4.3) to (4.6) are re-estimated using earnings quality 
estimate, AQ2, which is derived from the absolute value of residuals from the original 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The original model relates total current accrual 
(TCA), to lagged, current and future cash flows from operations based on the 
assumption that current accruals are estimates of future year‟s cash flow realisation. 
AQ2 is the additive inverse of the absolute value of residuals from cross-sectional 
regressions of the model.  
 
Table 5.10 presents the results from the estimation of equation (4.3) and (4.4), where 
the alternative measure for earnings quality (AQ2) is regressed on the measures for 
family firms (FAMILY), corporate governance and the control variables. Four 
estimations are repeated- the basic OLS regression, White‟s (1980) estimates, 
industry and year fixed effects regression, and Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure.  
 
Table 5.11 and 5.12 report the results of the similar regression for the nonfamily and 
family firm subsamples. Table 5.13 reports the results of the four regressions with 
interaction terms. In all cases, the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained 
with the variable AQUALITY. 
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Table 5.10: Regression Results of Family Firms and Corporate Governance on Earnings 
Quality (Earnings Quality=AQ2) 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.098* -4.333 
 
-0.098* -4.002 
 
-0.086* -3.395 
 
-0.102*** -2.208 
FAMILY 0.007* 3.160 
 
0.007* 3.131 
 
0.007* 2.743 
 
0.008* 4.711 
ACSIZE 0.003 1.600 
 
0.003*** 1.661 
 
0.003 1.251 
 
0.003 1.720 
ACIND 0.030* 2.892 
 
0.030* 3.214 
 
0.030* 2.746 
 
0.022 1.673 
ACMEET 0.001 1.010 
 
0.001 0.955 
 
0.001 1.174 
 
0.001 0.794 
ACFIN -0.005 -0.778 
 
-0.005 -0.791 
 
-0.006 -0.915 
 
-0.006 -1.010 
BODSIZE -0.002** -2.121 
 
-0.002** -2.046 
 
-0.001*** -1.914 
 
-0.002** -2.944 
BODIND -0.010 -0.815 
 
-0.010 -0.755 
 
-0.010 -0.812 
 
-0.008 -0.617 
DUALITY 0.000 0.143 
 
0.000 0.146 
 
0.001 0.377 
 
-0.000 -0.021 
BIG4 -0.003 -1.429 
 
-0.003 -1.425 
 
-0.003 -1.159 
 
-0.003** -3.070 
GROWTH -0.011* -6.893 
 
-0.011* -5.674 
 
-0.010* -6.379 
 
-0.009** -3.907 
LEVERAGE -0.015*** -1.860 
 
-0.015 -1.618 
 
-0.012 -1.511 
 
-0.013 -1.124 
SIZE 0.004*** 1.813 
 
0.004*** 1.726 
 
0.004 1.354 
 
0.005 1.088 
LOSS -0.017* -5.456 
 
-0.017* -5.175 
 
-0.017* -5.397 
 
-0.017* -6.268 
SALESVAR -0.029* -3.921 
 
-0.029* -3.404 
 
-0.030* -4.090 
 
-0.029** -2.855 
CAPINT 0.036* 5.892 
 
0.036* 5.664 
 
0.035* 5.344 
 
0.037* 6.035 
OPCYCLE -0.003 -1.162 
 
-0.003 -1.086 
 
-0.003 -0.981 
 
-0.003 -0.988 
CFOVAR -0.204* -7.569 
 
-0.204* -5.879 
 
-0.202* -7.450 
 
-0.209* -7.067 
INTINT -0.021** -1.965 
 
-0.021 -1.538 
 
-0.025** -2.285 
 
-0.024** -3.743 
DISTRESS -0.002 -0.581 
 
-0.002 -0.583 
 
-0.002 -0.546 
 
-0.002 -0.594 
IND_1 
      
0.000 0.039 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.009*** -1.746 
   
IND_3 
      
0.001 0.185 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.006 -1.026 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.007 -1.003 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.008 -1.516 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.005 -1.285 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.004 1.121 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.006 1.448 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.003 -0.641 
   
YR_2008 
      
0.001 0.127 
   
Adj.R2 0.09 
  
0.09 
  
0.10 
  
0.13 
 
Obs 3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
 
F-stat 18.138 
  
12.878 
  
12.264 
  
44.730 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All 
variables are as previously defined 
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Table 5.11: Regression Results of Corporate Governance on Earnings Quality in Nonfamily 
Firms (Earnings Quality=AQ2 and FAMILY=0) 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.142* -4.096 
 
-0.142* -3.803 
 
-0.123* -3.220 
 
-0.145*** -2.234 
ACSIZE 0.008* 2.722 
 
0.008* 3.120 
 
0.008** 2.463 
 
0.008*** 2.478 
ACIND 0.046* 2.865 
 
0.046* 3.387 
 
0.047* 2.790 
 
0.051* 10.289 
ACMEET 0.001 0.890 
 
0.001 0.807 
 
0.002 0.926 
 
0.002 0.902 
ACFIN -0.002 -0.213 
 
-0.002 -0.209 
 
-0.002 -0.220 
 
-0.004 -0.330 
BODSIZE -0.002*** -1.927 
 
-0.002*** -1.925 
 
-0.002*** -1.823 
 
-0.003*** -2.549 
BODIND -0.008 -0.435 
 
-0.008 -0.406 
 
-0.009 -0.475 
 
-0.010 -0.542 
DUALITY -0.003 -0.611 
 
-0.003 -0.597 
 
-0.003 -0.577 
 
-0.003 -0.707 
BIG4 -0.004 -1.006 
 
-0.004 -1.017 
 
-0.004 -0.975 
 
-0.003 -1.167 
GROWTH -0.014* -5.855 
 
-0.014* -4.962 
 
-0.013* -5.471 
 
-0.011** -2.927 
LEVERAGE -0.005 -0.371 
 
-0.005 -0.323 
 
-0.000 -0.014 
 
-0.001 -0.051 
SIZE 0.007*** 1.940 
 
0.007*** 1.834 
 
0.006 1.513 
 
0.007 1.056 
LOSS -0.014* -2.961 
 
-0.014* -2.867 
 
-0.013* -2.864 
 
-0.015* -4.084 
SALESVAR -0.039* -3.709 
 
-0.039* -3.315 
 
-0.041* -3.857 
 
-0.040** -2.878 
CAPINT 0.030* 3.192 
 
0.030* 3.067 
 
0.030* 2.918 
 
0.030* 4.452 
OPCYCLE -0.001 -0.356 
 
-0.001 -0.347 
 
-0.001 -0.184 
 
-0.001 -0.234 
CFOVAR -0.159* -3.934 
 
-0.159* -3.305 
 
-0.155* -3.780 
 
-0.167* -5.251 
INTINT -0.012 -0.688 
 
-0.012 -0.550 
 
-0.011 -0.592 
 
-0.020 -1.151 
DISTRESS -0.010*** -1.949 
 
-0.010*** -1.906 
 
-0.010** -2.022 
 
-0.009** -2.676 
IND_1 
      
-0.009 -0.912 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.012 -1.471 
   
IND_3 
      
0.002 0.134 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.010 -1.067 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.013 -1.211 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.012 -1.396 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.004 -0.695 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.004 0.628 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.009 1.390 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.000 -0.010 
   
YR_2008 
      
-0.002 -0.234 
   
Adj.R2 0.09 
  
0.09 
  
0.09 
  
0.14 
 
Obs 1542 
  
1542 
  
1542 
  
1542 
 
F-stat 9.075 
  
7.433 
  
5.968 
  
113.244 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
previously defined.  
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Table 5.12: Regression results of corporate governance on earnings quality in family firms 
(Earnings Quality=AQ2 and FAMILY=1). 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.026 -0.905 
 
-0.026 -0.896 
 
-0.026 -0.763 
 
-0.026 -1.037 
ACSIZE -0.003 -1.067 
 
-0.003 -1.008 
 
-0.003 -1.242 
 
-0.003 -1.633 
ACIND 0.014 1.069 
 
0.014 1.086 
 
0.012 0.881 
 
-0.008 -0.316 
ACMEET 0.001 0.436 
 
0.001 0.491 
 
0.001 0.445 
 
0.000 0.188 
ACFIN -0.009 -1.075 
 
-0.009 -1.186 
 
-0.010 -1.182 
 
-0.008** -2.906 
BODSIZE -0.001 -1.066 
 
-0.001 -1.003 
 
-0.001 -0.632 
 
-0.001 -1.183 
BODIND -0.013 -0.777 
 
-0.013 -0.740 
 
-0.013 -0.769 
 
-0.009 -1.085 
DUALITY 0.004 1.035 
 
0.004 1.136 
 
0.005 1.219 
 
0.004 1.364 
BIG4 -0.003 -0.929 
 
-0.003 -0.929 
 
-0.002 -0.620 
 
-0.003 -1.201 
GROWTH -0.007* -3.469 
 
-0.007* -2.919 
 
-0.006* -2.877 
 
-0.006*** -2.231 
LEVERAGE -0.023** -2.367 
 
-0.023** -2.093 
 
-0.024** -2.341 
 
-0.022 -1.489 
SIZE -0.000 -0.053 
 
-0.000 -0.053 
 
-0.000 -0.059 
 
0.001 0.311 
LOSS -0.020* -4.947 
 
-0.020* -4.737 
 
-0.020* -4.725 
 
-0.022* -5.437 
SALESVAR -0.012 -1.170 
 
-0.012 -1.087 
 
-0.014 -1.300 
 
-0.014 -1.568 
CAPINT 0.039* 4.901 
 
0.039* 4.896 
 
0.035* 4.170 
 
0.040* 4.407 
OPCYCLE -0.006*** -1.773 
 
-0.006 -1.581 
 
-0.006*** -1.730 
 
-0.006*** -2.319 
CFOVAR -0.241* -6.711 
 
-0.241* -4.937 
 
-0.236* -6.447 
 
-0.235* -5.255 
INTINT -0.026** -2.053 
 
-0.026 -1.526 
 
-0.033** -2.533 
 
-0.026 -1.665 
DISTRESS 0.006 1.640 
 
0.006*** 1.711 
 
0.008*** 1.897 
 
0.007 1.134 
IND_1 
      
0.007 1.047 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.005 -0.770 
   
IND_3 
      
0.004 0.532 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.002 -0.310 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.004 -0.403 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.003 -0.448 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.006 -1.157 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.005 1.109 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.004 0.733 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.005 -1.048 
   
YR_2008 
      
0.004 0.662 
   
Adj.R2 0.09 
  
0.09 
  
0.10 
  
0.16 
 
Obs 1620 
  
1620 
  
1620 
  
1620 
 
F-stat 9.954 
  
6.432 
  
6.884 
  
15.579 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
previously defined.  
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Table 5.13: Regression Results of the Effect of Family Firms on the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality (Earnings Quality=AQ2) 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.097* -3.985 
 
-0.097* -3.615 
 
-0.089* -3.368 
 
-0.104*** -2.272 
FAMILY 0.050** 2.237 
 
0.050** 2.245 
 
0.047** 2.053 
 
0.060*** 2.068 
ACSIZE 0.007* 2.660 
 
0.007* 2.687 
 
0.006** 2.306 
 
0.007*** 2.527 
ACIND 0.047* 3.456 
 
0.047* 3.791 
 
0.048* 3.445 
 
0.042* 4.686 
ACMEET 0.000 0.018 
 
0.000 0.014 
 
0.000 0.216 
 
0.001 0.254 
ACFIN 0.001 0.087 
 
0.001 0.077 
 
-0.000 -0.052 
 
-0.001 -0.167 
BODSIZE -0.002** -2.364 
 
-0.002** -2.030 
 
-0.002** -2.322 
 
-0.003*** -2.509 
BODIND -0.017 -1.111 
 
-0.017 -0.939 
 
-0.018 -1.161 
 
-0.017 -0.780 
DUALITY -0.004 -0.810 
 
-0.004 -0.688 
 
-0.003 -0.697 
 
-0.003 -0.828 
ACSIZE*FAMILY -0.010** -2.512 
 
-0.010* -2.635 
 
-0.009** -2.407 
 
-0.010* -4.601 
ACIND*FAMILY -0.037*** -1.920 
 
-0.037** -2.143 
 
-0.036*** -1.832 
 
-0.049*** -2.220 
ACMEET*FAMILY 0.001 0.353 
 
0.001 0.347 
 
0.001 0.265 
 
-0.000 -0.125 
ACFIN*FAMILY -0.005 -0.427 
 
-0.005 -0.433 
 
-0.005 -0.414 
 
-0.002 -0.204 
BODSIZE*FAMILY 0.002 1.358 
 
0.002 1.272 
 
0.002 1.438 
 
0.002 1.605 
BODIND*FAMILY 0.003 0.131 
 
0.003 0.126 
 
0.004 0.174 
 
0.006 0.308 
DUALITY*FAMILY 0.006 0.980 
 
0.006 0.950 
 
0.006 0.983 
 
0.005 0.960 
BIG4 -0.002 -0.794 
 
-0.002 -0.793 
 
-0.001 -0.641 
 
-0.002 -0.905 
GROWTH -0.009* -6.040 
 
-0.009* -4.945 
 
-0.009* -5.641 
 
-0.007** -3.113 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.056 
 
0.000 0.050 
 
0.003 0.325 
 
0.003 0.302 
SIZE 0.003 1.082 
 
0.003 1.027 
 
0.002 0.793 
 
0.004 0.871 
LOSS -0.014* -4.606 
 
-0.014* -4.257 
 
-0.013* -4.555 
 
-0.014* -4.217 
SALESVAR -0.021* -3.070 
 
-0.021* -2.592 
 
-0.023* -3.341 
 
-0.021*** -2.081 
CAPINT 0.028* 4.897 
 
0.028* 4.748 
 
0.026* 4.214 
 
0.029** 3.203 
OPCYCLE -0.003 -1.336 
 
-0.003 -1.287 
 
-0.003 -1.063 
 
-0.003 -1.587 
CFOVAR -0.186* -7.259 
 
-0.186* -5.685 
 
-0.183* -7.110 
 
-0.192* -6.799 
INTINT -0.021** -2.020 
 
-0.021 -1.628 
 
-0.024** -2.285 
 
-0.023** -3.879 
DISTRESS -0.004 -1.509 
 
-0.004 -1.498 
 
-0.004 -1.390 
 
-0.005 -1.216 
IND_1 
      
0.001 0.241 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.005 -0.973 
   
IND_3 
      
0.007 0.972 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.004 -0.665 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.003 -0.483 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.005 -1.005 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.003 -0.723 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.005 1.401 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.008** 1.993 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.002 -0.423 
   
YR_2008 
      
-0.000 -0.058 
   
Adj.R2 0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.12 
 
Obs 3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
 
F-stat 11.186 
  
7.986 
  
8.421 
  
25.318 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
previously defined. 
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5.6.2 Alternative Measures of Family Influence 
This section presents the results of regression estimates of equation (4.3) to (4.6) 
using alternative definitions for family firms. In Section 5.6.2.1, family firms are 
identified based on the percentage of family members‟ equity holdings. Based on this 
definition, all firms with family ownership more than 20% of total firms equity are 
considered as family firms. In Section 5.6.2.2, family firms are identified based on 
family control of board of directors, regardless of their shareholdings. Firms are 
classified as family firms if two or more family members are appointed as directors. 
In Section 5.6.2.3, additional analysis of firms with family ownership is presented. 
These firms are examined based on family ethnicity, to provide further understanding 
of the corporate governance-earnings quality relationship in family firms in Malaysia. 
 
5.6.2.1 Measuring Family Influence Based on Family Share Ownership 
In this section, family firms are identified based on the percentage of shares owned by 
the controlling family. Based on this measure, family firms, FAM20, is coded one if 
family members own more than 20% firm shares, and coded zero otherwise. The 
estimation results for equation (4.4) and (4.6) using FAM20 are presented in Table 
5.14.  
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Table 5.14: Regression Results of the Effect of Family Share Ownership on the Relationship 
between Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality (Earnings Quality=AQUALITY) 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.121* -4.159 
 
-0.121* -3.625 
 
-0.116* -3.686 
 
-0.131*** -2.481 
FAM20 0.073* 2.848 
 
0.073* 2.613 
 
0.070* 2.729 
 
0.083** 2.735 
ACSIZE 0.007** 1.987 
 
0.007** 2.091 
 
0.007*** 1.732 
 
0.007 1.778 
ACIND 0.046** 2.482 
 
0.046* 2.659 
 
0.047** 2.457 
 
0.052* 4.229 
ACMEET -0.000 -0.009 
 
-0.000 -0.006 
 
0.001 0.263 
 
0.002 0.335 
ACFIN -0.013 -0.978 
 
-0.013 -0.876 
 
-0.014 -1.054 
 
-0.015*** -2.092 
BODSIZE -0.000 -0.193 
 
-0.000 -0.174 
 
-0.000 -0.198 
 
-0.001 -0.407 
BODIND 0.016 0.727 
 
0.016 0.662 
 
0.014 0.632 
 
0.011 0.430 
DUALITY -0.001 -0.221 
 
-0.001 -0.199 
 
-0.001 -0.159 
 
-0.002 -0.616 
ACSIZE*FAM20 -0.007 -1.628 
 
-0.007*** -1.707 
 
-0.007 -1.564 
 
-0.006*** -2.124 
ACIND*FAM20 -0.024 -1.115 
 
-0.024 -1.212 
 
-0.023 -1.034 
 
-0.044*** -2.101 
ACMEET*FAM20 0.000 0.071 
 
0.000 0.053 
 
-0.000 -0.116 
 
-0.001 -0.289 
ACFIN*FAM20 0.013 0.858 
 
0.013 0.797 
 
0.013 0.847 
 
0.015 1.488 
BODSIZE*FAM20 -0.002 -0.900 
 
-0.002 -0.815 
 
-0.001 -0.809 
 
-0.001 -0.487 
BODIND*FAM20 -0.046*** -1.801 
 
-0.046*** -1.663 
 
-0.043*** -1.677 
 
-0.041 -1.891 
DUALITY*FAM20 0.001 0.102 
 
0.001 0.094 
 
0.001 0.131 
 
0.002 0.342 
BIG4 -0.002 -0.859 
 
-0.002 -0.865 
 
-0.002 -0.714 
 
-0.001 -0.910 
GROWTH -0.009* -5.862 
 
-0.009* -4.797 
 
-0.008* -5.392 
 
-0.007** -2.899 
LEVERAGE 0.002 0.294 
 
0.002 0.261 
 
0.004 0.541 
 
0.005 0.524 
SIZE 0.002 0.949 
 
0.002 0.901 
 
0.002 0.747 
 
0.003 0.723 
LOSS -0.014* -4.640 
 
-0.014* -4.296 
 
-0.013* -4.570 
 
-0.014* -4.217 
SALESVAR -0.023* -3.380 
 
-0.023* -2.843 
 
-0.025* -3.592 
 
-0.023*** -2.210 
CAPINT 0.030* 5.174 
 
0.030* 4.993 
 
0.028* 4.459 
 
0.031** 3.372 
OPCYCLE -0.003 -1.256 
 
-0.003 -1.215 
 
-0.003 -0.991 
 
-0.003 -1.457 
CFOVAR -0.189* -7.380 
 
-0.189* -5.812 
 
-0.186* -7.212 
 
-0.194* -6.999 
INTINT -0.022** -2.154 
 
-0.022*** -1.728 
 
-0.026** -2.502 
 
-0.025** -3.797 
DISTRESS -0.005*** -1.741 
 
-0.005*** -1.724 
 
-0.005 -1.568 
 
-0.006 -1.394 
IND_1 
      
0.002 0.423 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.005 -0.947 
   
IND_3 
      
0.006 0.929 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.003 -0.631 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.003 -0.385 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.006 -1.165 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.002 -0.657 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.006 1.473 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.008** 2.099 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.001 -0.294 
   
YR_2008 
      
0.000 0.062 
   
Adj.R2 0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.12 
 
Obs 3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
 
F-stat 11.041 
  
7.701 
  
8.367 
  
86.558 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
previously defined.  
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Based on the results from the basic OLS regression of equation (4.4), the coefficient 
FAM20, like that on FAMILY, is positive and significant and the coefficients for 
ACSIZE and ACIND are both positive and significant. However, while the 
coefficients of interaction variable BODIND*FAM20 is negative and marginally 
significant, coefficients of ACSIZE*FAM20 and ACIND*FAM20 are negative but not 
significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on BODSIZE is also negative but not 
significant.  
 
The results for FAM20, ACSIZE, ACIND, BODSIZE and BODIND*FAM20 are 
qualitatively similar for the three other regression procedures except that the 
coefficients on the interaction on the variable ACSIZE*FAM20 are negative and 
significant using White (1980 and Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedures, and the 
coefficient on the interaction on the variable ACIND*FAM20 and ACFIN are negative 
and significant using Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure. Thus, the results are not the 
same as those obtained with the variable FAMILY but nevertheless they are similar. 
 
5.6.2.2 Measuring Family Influence Based on Family Control of Board 
In this section, family firms are identified based solely on the presence of family 
control over the board of directors. In this measure, family firms, FAMBOD, is coded 
one if two or more family members are directors, and coded zero otherwise. Table 
5.15 present the estimation result for equation (4.4) and (4.6) using FAMBOD.  
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Table 5.15: Regression Results of the Effect of Family Control on the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality (Earnings Quality=AQUALITY) 
 
Basic Regression 
 
White (1980) 
 
Industry & 
Year Effects  
Fama & MacBeth 
(1973) 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff white-t 
 
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT -0.094* -3.757 
 
-0.094* -3.385 
 
-0.086* -3.173 
 
-0.099*** -2.053 
FAMBOD 0.039*** 1.709 
 
0.039*** 1.670 
 
0.035 1.529 
 
0.045 1.658 
ACSIZE 0.007** 2.491 
 
0.007** 2.486 
 
0.006** 2.127 
 
0.007** 2.948 
ACIND 0.047* 3.287 
 
0.047* 3.522 
 
0.048* 3.284 
 
0.040** 3.872 
ACMEET 0.000 0.308 
 
0.000 0.233 
 
0.001 0.511 
 
0.001 0.428 
ACFIN -0.000 -0.048 
 
-0.000 -0.043 
 
-0.002 -0.245 
 
-0.002 -0.190 
BODSIZE -0.003* -2.837 
 
-0.003** -2.392 
 
-0.003* -2.780 
 
-0.003** -3.571 
BODIND -0.017 -1.023 
 
-0.017 -0.854 
 
-0.018 -1.092 
 
-0.017 -0.731 
DUALITY -0.005 -1.029 
 
-0.005 -0.851 
 
-0.005 -0.973 
 
-0.004 -0.903 
ACSIZE*FAMBOD -0.008** -2.139 
 
-0.008** -2.219 
 
-0.008** -2.023 
 
-0.008* -5.157 
ACIND*FAMBOD -0.033*** -1.670 
 
-0.033*** -1.844 
 
-0.031 -1.591 
 
-0.038*** -2.209 
ACMEET*FAMBOD -0.000 -0.007 
 
-0.000 -0.006 
 
-0.000 -0.120 
 
-0.001 -0.458 
ACFIN*FAMBOD -0.004 -0.297 
 
-0.004 -0.295 
 
-0.003 -0.203 
 
-0.002 -0.158 
BODSIZE*FAMBOD 0.003** 1.996 
 
0.003*** 1.824 
 
0.003** 2.049 
 
0.003** 2.877 
BODIND*FAMBOD 0.002 0.068 
 
0.002 0.063 
 
0.003 0.118 
 
0.005 0.326 
DUALITY*FAMBOD 0.008 1.239 
 
0.008 1.154 
 
0.008 1.303 
 
0.006 1.049 
BIG4 -0.002 -0.753 
 
-0.002 -0.753 
 
-0.001 -0.608 
 
-0.002 -0.948 
GROWTH -0.009* -5.933 
 
-0.009* -4.876 
 
-0.009* -5.571 
 
-0.007** -3.049 
LEVERAGE -0.000 -0.017 
 
-0.000 -0.015 
 
0.002 0.243 
 
0.002 0.232 
SIZE 0.003 1.088 
 
0.003 1.032 
 
0.002 0.810 
 
0.004 0.847 
LOSS -0.014* -4.669 
 
-0.014* -4.292 
 
-0.014* -4.608 
 
-0.014* -4.062 
SALESVAR -0.022* -3.124 
 
-0.022* -2.643 
 
-0.024* -3.399 
 
-0.021*** -2.144 
CAPINT 0.028* 4.874 
 
0.028* 4.733 
 
0.026* 4.159 
 
0.028** 3.237 
OPCYCLE -0.004 -1.403 
 
-0.004 -1.347 
 
-0.003 -1.097 
 
-0.004 -1.533 
CFOVAR -0.187* -7.309 
 
-0.187* -5.732 
 
-0.184* -7.146 
 
-0.194* -7.093 
INTINT -0.020*** -1.896 
 
-0.020 -1.537 
 
-0.023** -2.171 
 
-0.022** -3.658 
DISTRESS -0.004 -1.425 
 
-0.004 -1.414 
 
-0.004 -1.284 
 
-0.005 -1.233 
IND_1 
      
0.002 0.330 
   
IND_2 
      
-0.005 -0.934 
   
IND_3 
      
0.007 1.052 
   
IND_4 
      
-0.004 -0.682 
   
IND_5 
      
-0.003 -0.515 
   
IND_6 
      
-0.005 -0.916 
   
YR_2004 
      
-0.003 -0.731 
   
YR_2005 
      
0.005 1.395 
   
YR_2006 
      
0.007*** 1.960 
   
YR_2007 
      
-0.002 -0.441 
   
YR_2008 
      
-0.000 -0.104 
   
Adj.R2 0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.08 
  
0.12 
 
Obs 3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
  
3162 
 
F-stat 11.182 
  
8.049 
  
8.430 
  
25.867 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are as 
previously defined. 
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The results of the basic OLS regression with FAMBOD are very similar to those 
obtained with FAMILY, as reported in Table 5.9 except that the coefficient in the 
interaction variable BODSIZE*FAMBOD is not only positive but also significant thus 
indicating that family influence also mitigates the effect of board size. The results for 
the other three regressions procedures are qualitatively the same. Thus, overall the 
results are very similar to those obtained with the variable FAMILY. 
 
5.6.2.3 Additional Analysis: Corporate Governance-Earnings Quality Relationship in 
Chinese and Malay Family Firms  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, due to the New Economic Policy of 1969, the majority of 
Malaysian business are controlled by two major ethnicities, the Malay (Bumiputera) 
and Chinese.  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that in Malaysia, Chinese families are 
more secretive in their financial reporting. According to Zapalska and Edwards 
(2001), Chinese family culture is mostly influenced by Confucianism that promotes 
strong paternalism and collectivism within the families. Chinese culture demands a 
very strong commitment to families (Zapalska and Edwards, 2001).  Therefore, as 
business is regarded as an extension of the family system, Chinese business owners 
are more dedicated and more aggressively involved in their business.  
 
On the other hand, firms owned by Malay families are perceived to be more 
politically connected and have closer relationship with the government. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005) document that Malay firms are positively related to voluntary 
disclosure and corporate social disclosure. They explain that Malay firms adopt a 
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reactive legitimating strategy by increasing the social responsibility disclosures to 
divert the attention of their stakeholders away from the close relationship they have 
with government. Due to high level of voluntary disclosure of Malay firms 
documented by Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Rahman and Ali (2006) posit that Malay 
firms may have fewer tendencies to manage earnings. The differences in the cultural 
values of Malay and Chinese families may thus lead to differences in the corporate 
governance- earnings quality relationship of the two groups of family firms.  
 
To test for this difference, the sample of family owned firms is partitioned into 
subsamples of Malay and Chinese firms. A firm is considered to be a Chinese family 
firm if it has more than 20% family shares and the majority of board is Chinese. 
Similarly, a firm is categorised as a Malay family firm if it has more than 20% family 
shares and the majority of the board is Malay. Equation (4.5) is estimated for both 
subsamples and the results are reported in Table 5.16. 
 
Table 5.16 illustrates that from 2358 firm-year observation of family owned firms, 
only 686 firm-year observations are from Malay family firms, while the remaining 
1672 are from Chinese family firms. This shows that within the firms that have more 
than 20% family ownership in the study, more than 70% are of Chinese families.  
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Table 5.16: Regression Results of Corporate Governance on Earnings Quality in Chinese and 
Malay Family Owned Firms (Earnings Quality=AQUALITY) 
  
Malay Family Firms 
 
Chinese Family Firms 
  
coeff t-stat 
 
coeff t-stat 
INTERCEPT 
 
0.008 0.137 
 
-0.042 -1.377 
ACSIZE 
 
0.005 1.148 
 
-0.003 -0.975 
ACIND 
 
0.041 1.623 
 
0.014 1.087 
ACMEET 
 
-0.001 -0.441 
 
0.001 0.864 
ACFIN 
 
0.009 0.617 
 
-0.004 -0.493 
BODSIZE 
 
-0.003** -2.048 
 
-0.001 -0.671 
BODIND 
 
-0.048*** -1.735 
 
-0.024 -1.544 
DUALITY 
 
0.001 0.095 
 
0.001 0.355 
BIG4 
 
-0.000 -0.003 
 
-0.003 -0.918 
GROWTH 
 
-0.005 -1.580 
 
-0.008* -3.661 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.038*** 1.931 
 
-0.009 -0.933 
SIZE 
 
-0.004 -0.693 
 
0.000 0.130 
LOSS 
 
-0.010 -1.501 
 
-0.015* -4.051 
SALESVAR 
 
-0.026 -1.611 
 
-0.021** -2.307 
CAPINT 
 
0.020 1.283 
 
0.034* 4.382 
OPCYCLE 
 
-0.001 -0.147 
 
-0.005 -1.451 
CFOVAR 
 
-0.241* -4.683 
 
-0.161* -4.095 
INTINT 
 
-0.029 -1.220 
 
-0.037* -2.831 
DISTRESS 
 
-0.010 -1.440 
 
0.002 0.486 
IND_1 
 
-0.010 -0.778 
 
0.009 1.422 
IND_2 
 
-0.027** -2.530 
 
0.005 0.758 
IND_3 
 
-0.016 -0.926 
 
0.017** 2.054 
IND_4 
 
-0.016 -1.198 
 
0.001 0.165 
IND_5 
 
-0.009 -0.605 
 
-0.003 -0.327 
IND_6 
 
-0.022** -2.165 
 
0.007 1.046 
YR_2004 
 
0.001 0.144 
 
-0.005 -1.156 
YR_2005 
 
0.002 0.261 
 
0.006 1.362 
YR_2006 
 
0.014 1.602 
 
0.002 0.371 
YR_2007 
 
-0.003 -0.355 
 
-0.000 -0.088 
YR_2008 
 
0.007 0.742 
 
0.002 0.307 
Adj.R2 
 
0.06 
  
0.07 
 
Obs 
 
686 
  
1672 
 
F-stat 
 
2.630 
  
5.283 
 
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Firms are considered 
as Chinese family is when it has more than 20% family shares and majority of board is dominated by Chinese 
directors. Malay family firms are firms that have more than 20% family shares and with a majority of Malay 
directors in board. All variables are as previously defined. 
 
For Malay family firms, corporate governance variables show a significant 
association with earnings quality. Specifically, the coefficients for board size 
(BODSIZE) and board independence (BODIND) are negatively significant at 5% 
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level and 10% level, respectively. This indicates that in Malay family firms, bigger 
and more independent board are associated with lower quality of earnings. The 
finding on board size supports the argument that a smaller board is more effective in 
monitoring management. However, the result on board independence is contrary to 
the argument that a more independent board of directors would results in better 
monitoring and thus higher quality of financial reporting. The result could be due to 
the possibility that in family firms, lower board independence reflects higher 
involvement of family members in board, and thus greater monitoring by family 
members. 
 
For Chinese family firms, no corporate governance variables are significantly 
associated with earnings quality. This result supports view that in family firms, 
corporate governance mechanisms do not add to the monitoring provided by the 
family. 
 
5.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
This study had three main objectives. The study aimed (1) to examine the association 
between earnings quality and corporate governance, (2) to examine the relationship 
between earnings quality and family influence, and (3) to examine whether the 
influence of family firms mitigates the relationship between corporate governance 
and earnings quality. The results show that in general, audit committee independence 
and board size are significantly associated with earnings quality. The results also 
show that the quality of earnings is higher in family firms relative to nonfamily firms. 
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However, the significance of corporate governance variables is due to the nonfamily 
firms in the sample as none of the corporate governance variables has significant 
association with earnings quality in family firms. The following subsections provide 
further discussions on the results.  
 
5.7.1 Earnings Quality and Family Firms 
Consistent with the argument that family firms are more likely to report higher 
quality of earnings, this study finds a significant positive association between family 
firms (FAMILY) and quality of reported earnings. In particular, this finding is robust 
across different measures of earnings quality (AQUALITY and AQ2) and different 
measures of family firms (FAMILY, FAM20 and FAMBOD).  The evidence suggest 
that a significant amount of family ownership, coupled with the presence of family 
members on the board reduces agency costs, resulting in better quality of earnings. 
Overall, the results of the study reject the first null hypothesis, (H01), that there is a no 
difference between the earnings quality of family and nonfamily firms. The findings 
of this study thus support the alignment hypothesis and Fama and Jensen‟s (1983b) 
suggestion that family influence, through ownership and control provide better 
monitoring. 
 
The evidence that family influence results in better monitoring of firms management 
is consistent with Wang (2006) who reports higher quality of earnings in firms owned 
by founding families in the United States.  Similarly, Ali et al. (2007) show that 
compared to their nonfamily counterparts, family firms in the United States are less 
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likely to manipulate discretionary accruals and are more likely to warn of bad news. 
A study in China by Yang (2010) also suggests that the appointment of family 
members as the CEO in family firms improves earnings quality. Yang documents 
(2010) that the family CEO has a lower tendency to manage earnings relative to a 
nonfamily CEO, supporting the alignment of interests between family and minority 
shareholders. Consistently, Sánchez et al. (2007) also provides evidence that earnings 
quality is higher in family firms relative to non-family firms in Spain. Sánchez et al. 
(2007) suggest that family firms have lower discretionary accruals and greater 
predictability of future cash flows due to their long-term orientation.  
 
The result is also consistent with other related studies, which examine the association 
between family ownership and firm performance (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; 
Chu and Cheah, 2006; McConaughy et al., 2001). Using a sample of companies from 
the United States, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) report that family firms are better than 
nonfamily firms in terms of performance and suggest that family ownership is an 
effective organisational structure. Their study concludes that in well-regulated and 
transparent markets, family ownership in public firms reduces agency problems 
without leading to severe losses in decision-making efficiency. Similarly, 
McConaughy et al. (2001) show that founding family controlled firms operate more 
efficiently, carry less debt than other firms and have greater market value as a result 
of combined high performance and low risk. The study also finds that greater 
alignment of managerial and shareholders‟ interests through managerial ownership 
only occur in family firms. In Malaysia, Chu and Cheah (2006) also reported a 
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positive and significant relationship between family ownership and performance. The 
study suggests that in principle, family controlled firms still maintain the passion of 
entrepreneurship, which focuses on firm output efficiency- expansion as well as on 
maximisation of shareholders' value. 
 
The result of the current study supports the notion that family firms have special 
qualities that allow them to effectively monitor the firm‟s activities. Higher quality of 
earnings in family firms could be a result of family firm‟s altruism and long-term 
orientation that reduce the incentives for earnings manipulations. Additionally, the 
results could also be due to the fact that family firms have lower agency costs and 
greater expertise relating to firm‟s operation that provides them with additional 
advantage in performing the monitoring function.  
 
5.7.2 Earnings Quality and Corporate Governance 
5.7.2.1 Audit Committee Size 
Consistent with evidence from the previous studies (e.g. Lin et al., 2006; Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005), this study supports the argument that a larger audit committee 
would provide better governance and thus ensure higher quality of financial 
statements. However, this study does not find a significant association between audit 
committee size (ACSIZE) and earnings quality for the full sample of Malaysian firms. 
Further analysis reveals that while this result holds for family firms, for nonfamily 
firms this corporate governance variable is significant. In respect of nonfamily firms, 
consistent with the United States study by Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Lin et al. 
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(2006), this study finds the evidence that a larger audit committee is associated with 
better quality of reported earnings.  
 
5.7.2.2 Audit Committee Independence 
The study also finds that there is a significant positive association between audit 
committee independence (ACIND) and the quality of reported earnings. However, as 
with audit committee size, this association holds only for non-family firms. The 
results are also robust in nearly all sensitivity analyses.  
 
The result of this study for nonfamily firms is consistent with empirical evidence 
from prior studies, which suggest that higher levels of audit committee independence, 
improves monitoring and results in higher quality of financial reporting. For example, 
prior studies  reported  that companies with more independent audit committee are 
less likely to have financial restatements (Abbott et al., 2004),  less likely to commit 
financial reporting fraud (Beasley et al., 2000), and more likely to have lower 
earnings management (Bédard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002). Consistently, Bradbury et 
al.‟s (2006) study in Malaysia and Singapore also found a significant reduction in the 
level of income-increasing accruals in companies with fully independent audit 
committee members and Saleh et al. (2007) show that the presence of a fully 
independent audit committee reduces earnings management practices of Malaysian 
firms. 
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This finding suggests that a more independent audit committee is more effective in 
performing its oversight role and ensuring high quality of financial reporting. This is 
because independent audit committee members provide more objective monitoring of 
company‟s financial reporting relative to other members as they do not have personal 
interests in the company. Moreover, the independent members are committed in 
performing their monitoring role in order to preserve and develop their reputation. 
Relative to other audit committee members, independent members also have greater 
incentive to avoid activities that could damage their reputation (Abbott and Parker, 
2000; Abbott et al., 2003b). 
 
5.7.2.3 Audit Committee Meeting Frequency 
Despite the argument that more frequent audit committee meetings promotes greater 
diligence and effectiveness of audit committee in monitoring firm‟s financial 
reporting, this study did not find any association between audit committee meeting 
frequency (ACMEET) and earnings quality. The result, which is consistent in all 
regressions and sensitivity analyses, leads to the conclusion that there is no basis to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and earnings quality. 
 
This result of the study is consistent with the Bédard et al. (2004) study in the United 
States, which also found that the frequency of audit committee meetings does not 
seems to affect the probability of aggressive earnings management. Similarly, 
Rahman and Ali (2006) do not find evidence to support a relationship between the 
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frequency of audit committee meetings and firm‟s level of earnings management in 
Malaysia. 
 
This finding suggests that looking only at the frequency of meetings of an audit 
committee is not sufficient to assess the effectiveness of the committee. Other factors 
such as the amount of information exchanged between the members, the depth of 
discussion on financial reporting matters, the content and length of the meetings and 
the post-meeting actions relating to the issues discussed in the meetings could be 
helpful in assessing the effectiveness of an audit committee.  
 
5.7.2.4 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Similar to a number of prior studies (Anderson et al., 2004; Carcello and Neal, 2003; 
DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005; Lee, Mande, and Ortman, 2004; Saleh et al., 2007), 
this study fails to provide evidence that financial expertise of audit committee 
members could positively influence audit committee effectiveness. From the 
regression results, the coefficient for audit committee financial expertise (ACFIN) is 
not significant in all models and sensitivity analyses. The results imply that the 
financial expertise of audit committee members is a not a factor that could 
significantly contribute to the effectiveness of an audit committee in ensuring high 
quality of reported earnings. Based on the results, this study is not able to reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no association between audit committee financial 
expertise and earnings quality.  
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The insignificant results could be due to the possibility that the proportion of 
financial experts in an audit committee does not necessarily capture the employment 
of the knowledge and its effectiveness. Saleh et al.‟s (2007) findings show that 
having a higher proportion of financial expertise in an audit committee per se would 
not necessarily lead to the effectiveness of the audit committee in curbing earnings 
management of Malaysian firms. However, a combination of high proportion of 
members with accounting knowledge in audit committee and high frequency of audit 
committee meetings results in significantly low earnings management practices. 
Similarly, a recent study by Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) claims that the 
personal characteristics of audit committee accounting experts could affect their 
monitoring of accrual quality. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) found that audit committee 
accounting experts who are independent, hold fewer directorships, and have a lower 
tenure in their firms have a profound positive impact on accruals quality. In other 
words, their results suggests that to be effective, audit committee members should not 
only possess accounting expertise but also be independent, relatively free from 
commitments to other firms, and be recent appointees. 
 
5.7.2.5 Board Size 
From the analyses conducted using the total sample of Malaysian companies, it was 
found that a smaller board of directors is associated with higher quality of earnings. 
The significant negative associations between board size (BODSIZE) and quality of 
reported earnings appear in all models reported in the study. The results are also 
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robust in all sensitivity analyses. Based on the results, this study rejects the null 
hypothesis that there is no association between board size and earnings quality. 
 
However, as with the other corporate governance variables, the result holds only for 
nonfamily firms. This result is consistent with a number of previous studies (e.g. 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Vafeas, 
2000; Yermack, 1996), which suggests that the smaller the board, the more effective 
it is in its monitoring function. The effectiveness of smaller boards in performing the 
monitoring function could be due to several reasons. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue 
that smaller boards involves fewer number of directors, and thus easier to be managed 
and are more organised. When the boards are too big, it would be harder to coordinate 
the directors‟ efforts. In addition, smaller board are more effective as they have better 
communication and more timely decision making (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
Furthermore, in smaller boards, the directors have fewer tendencies to free-ride and 
have greater accountability compared to larger boards. 
 
5.7.2.6 Board Independence 
The result of this study does not support the argument that greater involvement of 
independent board of directors would leads to higher monitoring of managerial 
activities and result in higher quality of reported earnings. The result shows that there 
is no significant association between board independence (BODIND) and earnings 
quality in the total sample of Malaysian companies. Therefore, there is not enough 
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evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between board 
independence and earnings quality.  
 
This finding is not consistent with prior studies such as Xie et al. (2003) and Peasnell 
et al. (2005), which find that a higher proportion of independent directors on the 
board is associated with higher quality of earnings. Nevertheless, the result is similar 
to the evidence found by Park and Shin (2004) in Canada and Choi et al. (2007) in 
Korea, which found no significant relationship between outside directors and the 
quality of earnings. The insignificant result is also similar to the previous studies in 
Malaysia that did not find any evidence supporting the role of independent directors 
in constraining earnings management in the country (Abdullah and Nasir, 2004; 
Rahman and Ali, 2006; Saleh et al., 2005).  
 
The findings of this study suggest that independent directors in Malaysia are not 
helpful in ensuring high quality of earnings. As a board of directors has diverse 
responsibilities including monitoring the firm‟s top executives, approving the 
company‟s strategy, and monitoring the internal control over financial reporting; the 
role of ensuring high quality of earnings may be delegated to firm‟s audit committees. 
The ineffectiveness of independent directors in carrying out monitoring function may 
also due to their lack of expertise, lack of required skills and knowledge in the 
business environment (Wan-Hussin, 2009). It is also likely that the lack of association 
between independent directors and earnings quality may be due to the reason that the 
appointment of independent directors could be influenced by controlling shareholders 
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or the CEOs to protect their interests. The independent directors may also be 
appointed for political reasons, for legitimising business activities, and for contacts 
and contracts, rather than for expertise and experience (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
 
5.7.2.7 CEO Duality 
This study does not find any significant association between CEO duality (DUALITY) 
and earnings quality, and therefore null hypothesis of no association between CEO 
duality and earnings quality is not rejected.  The finding suggests that although most 
of the codes of corporate governance recommend the separation of role of the 
chairman and that of the CEO, it does not necessarily lead to the improvement in the 
quality of financial reporting.  
 
Felton and Wong (2004) suggests that splitting the role of CEO and chairman might 
not result in independent and more effective monitoring if the CEO or chairman is not 
really independent. For example, in the UK, splitting the role of chairman and the 
CEO is not effective when a chairman-CEO gives up the CEO roles but stays on as a 
chairman or a chairman-CEO gives up the chairmanship but continues to serve as a 
CEO (Felton and Wong, 2004). According to Coombes and Wong (2004), even 
though separating the roles of chairman and CEO is recommended, it would not give 
any advantage unless the chairman is committed to performing his duties.  
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5.7.3 Interaction Effect of Family Influence and Corporate Governance on Earnings 
Quality 
This study finds that there is a significant impact of family firms on the relationship 
between audit committee size and earnings quality  and audit committee 
independence and earnings quality . Specifically, the findings of this study show that 
audit committee size-earnings quality and audit committee independence-earnings 
quality relationships are significantly weaker in family firms compared to nonfamily 
firms. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between 
corporate governance-earnings quality relationship in family and nonfamily firms is 
rejected. 
 
The results of this study suggest that family control mediates the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms (in the form of audit committee size and 
independence) in monitoring firms financial reporting. These results are consistent 
with Jaggi and Leung (2007), who found that the effectiveness of audit committees is 
significantly reduced when family members are present on corporate boards. Jaggi 
and Leung (2007) explain that the appointment of independent members to audit 
committees is to ensure that there is no undue pressure on audit committee members 
from individuals with controlling interests. When family members with controlling 
interests are present on boards, it is unlikely that independent audit committees 
members will oppose the family members, who appointed them to the corporate 
board (Jaggi and Leung, 2007). The loyalty of the independent audit committee 
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members to the controlling family board members would compromise their 
effectiveness. 
 
The findings also suggest a substitution effect for family control in family firms. As 
explained by Bertrand and Schoar (2006), “trust between family members can be a 
substitute for missing governance and contractual enforcement”. Thus, in family 
firms, even though the corporate governance mechanisms are weak, tight controls by 
the family results in high quality of financial reporting. Similarly, Klein, Shapiro and 
Young (2005) claim that in family firms, greater alignment of ownership and control 
obviates the need for outside directors.  Klein (2005) suggests that in family firm, the 
role of the board is more of providing service and advice rather than monitoring and 
control. 
 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides findings of the empirical analysis including the descriptive, 
univariate correlation, multivariate and sensitivity analysis. The descriptive analysis 
reported in this chapter presented the involvement of family through ownership of 
shares and control over board of directors in Malaysian firms, the extent of corporate 
governance practices as well as the level of earnings quality of the firms. The 
univariate analysis documented the difference between earnings quality and corporate 
governance of family and nonfamily firm. The multivariate analysis provides 
evidence on the difference between earnings quality of family and nonfamily firms, 
the association between corporate governance variables and earnings quality, and the 
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mediating effect of family influence on corporate governance- earnings quality 
relationship.  
 
The main findings on the direct effect of family influence and corporate governance 
on earnings quality shows that family firms have higher quality of earnings relative to 
nonfamily firms. The result supports the alignment effect within family firms that is 
consistent with prior studies in the US (Wang, 2006). In addition, the regression 
results show that audit committee independence and board size are significantly 
associated with earnings quality in nonfamily firms. The results suggest that a higher 
proportion of independent audit committee members and a smaller size of the board 
of directors are associated with higher quality of earnings. The findings are consistent 
with the agency theory expectation and most of prior findings in the literature. 
 
Examination of the interaction effect of family influence and corporate governance 
reveals that three corporate governance variables; the size of audit committee, the 
independence of audit committee and the size of the board of directors have 
significant associations with earnings quality in nonfamily firms. However, there is 
no association between any of the corporate governance variables and earnings 
quality in family firms. The results from both samples suggest that corporate 
governance variables are associated with earnings quality only in nonfamily firms, 
suggesting that the effectiveness of corporate governance could be mediated by 
family influence. Further multivariate analysis that includes interaction variables of 
corporate governance and family influence confirms the results.   
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the present study, highlights the limitations of 
the study and provides suggestions for future research. This chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 6.2 presents a summary of the research and implications of the 
findings. Section 6.3 discusses the limitations of the study. Section 6.4 concludes the 
thesis outlining the contributions and a number of suggestions for further research. 
 
6.2 Summary of the Research 
The purpose of this study was to examine the association between family influence 
and earnings quality, the association between corporate governance and earnings 
quality, and the mediating impact of family influence on the association between 
corporate governance and earnings quality in Malaysia. The study used a sample of 
527 companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia over the period 2003-2008 – a total of 
3162 firm-year observations.  
 
This study measures earnings quality as the additive inverse of the absolute value of 
residuals from the estimation of the original and modified cross-sectional Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model. A firm is categorised as a family firm if the family 
members owned more than 20% of the firm‟s shares and at least two family members 
are directors. The corporate governance aspects examined in this study include audit 
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committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee meeting frequency, 
audit committee financial expertise, board size, board independence and CEO duality. 
This study employs OLS regressions to test the hypotheses. To ensure the robustness 
of the results, this study performs several sensitivity analyses including using White 
(1980) adjusted t-statistics, using industry and year dummies to control for industry 
and year fixed effects, estimating Fama & MacBeth regressions to mitigate potential 
time-series correlations of pooled data, and using alternative measures for the family 
influence and earnings quality. 
 
This study finds that family firms have significantly higher earnings quality than 
nonfamily firms, supporting the view that significant family ownership and control in 
a firm provides additional monitoring in a weak capital market. Special 
characteristics possessed by family firms such as altruism and long-term orientation 
may contribute to better monitoring in these firms, resulting in higher quality of 
earnings.  
 
Consistent with the results from previous studies on earnings quality and corporate 
governance, this study documents significant associations between corporate 
governance variables and earnings quality. Specifically, this study documents that 
audit committee size, audit committee independence, and board size are significantly 
associated with accrual quality. However, the significant association between these 
corporate governance variables and earnings quality exists only in non-family firms. 
The results suggest that in nonfamily firms, a higher proportion of independent audit 
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committee members and a smaller board of directors provide more effective 
monitoring on the managers‟ financial reporting.  
 
By considering interaction variables between family and corporate governance, the 
study also found that that family influence mediates the effectiveness of these 
corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring firms financial reporting. These 
results are consistent with Jaggi and Leung (2007), who find that the effectiveness of 
audit committees is significantly reduced when family members are present on 
corporate boards. It could be that when family members with controlling interests are 
present on boards, it is unlikely that independent audit committee members will 
oppose them. The loyalty of the independent audit committee members to the 
controlling family board members might compromise their effectiveness (Jaggi and 
Leung, 2007). 
 
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, this study focused on the 
Malaysian institutional setting. The result should be applicable to other countries with 
similar business and institutional environment. However, it may not be applicable to 
other countries with a significantly different institutional and regulatory environment. 
 
Second, the validity of the conclusions drawn in this study depends upon accrual 
quality as a proper measure of earnings quality. This study measures earnings quality 
based on the quality of accruals using the original and modified Dechow and Dichev 
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(2002) models, thus the result of this study might not generalise to other dimensions 
of earnings quality. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, there are other measures of 
earnings quality. Since the measures represent different dimension of earnings 
quality, the use of such measures may give different results. 
 
In this study, the firms are included based on the availability of data to calculate 
accrual quality variable. This study includes only companies that have a complete set 
of data during an eight year period of 2002-2009. Thus, the data might suffer from 
sample bias towards surviving firms. Firms in the sample are more likely to be larger 
and more successful than firms that are not included in the sample, as smaller and less 
successful firms might not survive during the eight year period. 
 
Finally, the corporate governance variables used in this study may be endogenously 
related to earnings quality. Thus, the coefficient estimates and inferences derived in 
this study may be biased. Further, the results support associations (or lack thereof) 
but cannot be interpreted as establishing causality between family firms, corporate 
governance and earnings quality.  
 
6.4 Contributions and Suggestions for Future Research  
The present study contributes to the literature by documenting evidence that family 
firms in Malaysia report higher quality of earnings compared to their nonfamily 
counterparts, supporting the alignment hypothesis of family ownership and control. 
This study also documents that corporate governance, in the form of audit committee 
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size and independence, and board size, associates with higher earnings quality only 
for nonfamily firms but not for family firms. The study also concludes that family 
influence weakens the corporate governance-earnings quality relationship. This 
conclusion has important implications for countries with significant number of family 
firms, such as the East Asian countries (Claessens et al., 2000). The impact of the 
positive features of family influence on earnings quality seems to persist in a context 
where institutional environment is poor, as family control serves as a substitute for 
the poor external governance. As family firms are found to have higher quality of 
earnings, the Malaysian policy makers should analyse the appropriateness of 
requiring firms to have dispersed ownership structure and independent board of 
directors. The government should consider that family firms have dominant 
contributions in the development of the Malaysian economy. Since family firms 
represent a majority of firms in the country, this study also support the call to address 
an introduction of corporate governance system that are more appropriate for the 
firms with different ownership structure in the country.  
 
As suggested in Cascino (2010), future research could provide an extension to this 
study by examining the economic consequence of financial reporting quality in 
family firms. The studies can assess whether the higher quality of accounting 
information in family firms effectively translates into positive capital market 
outcomes, such as lower cost of capital, higher liquidity and more efficient 
contracting. 
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Johnson and Mitton (2003) found that in Malaysia, politically connected firms had 
worse stock returns during the early phase of the Asian financial crisis compared to 
nonpolitical firms. However, politically connected firms are associated with higher 
stock performance after the imposition of capital controls by the government. Ball 
(2003) claims that political forces, including the extent of involvement of 
governments in codifying and enforcing accounting standards, taxes, and political 
incentives to reduce the volatility of reported income, could affect the quality of 
financial reporting. As there is a possibility that these political factors could affect the 
quality of financial reporting, future research could provide a richer analysis by 
including this factor in analyses examining earnings quality of family firms in 
Malaysia.  For example, future research could examine whether the earnings quality 
of family firms that are politically connected differs from that of family firms that do 
not have political connections. 
 
Another important extension to this study would be an examination of family culture 
and its association with financial reporting quality. As reported in the additional 
analysis in this study, the influence of Chinese families on earnings quality is 
different from that of Malay families, suggesting that culture and family values are 
important predictors of earnings quality in countries with mixed cultures and races. 
The impact of culture on corporate social reporting in Malaysia was documented in 
the Haniffa and Cooke (2005) study. Further investigation on the impact of specific 
family culture and values on the quality of financial reporting may extend existing 
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studies on family firms, as well as provide further understanding of the impact of 
culture on broader financial reporting issues. 
 
Finally, this study examined the relationships between family firms, corporate 
governance and earnings quality from a positivist perspective, with the application of 
quantitative assessment techniques. Future research might provide further analysis 
using qualitative methods to help understand how family ownership and control, as 
well as corporate governance mechanisms, relate to firms quality of financial 
reporting. For example, future research could study the role that certain individuals 
play in accounting choices in family firms, their underlying motivations and the 
environment or variety of situations that motivates them to make such decisions.  
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Appendix 1: Compliance with OECD Corporate Governance Principles
27
 
OECD Principles Compliance Details 
Section I: The Rights of Shareholders    
Basic shareholders rights Yes Companies Act confers all basic rights to shareholders, including secure methods 
of ownership registration, free transfer of shares, the right to access information, 
the right to participate and vote at AGM (except for non-voting preference share), 
election of board and share in the profit. 
The right to participate in decisions of fundamental 
corporate changes 
Yes Shareholders have the right to participate on the decisions relating to the 
amendments to the statutes, authorizations of additional shares and extraordinary 
transactions (resulting in sale of the company).  
The right to be adequately informed about, participate 
and vote in general shareholder meetings (AGM) 
Some Shareholders are given sufficient and timely information about AGM. 
Shareholders can participate and vote in company meetings and shareholder 
ballots. A shareholder may appoint a proxy, who has the right to speak at a 
meeting and may demand a poll.  However, postal voting is not allowed. 
Disclosure of capital structures and arrangements 
enabling control disproportionate to equity ownership 
Some Nominee accounts are common in Malaysia. However, beneficial owners are 
required to reveal their identity. Some companies have special shares (golden 
shares), which requires the holders‟ concern over certain matters, or confer rights 
over the appointment of directors. Ownership concentration, pyramid structures 
and cross-holdings are common and ownership structures are difficult to capture. 
Efficient and transparent functioning of market for 
corporate control 
Some The market has clearly articulated and disclosed rules and procedure, transparent 
prices and fair conditions. However, concentration of shareholding imposes a 
constraint on the market for corporate control. 
Section II: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders   
Equal treatments of shareholders within same class Yes Shareholders within the same class have equal voting rights. Shareholders have 
the ability to obtain information about voting rights attached to all classes of 
shares before acquisition. Changes in voting rights are subject to shareholders 
vote.  
Prohibition of insider trading and self-dealing Yes Shareholders have the right to call for an AGM, or can apply for a court order if 
                                               
27 The data is gathered from the World Bank report on corporate governance country assessment 2001 and 2005. 
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OECD Principles Compliance Details 
they believe they have been oppressed, prejudiced, or unfairly discriminated 
against or their interests disregarded. Section 181 of Companies Act covers the 
situations where the shareholder alleges there has been appropriation of business, 
property, or corporate opportunity at the expense of the company or its minority 
shareholders, unjustifiable failure to pay dividends, or the director‟s neglect of the 
duty of care, skill, and diligence. 
Disclosure by directors and managers of material 
interests in transactions and matters affecting the 
company. 
Yes KLSE‟s listing rules specify that a company must make a public announcement, 
send a circular and seek the approval of shareholders on all material related party 
transactions. Additionally, Malaysia has adopted IAS 24 on related party 
disclosures. 
Section III: Role of Stakeholders in Corporate 
Governance 
  
Respect of legal stakeholders rights Yes The interests of stakeholders are included in the corporate governance framework 
in Malaysia and proposals have been made to permit more active participation by 
the other stakeholders, particularly the creditor banks and employees, in 
enhancing corporate governance. The rights of the stakeholders are also 
established under various statutes in the country such as the Labor Law, Contracts 
Law, and Insolvency Law. 
Performance enhancing mechanism for stakeholder 
participation 
Yes The law permit performance-enhancing mechanisms such as share option schemes 
for employee participation to be developed. Employee Stock Option Scheme 
(ESOS) is relatively common among Malaysian companies. Bursa Malaysia 
regulates the ESOS size, recipients, and eligibility under the scheme.  
Access to relevant information Yes Stakeholders have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a 
timely and regular basis when participating in the corporate governance process. 
Firms‟ financial information, economic prospects and significant facts about 
employees are required to be disclosed in the annual reports. As demanded by the 
market regulator through its Listing requirements, the information in firms‟ 
annual reports is sufficient, reliable and timely. 
Concerns about any illegal or unethical practice could 
be communicated to the board 
Yes There is a legislation to protect whistleblowers such as directors, management, 
and auditors, who report breaches of securities laws or listing rules and any matter 
that had material and adverse financial impact on publicly listed companies. The 
whistle-blowing provisions to report such breaches or financial matters were 
mandatory for auditors. The legislation is effective from January 2004. 
Existence of effective and efficient insolvency Some Due to some provisions under the Companies Act that deals with firms ongoing 
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framework and effective enforcement of creditor 
rights. 
 
concerns, the high court can issue summary orders temporarily restraining 
creditors from proceeding against the company. The court can also permit an 
arrangement or compromise between a company and its creditors, subject to 
certain requirements. The act does not have a well-defined scheme of judicial 
management of corporate restructuring. However, the country has established an 
asset management company (Danaharta) to acquire non-performing loans from 
banks, and assets from distressed companies, to minimize the problem of a credit 
crunch and to facilitate an orderly payment/write-down of debts. For corporate 
borrowers with total outstanding debt of less than RM 50 million, the Bank 
Negara Malaysia provides assistance in enabling these borrowers to receive 
financial support while restructuring their operations. Alternatively, the borrowers 
could also use the Danaharta assistance. In Malaysia, the widespread practice of 
pyramiding and cross-holdings causes a major divergence between the control and 
cash flow rights of insiders. These insiders have the incentive to maximize their 
private benefits of control and not necessarily shareholder value. Therefore, there 
is a high risks for the interests of minority shareholders being expropriated or their 
assets squandered. 
Section IV: Disclosure and Transparency   
Disclosure of material financial and non-financial 
information 
Yes Under legislative rules and listing requirements in Malaysia, firms are required to 
disclose financial and operating results, company‟s objectives, major share 
ownership and voting rights, remuneration policy for board and key executives, 
information about directors, related party transactions, foreseeable risk factors, 
issues regarding employees and other stakeholders, and governance structures and 
policies in the annual reports.  
Standards of accounting, disclosure, 
and audit 
Yes Malaysia has adopted IFRS, which is renamed as Financial Reporting Standards 
beginning from 2006. The law provides that it is the responsibility of the listed 
corporation, its directors and chief executive to ensure the compliance with 
accounting standards issued by the standards setting body, MASB.  
Annual audit by independent auditor Yes The Listing Requirements requires a listed company to appoint an accounting firm 
to act as its external auditors. The auditors have to comply with approved 
standards on auditing, which are basically consistent with the International 
Standards on Auditing issued by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board of IFAC. External auditors also have to comply with the Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by IFAC and adopted by MIA that 
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require auditors to be independent, competent, and qualified to provide objective 
assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly 
represent the performance of the company. 
Accountability of external auditors Yes External auditors are required by the Companies Act to report to the shareholders 
on the company‟s accounts, other records relating to the accounts, and 
consolidated accounts (for holding company) before the company in general 
meeting. In case of wrongdoings, the external auditors can be sued by the 
company‟s shareholders or stakeholders. There is a mandatory requirement for 
each auditor in Malaysia to obtain professional indemnity insurance for a 
minimum coverage of RM 100,000.00. The audit committee, comprising a 
majority of independent non-executive directors, oversees the audit function, and 
the Bursa and the SC conduct reviews of the audited financial statements. Any 
offense would result in sanctions against the publicly listed company and/or 
directors, whereas the respective auditors are referred to the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants for disciplinary action. 
Channels for disseminating 
information 
 
Yes Companies are required to make immediate public disclosure of all material 
information concerning their affairs to the Bursa and SC. Access to corporate 
information by the public is available through several channels, including annual 
reports and annual audited accounts, quarterly financial reports, and notices and 
circulars. Annual reports and the annual audited accounts are required to be 
distributed directly to shareholders no less than 14 days before the AGM and are 
also submitted to the Bursa. Quarterly financial reports are to be released not later 
than 2 months after the end of each quarter of the company‟s financial year. 
Access to such information also has been enhanced by the use of electronic 
reporting and the internet as a channel for dissemination. 
Section V: Responsibilities of the Board   
Duties and liabilities of the board Some Directors do not owe their duties to the shareholders, but the company. Directors 
have “trustee-like” fiduciary duties in addition to the duty of care, skill and 
diligence. The board decides major policies and may appoint one of their own as 
manager. There is no statutory or judicial recognition of the board‟s collective 
duty to oversee management. The Bursa can take action against directors directly 
involved with its listing rules and the SC can apply to court for disqualification of 
directors where they have been convicted of offences or breach of rules. 
Fair treatment of each class of shareholders Some Companies Act tries to address the problem of controlling shareholders acting as 
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“shadow directors” by exercising control over board without taking on the 
corresponding statutory duties and liabilities. 
Applying high ethical standards and taking into 
account stakeholders interests. 
Some There are voluntary code of ethics such as Rukuniaga Malaysia (Malaysian Code 
of Business Ethics) and the Directors‟ Code of Ethics. 
Fulfilling boards key function Some The board is responsible for the overall corporate governance of the company 
including its strategic direction, establishing goals for management, and 
monitoring the achievement of those goals. The role and function of the board are 
usually documented in a board charter. The Audit Committee, Investment 
Committee, and Executive Committee play a important role in channeling 
important operational and assurance-related issues to the board. In practice, 
almost all Malaysian companies have established an Audit Committee to 
independently monitor its financial reporting and compliance with laws and 
regulations. However, the establishment of the other board committees such as 
remuneration, nomination and executive is left to the individual companies, as the 
level of monitoring differs from one company to another.  
Directors objectivity and commitment Yes The Listing Requirements stipulate that at least two directors, or one third of the 
board, whichever is higher, must be independent directors. Audit Committee is 
required under the Listing Requirements and should comprise at least three 
members, with a majority of independent members. At least one member of the 
committee must be financially trained or a qualified accountant. The Listing 
Requirements indirectly state that board has to meet at least four times a year. The 
MCCG and the listing rules require disclosure in the annual report of the number 
of board meetings held in a year and the details of attendance of each individual 
director. A director is automatically disqualified if (s)he is absent from more than 
50 percent of the total board meetings held in a year. Directors are not allowed to 
hold directorships in more than 25 companies, specifically in 10 listed companies 
and 15 unlisted companies. 
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Appendix 2: Definition of Family Firm in Previous Studies 
Author(s) Sample Definition of Family Firms 
Arosa ,Iturralde, and 
Maseda (2010) 
Spain, 2006 A family firm is a firm that has a large body of common stock held by the founder or family 
members, allowing them to exercise control over the firm, and also family members who 
participate actively in monitoring the firm. 
Chau and Gray (2010) Hong Kong, 2002 Family firms are identified based on the percentage of common shares held by founding families 
and their relatives.  
Jiraporn and Dadalt (2009) U.S., 1994-1999 Family firms are identified based on the fractional equity ownership of the founding family 
and/or the presence of family members serving on the board of directors. 
Andres (2008) Germany, 1998 to 2004 Family firm is firm that has a founder and/or family members (1) with more than 25% of the 
voting shares, and/or (2) represented on either the executive or the supervisory board. 
Prencipe, Markarian, and 
Pozza (2008) 
Italy, 2003 Family firms are defined as firms in which one or more families linked by kinship, close affinity, 
or solid alliances hold a sufficiently large share of capital to enable them to make  decisions 
regarding strategic management. 
Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan (2007) 
U.S., 2002 Family firm is a firm whose founders or descendants continue to hold positions in the top 
management or on the board, or are among the company´s largest shareholders. 
Sánchez, Alemán and 
Martín (2007) 
Spain, 1997-2003 A firm, in which the ultimate owner is a family, and the family is represented on the board. 
Ultimate owner is the principal shareholder, who directly or indirectly owns a percentage of 
voting rights that is equal to or above an established level of control (10%). 
Kim (2006) Korea,1991 to 1998 Family firms are “chaebols” firms, defined based on business groups designation provided by the 
Korean Fair Trade Commission as “Daegyumo Guiup Jipdan” (which is literally translated as 
“big business groups”). 
Maury (2006) 13 Western European 
countries, 1996 to 2003 
Family firm are firms with a family, an individual, or an unlisted firm as largest shareholders, 
which hold at least 10% of the voting rights. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) U.S., 1994 to 2000 Family firms are those in which the founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or 
marriage is an officer, director, or block holder, either individually or as a group. 
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Wang (2006) U.S., 1994-2002 Firms with substantial common stock held by family members or with founding family members 
actively involved in the management or the board of directors. 
Barth, Gulbrandsen and 
Schøne (2005) 
Norway, 1996 Family-owned firms are firms with an individual or a family owning at least 33% of firms 
shares. 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) U.S., 1992 to 1999 Family firms are publicly traded firms, in which the founding families continue to have an 
ownership stakes or maintain board seats. Alternative measurement of family firm is (1) the ratio 
of board seats held by family members to board seats held by independent directors, and (2) a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if family board control exceeds independent board control, 
otherwise 0. 
Suehiro and Wailerdsak 
(2004) 
Thailand, 1996 and 
2000 
Family business is defined as a firm or a group which meets three major conditions: (1) owner 
family members control its ownership through various means; (2) they exert control over its top 
management; and (3) owner family members have succeeded, otherwise will intend to succeed, 
the business of their founder. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) U.S., 1992 to 1999 Family firm is based on fractional equity ownership of the founding family and / or the presence 
of family members serving on the board of directors. Other definitions employed: Ratio of board 
seats held by family members to board seats held by independent directors / CEO founder 
indicates a founding family firm when the CEO is the founder of the firm / CEO descendent 
indicates a founding family firm when the CEO is a descendent of the founder during the past 
decade. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003b) U.S., 1993 to 1999  A firm is identified as family firm when founding family has an equity stake in firm equity.  
Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 
(2003) 
U.S., 1995 Family firms are privately held, have greater than $5 m annual sales, and listed by Arthur 
Anderson as a family business. 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
and Lang (2002) 
8 East Asian 
countries,1996 
Family firm are firms in which there is a presence of a group of people related by blood or 
marriage with large ownership stakes. 
Faccio and Lang (2002) 13 Western European 
countries,1996 to 1999 
Firms are considered as family firms when a family or an individual or unlisted firm hold greater 
than 20% of either cash flow or control rights. 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and 
Buchholtz (2001) 
U.S., 1995 Family firms are privately held, have greater than $5 m annual sales, and listed by Arthur 
Anderson as a family business. 
Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang (2000) 
9 East Asian countries, 
1996 
Family firms are firms with family groups, which control more than 5% of the company's votes.  
Family group is identified through published family trees in each country and may consist of one 
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family or a group of families. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Salines 
and Shleifer (1999) 
27 richest countries, 
1995 to 1997 
Firms are considered as family firms when the controlling shareholder (the ultimate owner) is an 
individual or a family, based on 10% and 20% direct and indirect voting rights cut-offs. 
McConaughy, Walker, 
Handerson and Mishra 
(1998) 
U.S., 1987 Family founder controlled firm is a publicly listed firm whose CEO is either the founder or a 
member of the founder's family. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) 
U.S., 1980 Family firm is firm with a member of the founding family being among the top two officers. 
Allen and Panian (1982) U.S., 1971 to 1980 Family firms are firms, in which the members of a descendent group and their affines owned or 
controlled at least 5 percent of the voting stock and are represented on board of directors. Family 
firms are further classified into firms with direct family control and indirect family control. 
Family firms that have a CEO, who is also a member of the controlling family are classified as 
having direct family control.  
James and Soref (1981) U.S. 1965 Family controlled firms are firms with major shareholders represented on the board (using a 
dichotomous variable). 
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Appendix 3: Empirical Studies on Firms Ownership and Accounting Quality 
Author(s) Research objective Sample 
Measures for 
Accounting Quality 
Measures for Ownership 
Variables 
Results 
Cascino, 
Pugliese, 
Mussolino and 
Sansone 
(2010) 
To explore the quality of 
accounting information in 
listed family firms. 
778 firm-year 
observations 
of listed Italian 
firms over 
1998-2004. 
Accrual quality, 
persistence, 
predictability, 
smoothness, value 
relevance, timeliness 
and conservatism. 
Family firms are firms in which 
50% of voting rights or 
outstanding shares (both direct 
and indirect) are held by family 
blockholders, and with at least 
one family member holding a 
managerial position. 
Family firms have higher 
accrual quality, less 
persistence, more predictable, 
smoother, more value-relevant 
and timely earnings relative to 
nonfamily firms. 
Chau and Gray 
(2010) 
To examine whether the 
association between the 
extent of voluntary 
disclosure and the level of 
family ownership is non-
monotonic. 
 
273 HK firms 
listed on the 
Main Board of 
the HK Ex for 
the year of 
2002. 
 
Voluntary disclosure 
of strategic, financial 
and non-financial 
information. 
Family ownership is measured 
as the percentage of common 
shares held by the founding 
family and their relatives. 
 
When the level of family 
shareholding is less than 25%, 
family shareholding is 
associated with lower 
voluntary disclosure 
supporting convergence of 
interest hypothesis. When the 
interests converge, the need 
for voluntary disclosure is 
lower. However, when family 
share is more than 25%, the 
entrenchment effect dominates 
and is associated with higher 
voluntary disclosure. 
Klai (2010) To examine whether the 
control by foreigners, block 
holders, families and states 
affects the quality of 
financial reporting. 
22 
nonfinancial 
firms listed on 
Tunisian Stock 
Exchange 
during the 
period 1997-
2007. 
Principal component 
analysis (a single 
measure) from two 
earnings quality 
measures, accrual 
quality and earnings 
informativeness. 
Family control is measured as 
the percentage of directors who 
represent families and their 
shareholdings. 
The control by foreigners, 
families and block holders 
reduces reporting quality, 
while the control by the state 
and financial institutions is 
associated with higher 
reporting quality. 
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Givoly, Hayn 
and Katz 
(2010) 
To examine whether public 
equity ownership improves 
firms earnings quality. 
12,261 firm-
year 
observations 
from 2817 
firms, over 
1978-2003, 
extracted from 
Compustat. 
Accrual persistence, 
accrual estimation 
error (modified 
Dechow and Dichev 
model), absence of 
earnings management 
and conservatism. 
Firms considered as having 
public equity ownership are 
public companies that publicly 
trade their equities. Private 
equity companies are public 
companies with privately held 
equity, but publicly trade debt. 
Private equity firms are 
associated with higher quality 
accruals and a lower 
propensity to manage income 
compared to public equity 
firms. 
Yang (2010) To examine the relationship 
between insider ownership 
and earnings management in 
family firms and the impact 
of family CEO on earnings 
management.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
3914 firm-year 
observations 
of Taiwanese 
listed firms, 
over 2001-
2008. 
Earnings 
management 
measured by Jones 
(1991) discretionary 
accrual model as 
modified by Kothari
et al. (2005). 
Controlling families are families 
that own more than 20% control 
rights. Insider ownership is 
measured based on (1) the 
proportion of insider ownership 
over total shares, (2) control
rights or voting rights (3) 
entrenchment effect or the 
degree of divergence. 
Family firms with higher level 
of insider ownership are more 
likely to have higher level of 
earnings management. Family 
CEO have lower tendency to 
manage earnings compared to
nonfamily CEO. 
Beuselinck, 
Deloof and 
Manigart 
(2009) 
To study the association 
between private equity 
ownership and the earnings 
quality. 
 
488 unlisted 
Belgian firms 
with private 
equity. 
Conditional loss 
recognition 
timeliness (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005 
model) 
Private equity involvement is 
measured based on the 
proportion of private equity 
ownership in the sample firms. 
The results show that (1) 
private equity (PE) 
involvement increases a firm‟s 
willingness to recognize losses 
more timely as compared to 
industry, size and life-cycle 
matched non-PE backed firms, 
(2) the effect is more powerful 
for firms backed by 
independent and captive PE-
investors as compared to firms 
backed by government-related 
PE-investors, (3) there is no 
systematic variation in 
earnings quality across 
different levels of PE 
ownership. 
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Jaggi, Leung 
and Gul 
(2009) 
To examine whether the 
monitoring effectiveness of 
independent corporate 
boards is affected by the 
family ownership control or 
the appointment of family 
members on corporate 
boards. 
309 Hong 
Kong firms 
over 1998- 
2000. 
Accrual quality. Family-owned firms are 
identified using share ownership 
(of more than 20%) and the 
presence of 2 or more family on 
the board. 
Monitoring effectiveness of 
independent directors are 
reduced in family-controlled 
firms. 
 
Jiraporn and 
DaDalt (2009) 
To examine the relationship 
between founding family 
control and earnings 
management. 
805 firm-year 
observations 
of S&P 500 
over 1994-
1999. 
Earnings 
management is 
calculated using the 
modified Jones 
(1991) model. 
Family-owned firms are 
identified based on the 
fractional equity ownership of 
the founding family and/or the 
presence of family members. A 
binary variable is used to 
designate family control. 
Family firms are less likely to 
manage earnings. 
Katz (2009) To study how firms‟ 
ownership structures (private 
equity sponsorship), affect 
firms‟ earnings quality and 
long-term performance. 
147 IPOs 
(1,070 firm-
year 
observations) 
over 1980 - 
2005. 
Earnings 
management 
(modified Jones 
model) and timely 
loss recognition (Ball 
and Shivakumar 
model). 
Ownership structure examined 
in this study is private equity 
with majority holdings, private 
equity with minority holdings, 
and management ownership. 
Private equity backed firms 
have higher earnings quality, 
engage less in earnings 
management, and report more 
conservatively both before and 
after the IPO. 
Korczak and 
Korczak 
(2009) 
To test the association 
between ownership structure 
and the quality of accounting 
information. 
528 frim-year 
observation of 
172 companies 
over 1999-
2002 period. 
Informativeness of 
earnings measured 
based on returns-
earnings relationship. 
Managerial ownership is 
measured as the percentage of 
shares held by managers and 
their family members. Unrelated 
block ownership is the sum of 
all shares more than 5% other 
than managerial ownership. 
Unrelated block ownership is 
then categorized as government, 
foreign investors, institutions, 
National Investment Funds or 
unrelated individuals. 
Earnings informativeness 
increases when few block 
holders jointly hold between 
25-50% of shares. Managerial 
holdings have positive 
association with the 
information content of 
earnings. 
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Kwak (2009) To investigate the 
association between 
institutional ownership 
structures and the quality of 
earnings information 
Japanese firms 
during 1990-
1998. 
Earnings response 
coefficients. 
Institutional ownership. The greater the percentage of 
institutional shareholders in 
Japan, the better the quality of 
earnings information and the 
higher the foreign ownership. 
Machuga and 
Teitel (2009) 
To examine the association 
between board 
characteristics (board 
composition disclosure, 
family concentrated 
ownership and shared-
directors) and earnings 
quality. 
62 firms listed 
on the  
Mexican Stock 
Exchange 
(Bolsa) over 
the period 
1998-2002. 
 
Income smoothing, 
timely loss 
recognition and 
conditional accruals. 
 
Family concentrated ownership 
is based on the ratio of the 
independent non-related board 
members to the total board. 
 
Firms that do not have 
concentrated family ownership 
or share directors are more 
likely to have greater increases 
in earnings quality. 
Pergola, 
Joseph and 
Jenzarli (2009) 
To study the association 
between board members 
ownership and earnings 
quality. 
499 publicly 
traded firms 
from the S&P 
500 (large 
cap), S&P 400 
(mid cap), and 
S&P 600 
(small cap) 
indices, in 
2002. 
Earnings quality is 
measured using 
Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) accrual 
quality model. 
Board insiders ownership is the 
percentage of shares owned by 
insiders (executive directors) to 
total board shares. 
 
Earnings quality is negatively 
associated with insider 
ownership and the association 
is moderated by governance 
structures. 
Prencipe, 
Markarian and 
Pozza (2008) 
To study the motivations of 
earnings management in 
family and non-family firms.  
182 firms 
listed on Milan 
Stock 
Exchange in 
the year 2003. 
Earnings 
management is based 
on the capitalization 
of R&D cost. 
Family firms are firms where 
the dominant family owns 
directly or indirectly more than 
50% of equity, or the dominant 
family controls the firm‟s 
strategic decisions. 
Family firms are less likely to 
manage earnings for income-
smoothing purposes, 
compared to nonfamily firms. 
However, both family and 
nonfamily firms are similarly 
motivated to manage earnings 
to avoid debt-covenant 
violations. 
Siregar and 
Utama (2008) 
To investigate whether 
companies listed on the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange 
144 firms 
listed on the 
Jakarta Stock 
Earnings 
management is 
measured as 
Family own firms are firms 
whose listed ownership 
excluding the state, financial 
Firms with higher proportion 
of family ownership and non-
business groups are 
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conduct efficient or 
opportunistic earnings 
management and to examine 
the effect of ownership 
structure, firm size, and 
corporate-governance 
practices on earnings 
management. 
 
Exchange for 
the years of 
1995 to 1996 
and 1999 to 
2002. 
 
discretionary accrual 
using Jones (1991), 
Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995), 
Kasznik(1999) and 
Dechow Richardson 
and Tuna (2002) 
models. 
institutions, or the public is 
more than 5%. Sample is then 
divided into high and low 
family ownership, based on 
50% cut-off point. 
significantly more likely to 
choose efficient earnings 
management relative to other 
firms. 
 
Teshima and 
Shuto (2008) 
To examine the relationship 
between managerial 
ownership and earnings 
management. 
18,163 firm-
year 
observations 
of Japanese 
firms over 
1991-2000. 
 
Earnings 
management 
measured based on 
Jones (1991) 
discretionary accrual 
model as modified by 
Kasnik (1999). 
Managerial ownership is based 
on the fraction of shares held by 
all directors. 
The study found a significant 
non-monotonic relationship 
between managerial 
ownership and discretionary 
accruals in Japanese firms. 
 
Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan 
(Ali et al., 
2007) 
To examine the influence of 
family firms on corporate 
disclosure; in terms of 
earnings quality, voluntary 
disclosure of bad news 
through management 
earnings forecasts, and 
voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance 
practices. 
S&P 500 firms 
over 1998-
2002 period. 
Earnings quality is 
based on the level of 
discretionary accruals 
in earnings, the 
ability of earnings 
components to 
predict future cash 
flows, the persistence 
of earnings, and the 
association of 
earnings with 
contemporaneous 
stock returns. 
Family firms are firms that have 
the founder and/or their 
descendents holding the top 
positions in managements or are 
among companies‟ largest 
shareholders (based on Business 
Week classification of family 
firms).  
Family firms are associated 
with higher earnings quality 
and have greater tendency to 
warn for a given magnitude of 
bad news. However, 
disclosures relating to 
corporate governance are 
lower in those firms. 
Ding, Zhang 
and Zhang 
(2007)  
To investigate the role 
played by a firm‟s 
ownership structure in 
earnings management. 
 
273 privately-
owned and 
state-owned 
companies 
listed in China 
in 2002. 
Earnings 
management is 
measured using 
discretionary 
accruals. 
Ownership concentration is 
measured as the percentage of 
shares held by the largest 
shareholder over the total 
shares. 
 
The relationship between 
ownership concentration and 
earnings management exhibits 
an inverted U-shape pattern. 
At low level, increased 
ownership concentration is 
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 positively related to upward 
earnings management, but at 
higher level (>55 %), 
ownership concentration is 
associated with downward 
earnings management. 
Firth, Fung 
and Rui (2007) 
To examine how ownership, 
two-tier board structure, and 
auditor affect firms‟ 
earnings informativeness. 
 
5189 firm-year 
observations 
of 
Chinese listed 
companies, 
over 1998-
2003. 
Earnings 
informativeness is 
measured by earnings 
response coefficients 
and discretionary 
accruals. 
 
The measure of ownership 
concentration is based on the 
percentage of shares owned by 
the largest owner. 
 
The study shows that firms 
with higher ownership 
concentration have lower 
earnings informativeness. This 
result supports the 
entrenchment effect that 
concentrated ownership has on 
earnings quality. 
 
 
Hutchinson 
and Leung 
(2007) 
To examine the relationship 
between top management 
ownership and earnings 
management. 
15,945 firm-
year 
observations 
of US firms 
over 1996-
2001. 
Earnings 
management is 
measured using 
Kothari et.al (2005) 
performance-adjusted 
current discretionary 
accruals.  
Top management ownership is 
measures as the total stocks held 
by directors and officers over 
the total current outstanding 
stocks. 
Top management ownership  
is non-monotonically 
associated with managers‟ 
propensity to manage 
earnings. 
 
Jaggi and 
Leung (2007) 
To examines whether the 
establishment of audit 
committees by Hong Kong 
firms would constrain 
earnings management, 
especially in firms with 
family-dominated corporate 
boards. 
 
523 
observations 
of Hong Kong 
firms over the 
period 1999- 
2000. 
 
Earnings 
management 
measured by 
discretionary 
accruals. 
Family firms are measured 
using the proportion of directors 
from the same family on the 
board of directors. 
 
The effectiveness of audit 
committees is, however, 
significantly reduced when 
family members are present on 
corporate boards. 
 
Sánchez,  
Alemán and 
Martín (2007) 
To analyze the relationship 
between family control and 
earnings quality in a context 
102 non 
financial firms 
listed on the 
Earnings 
management 
(absolute value of 
Family firms (FAMVAR) are 
firms that have family shares of 
more than 10% with at least a 
Family firms are more likely 
to have higher quality of 
earnings relative to non-family 
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where there is a divergence 
of interest between 
controlling and minority 
shareholders. 
Spanish stock 
market 
at the end of 
2003. 
 
discretionary 
accruals) based on 
Jones model 
modified by Kothari 
et al. (2005) and 
predictability of cash 
flows. 
family representative on board. 
Family ownership (FAMOWN) 
is measured as percentage of 
voting rights held by the family 
owners. Divergence between the 
voting and cash flows rights of 
family firms (FAMDIV) is 
measured by the ratio of voting 
rights over cash flow rights. 
firms. The study also found 
that lower divergence between 
voting and cash flows rights of 
controlling family leads to 
higher quality of earnings. 
Kim and Yi 
(2006) 
To investigate whether, and 
how, the deviation of 
controlling shareholders' 
control from ownership, 
business group affiliation, 
and listing status 
differentially affect the 
extent of earnings 
management. 
15,159 firm-
year 
observations  
of public and 
private Korean 
firms over the 
period 1992-
2000. 
Earnings 
management is 
measured by absolute 
discretionary accruals 
estimated from the 
modified Jones 
(1991) model. 
This study use a measure called 
ownership wedge, which is a 
continuous variable measuring 
the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights held 
by the controlling shareholder. 
The study found that as the 
difference between control 
(voting rights) and ownership 
(cash now rights) of the  
controlling shareholders 
becomes larger, firms tend to 
have a more aggressive 
earnings management. 
Velury and 
Jenkins (2006) 
To investigate whether the 
quality of reported earnings 
is associated with the level 
of institutional   ownership 
and ownership 
concentration. 
4238 firm-year 
observations 
from CSRP 
over 1992-
1999. 
Predictive value or 
feedback value, 
neutrality, timeliness 
and representational 
faithfulness. 
Institutional ownership is 
measured as the percentage of 
common shares held by 
institutions. Ownership 
concentration is based on 
percentage of company's stock 
held by the five largest 
institutional owners of the firm. 
Earnings quality is positively 
associated with institutional 
ownership, but negatively 
associated with concentrated 
institutional ownership. 
Wang (2006) To investigate the relation 
between founding family 
ownership and earnings 
quality. 
 
4195 
observations 
from S&P 500 
companies for 
the period 
1994-2002. 
Abnormal accruals, 
earnings 
informativeness, and 
persistence of 
transitory loss 
components in 
earnings. 
 
This study uses a dummy 
variable for family founding 
ownership. Firms that have the 
founder owning some shares are 
considered as having founding 
family ownership. 
Founding family ownership is 
associated with lower 
abnormal accruals, greater 
earnings informativeness, and 
less persistence of transitory 
loss components in earnings. 
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Koh (2003) To examine the association 
between institutional 
ownership and aggressive 
earnings management (EM) 
strategies in Australia. 
 
107 firm-year 
observations 
of Australian 
firms listed on 
the ASX over 
1993-1997. 
Earnings 
management is 
measured by 
discretionary accruals 
from cross-sectional 
variations of Jones 
(1991) model. 
Institutional ownership is total 
shares held by institutional 
investors divided by firm‟s total 
shares outstanding. 
 
Relationship between 
institutional ownership and 
EM is non-linear. 
At lower level, higher portion 
of institutional ownership is 
related to higher EM. At 
higher level, higher portion of 
institutional ownership is 
related to less EM. 
Vander 
Bauwhede, 
Willekens & 
Gaeremynck 
(2003) 
To investigate the impact of 
income smoothing, auditor 
size, and public ownership 
on earnings management. 
 
136 firm-year 
observations 
of Belgian 
matched-
sample 
companies 
over a 3-year 
period. 
Earnings 
management is 
measured using 
discretionary 
accruals. 
Firms with public ownership are 
those that are publicly listed. 
Both private and public firms 
manage earnings to meet the 
benchmark target of prior-year 
earnings. Public companies 
are more likely to manage 
earnings only in above target 
companies. 
Fan and Wong 
(2002) 
To examine the association 
between earnings 
informativeness and 
ownership structure. 
977 firms from 
Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Singapore, 
South Korea, 
Taiwan, and 
Thailand. 
Earnings 
informativeness is 
based on returns-
earnings relationship. 
Ownership concentration is 
measured based on the degree of 
divergence between the 
controlling owner‟s cash flow 
rights and voting rights. 
Concentrated ownership is 
associated with low 
informativeness of earnings. 
Gabrielsen, 
Gramlich and 
Plenborg 
(2002) 
To examine the impact of 
managerial ownership on the 
information content of 
earnings in Danish 
companies.  
 76 Danish 
firms over 
1991-1995. 
Information content 
of earnings is 
measured based on 
earnings response 
coefficient and 
discretionary 
accruals. 
Managerial ownership is based 
on the percentage of equity held 
by individuals (officers, 
directors and principal owners) 
who can exercise significant 
influence over corporate 
matters. 
Managerial ownership is 
negatively related to the 
information content of 
earnings.  
Jung and 
Kwon (2002) 
To examine the relationship 
between corporate 
ownership structure and 
2820 
observations 
of firms listed 
Earnings 
informativeness is 
measured based on 
Ownership of largest 
shareholders is measured using 
a dichotomous variable, 1 if the 
The results support the 
convergence of interest 
hypothesis. The results show 
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earnings informativeness. on the Korean 
Stock 
Exchange over 
1993-1998. 
earnings-returns 
relationship. 
largest shareholder‟s ownership 
is higher than the median, 0 
otherwise. Similar method is 
used for the measurement of 
institutional shareholders. 
positive relationship between 
earnings informativeness and 
both, the owner–largest 
shareholders and institutional 
owners/ blockholders. 
 
Ho and Wong 
(2001) 
To study the relation of 
independent directors, 
voluntary audit committee, 
dominant personalities 
(CEO/Chairman duality), the 
percentage of family 
members on the board with 
the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
98 Hong Kong 
companies 
over 1994-
1997. 
The quality of 
accounting 
information is 
represented by 
voluntary disclosure. 
Family ownership is based on 
the percentage of family 
members on board. 
 
The extent of voluntary 
disclosure is positively related 
to the presence of an audit 
committee, and negatively 
related to the percentage of 
family members on the board. 
Carlson and 
Bathala (1997) 
To examine the association 
between different ownership 
structure and income 
smoothing. 
265 firms from 
Forbes. 
Income smoothing 
based on variability 
of income. 
Managerial ownership is based 
on the proportion of stock 
ownership held by insiders 
(officers and directors).  
Institutional ownership is 
measured as the percentage of 
outstanding common shares 
held by institutional investors 
and the number of institutional 
investors holding the firm's 
common stock. 
The study found that firms 
that smooth income (1) have 
lower proportion of inside 
ownership (2) higher 
proportions of institutional 
ownership (3) wider the 
dispersion of stock ownership. 
Warfield, Wild 
& Wild (1995) 
To study how the separation 
of corporate ownership and 
control affects both the 
informativeness of earnings 
and the managers‟ 
accounting choices. 
 
4,778 firm-
year 
observations 
 
Informativeness  of 
earnings is based on 
earnings-returns 
relationship and 
managers accounting 
choices is based on 
discretionary 
accruals. 
Percentage of managerial 
ownership. 
Managerial ownership is 
positively associated with 
earnings explanatory power 
for returns and negatively 
related to the magnitude of 
accrual adjustments. 
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Dempsey, 
Hunt III and 
Shcroeder 
(1993) 
To examine the relation 
between ownership structure 
and earnings management 
through the use of 
extraordinary item (EI) 
reporting. 
 
248 firms from 
COMPUSTAT 
that reported at 
least one EI 
during 1960- 
1966. 
 
Earnings 
management is based 
on the tendency to 
report extraordinary 
gains in income 
statement and 
extraordinary losses 
in retained earnings 
statement. 
Firms are divided into (1) 
owner-managed (firms with  a 
CEO who owns five percent or 
more of voting shares),(2) 
externally-controlled (firms 
with a dominant stockholder 
with interest of 10 percent or 
more and not part of top 
management), and manager-
controlled (firms which do not 
meet the definition of OM or 
EC firms). 
Non-owner managers select 
income-increasing reporting 
alternatives for EIs more often 
than owner-managers. 
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Appendix 4: Empirical Studies of the Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality Relation
28
 
Author(s) Research objective Sample 
Measures for Earnings 
Quality 
Corporate Governance 
Variables 
Results 
Labelle, 
Gargouri and 
Francoeur 
(2010) 
To study the relation 
between corporate 
governance, business ethics 
and financial reporting 
quality. 
156 
observations of 
78 companies 
over 2 years 
(2005-2006). 
 
Earnings management is 
used as a proxy for 
earnings quality. A 
dummy is use to indicate 
earnings management. 
Firms with absolute 
value of discretionary 
that falls above the 
median is categorized as 
having higher earnings 
management, vice versa. 
Governance quality is 
measured using the ratings 
of Jantzi Research (JR), a 
leading provider of social 
and governance research 
for institutional investors. 
 
There is a significant negative 
relation between business 
ethics and the magnitude of 
earnings management, while 
controlling for corporate 
governance and other factors. 
Teitel and 
Machiga 
(2010) 
To examine the interaction 
effect of auditor quality on 
the association between 
earnings quality and the 
implementation of the 
Mexican code of best 
corporate practices. 
44 firms listed 
on the Mexican 
Stock 
Exchange 
(Bolsa), 1998-
2002. 
Income smoothing, 
measured by the ratio of 
the variability of the 
absolute value of the 
changes in NI to CFO, 
and the spearman 
correlation of total 
accruals with CFO; and 
conditional accrual. 
Auditor quality (Big5/non-
Big5) 
Firms that hire high quality 
auditors are more likely to 
have greater earnings quality 
after the implementation of the 
Mexican code of best 
corporate practices. 
Baxter and 
Cotter (2009) 
To examine the association 
between audit committees 
and earnings in Australia. 
309 companies 
from the Top 
500 ASX listed 
companies in 
2001. 
 
Earnings management 
(Jones model) and 
accrual estimation error 
(Dechow and Dichev 
model) 
Audit committee formation, 
audit committees 
independence, audit 
committee expertise, audit 
committee activity, audit 
committee size.  
Audit committees are effective 
in reducing intentional 
earnings manipulations, but 
not accrual estimation errors. 
                                               
28 While there are other studies examining earnings management and corporate governance, I include only studies that refer earnings management as a proxy for earnings quality. 
The studies are presented in chronological and alphabetical order. 
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Author(s) Research objective Sample 
Measures for Earnings 
Quality 
Corporate Governance 
Variables 
Results 
Chang and 
Sun (2009) 
To examine whether the 
provisions of SOX improve 
the effectiveness of an 
independent audit committee 
and other corporate-
governance functions in 
monitoring the earnings 
quality of cross-listed 
foreign firms. 
96 foreign 
firms in the 
pre-SOX 
sample and 106 
foreign firms in 
the post-SOX 
sample, over 
the 2001-2003 
period. 
 
Earnings informativeness 
and earnings 
management. 
Audit committee 
independence, board 
independence, audit 
committee financial expert, 
CEO duality and an 
aggregate corporate 
governance score. 
After the SOX period, 
earnings informativeness is 
positively associated with 
audit-committee 
independence, board 
independence and negatively 
associated with CEO duality; 
and earnings management is 
negatively associated audit-
committee independence,. 
However, no significant 
associations were found in 
pre-SOX period. The results 
suggest that the SOX 
provisions improve the 
effectiveness corporate-
governance monitoring the 
quality of earnings. 
Gul, Fung and 
Jaggi (2009) 
To examine whether 
industry specialization of 
auditors and low balling 
affect the association 
between auditor tenure and 
earnings quality. 
32,777 firm-
year 
observations of 
over 1993-2004 
from the 
Compustat. 
Discretionary accruals. Auditor tenure and auditor 
specialization. 
The association between 
shorter auditor tenure and 
lower earnings quality is 
weaker for firms audited by 
industry specialists compared 
to non-specialists 
Hashim and 
Devi (2009) 
To examine the relationship 
between board 
characteristics and 
ownership  structure with 
earnings quality. 
280 non-
financial 
companies 
listed on Bursa 
Malaysia's 
Main Board in 
2004. 
Accrual quality. Board independence, CEO 
duality, board size, board 
meeting and board tenure 
Board tenure, outside board 
ownership and family 
ownership is positively 
associated with earnings 
quality. 
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Machuga and 
Teitel (2009) 
To investigate whether 
board characteristics (board 
composition disclosure, 
family concentrated 
ownership and shared-
directors) are associated 
with the improvement in 
earnings quality. 
 
32 companies 
registered on 
Mexican Stock 
Exchange 
(Mexican 
Bolsa) over the 
period 1998-
2002. 
Income smoothing, 
timely loss recognition 
and conditional accruals. 
 
Board composition 
disclosure, family 
concentrated ownership 
and shared-directors. 
Firms that do not have 
concentrated family ownership 
or share directors have greater 
increases in earnings quality 
than firms that have 
concentrated family ownership 
or share directors. 
 
Pergola, 
Joseph and 
Jenzarli (2009) 
To study the association 
between board members 
ownership and earnings 
quality. 
499 publicly 
traded firms 
from the S&P 
500 (large cap), 
S&P 400 (mid 
cap), and S&P 
600 (small cap) 
indices, in 
2002. 
Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) accrual quality 
model. 
Board insider ownership, Earnings quality is negatively 
associated with insider 
ownership and the association 
is moderated by governance 
structures. 
Rainsbury, 
Bradbury and 
Cahan (2009) 
To examine the association 
between the quality of audit 
committees on financial 
reporting quality and 
external audit fees in an 
environment where the 
formation of audit 
committees was unregulated. 
 
87 New 
Zealand firms 
in 2001. 
 
Financial reporting 
quality score based on 
firm‟s individual 
accounting choice scores. 
 
Best practice of audit 
committee, audit committee 
independence, audit 
committee expertise. 
There is no significant 
association between the 
quality of an audit committee 
and the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
Flynn (2008) To examine the impact of 
audit committee 
compensation type on 
nonprofessional investors‟ 
perceptions of earnings 
quality. 
48 
nonprofessional 
investors. 
Earnings quality is based 
on investors‟ perception, 
gathered from an 
experimental setting. 
 
Audit committee 
compensation. 
Firms that compensate audit 
committee based on stock 
performance are more likely to 
have lower perceived earnings 
quality. 
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Francis, 
Huang, 
Rajopal and 
Zhang (2008) 
To provide evidence on 
whether reputed CEOs are 
associated with higher or 
lower quality of earnings 
2000 firm-year 
observations 
for S&P 500 
firms over 
1992-2001. 
Accrual quality. CEO reputation. CEO with higher reputation is 
associated with poorer 
earnings quality. 
Francis and 
Wang (2008) 
To examine whether 
earnings quality is jointly 
affected by the investor 
protection environment 
where a firm is located and 
the firm‟s choice of a Big 4 
versus non-Big 4 auditor. 
 
57996 obs. for 
abnormal 
accrual 
analysis, 85193 
obs. for loss 
avoidance, and 
68167 obs. for 
earnings 
conservatism 
from 42 
countries, 
1994-2004. 
Magnitude of signed 
abnormal accruals 
(Frankel, Johnson and 
Nelson 2002), likelihood 
of reporting a loss 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997) and earnings 
conservatism (Basu 1997 
and Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin 2000). 
Audit quality (Big4/Non-
Big4) 
Earnings quality is higher as 
the country's investor 
protection regime becomes 
stronger, but only for firms 
with Big 4 auditors. 
 
Haber and 
Braunstein 
(2008) 
To see whether earnings 
quality ratings correlate to 
governance ratings. 
50 companies 
listed on the 
NYSE or 
American 
Exchange. 
Earnings quality ratings 
are provided by 3D 
Ratings according to 
accounting principle 
based models. 
GMI corporate governance 
ratings. 
There is no significant 
relationship between the 
governance ratings of GMI 
and earnings quality ratings of 
3D Ratings. 
Jiang, Lee and 
Anandarajan 
(2008) 
To reexamines the relation 
between corporate 
governance and quality of 
earnings using a summary 
governance measure. 
 
4,311 
observations 
over 2002-
2004. 
 
Absolute discretionary 
accruals and earnings 
benchmark/ earnings 
surprise. 
 
Gov-Score developed by 
Brown and Caylor (2006). 
 
Higher levels of corporate 
governance are associated 
with lower absolute 
discretionary accruals. 
Corporate governance is also 
negatively associated with 
small earnings surprises.  
Jaggi and 
Leung (2007) 
To examines whether the 
establishment of audit 
committees by Hong Kong 
firms would constrain 
earnings management, 
especially in firms with 
523 
observations  of 
Hong Kong 
firms for the 
period of 1999-
2000. 
Earnings management 
(magnitude of 
discretionary accruals) 
Audit committee. Audit committees play a 
significant role in constraining 
earnings management even in 
the environment of higher 
ownership concentration. But, 
the effectiveness of audit 
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family-dominated corporate 
boards. 
committees is significantly 
reduced when family members 
are present on boards. 
García Lara, 
García Osma 
and Penalva 
(2007) 
To examine whether firms 
with low CEO influence on 
board decision making 
(indicating strong corporate 
governance) are more 
conservative than firms 
where the CEO has a high 
influence on board decision 
making (weak governance 
structure). 
 
 
69 Spanish 
listed firms for 
the period 
1997-2002. 
 
Earnings conservatism 
based on asymmetric 
recognition speed of 
good and bad news in 
earnings, using Basu 
(1997) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005). 
Aggregate measures (Ind6 
and Ind8) of corporate 
governance based on  board 
size, proportion of non-
executive directors, 
proportion of independent 
directors, whether the 
chairman of the board is an 
executive director, the 
number of board meetings, 
and the existence of an 
audit committee, a 
nomination/ remuneration 
committee and an executive 
committee. 
Firms with a CEO that has a 
low influence over the 
functioning of the board of 
directors show a greater 
degree of accounting 
conservatism. 
 
Machuga and 
Teitel (2007) 
To investigate whether there 
is an improvement in 
earnings quality after  the 
implementation of the  code 
of corporate governance in 
Mexico. 
92 Mexican 
firms during 
1998-2002. 
Income smoothing, 
timely loss recognition, 
abnormal accruals. 
Implementation of the 
Mexican code of corporate 
governance. 
 
The quality of earnings 
increases after the 
implementation of the Code. 
 
Petra (2007) To examine whether the 
informativeness of earnings 
is associated with corporate 
governance. 
 
500 largest US 
publicly listed 
firms, over 
1996-1999. 
 
Earnings response 
coefficient 
Percentage of outside 
independent directors 
serving on the board, the 
absence of CEO duality, 
the presence of independent 
audit committee, 
compensation committee, 
and nominating committee. 
The proportion of outside 
independent directors serving 
on firm‟s boards is positively 
associated with earnings 
informativeness. 
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Lin, Li and 
Yang (2006) 
To investigate the effect of 
audit committee 
performance on earnings 
quality. 
212 publicly 
listed US 
companies that 
restated their 
earnings in the 
year 2000. 
Restatement of earnings. Size of audit committee , 
audit committee 
independence, audit 
committee financial 
expertise, frequency of 
audit committee meetings 
and audit committee 
members ownership  
The study found a negative 
association between the size of 
audit committee and earnings 
quality. They found no 
evidence on the relationship 
between four other audit 
committee characteristics 
(independence, financial 
expertise, frequency of 
meetings and ownership) and 
earnings restatement. 
Vafeas (2005) To study the relationship 
between audit committees 
and boards of directors with 
earnings quality. 
252 U.S. firms, 
from 1994 to 
2000. 
The magnitude of 
earnings increases (small 
earnings increases 
indicates low quality of 
earnings) and negative 
earnings avoidance. 
Percentage of committee 
insiders, percentage of 
active business executives, 
percentage of members 
with other audit committee 
experience, audit 
committee size, audit 
committee meetings, stock 
ownership of committee 
members, mean tenure per 
committee member, mean 
directorships per committee 
member, mean committee 
memberships per 
committee member, inside 
ownership, percentage of 
board outsiders, and board 
size. 
Firms with greater insider in 
audit committee, less active 
business executive, less 
frequency of meeting, higher 
equity incentives and greater 
length of board tenure are 
more likely to have lower 
quality of earnings. 
Wild (1996) To examine the association 
between audit committee 
formation and earnings 
quality. 
260 listed firms 
in the U.S., 
over 1966-
1980. 
Earnings Response 
Coefficient (ERC). 
Audit committee formation The result shows a significant 
increase in the market's 
reaction to earnings 
subsequent to the formation of 
the audit committee. This 
suggests that audit committee 
272 
improve earnings quality 
through their effective 
monitoring of the financial 
reporting and auditing 
process. 
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Appendix 5: Ticker Code Used to Extract Financial Data from Thompson Financial One Banker Database. 
Variables Description Worldscope Item Name and Ticker Code Thompson Financial Definition of Variables 
TCA Total current accrual is measured as 
changes in working capital. 
Increase/Decrease In Working Capital 
 
Ws.WorkingCapitalIncDecCFStmt 
The change in working capital from one year to 
the next year 
TASSETS Total Assets Total Assets 
 
Ws.TotalAssets 
The sum of total current assets, long term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property 
plant and equipment and other assets. 
CFO Cash flow from operations Net Cash Flow - Operating Activities 
 
Ws.NetCashFlowOperatingCFStmt 
The net cash receipts and disbursements 
resulting from the operations of the company. It 
is the sum of Funds from Operations, Funds 
From/Used for Other Operating Activities and 
Extraordinary Items. 
PPE Gross plant, property and equipment Property, Plant and Equipment- Gross 
 
Ws.TotalPropPlantEquipGross 
Tangible assets with an expected useful life of 
over one year which are expected to be used to 
produce goods for sale or for distribution of 
services. 
 
REV Revenues  / Sales Net Sales or Revenues 
 
Ws.Sales 
Gross sales and other operating revenue less 
discounts, returns and allowances. 
NI Net Income Net Income Used To Calculate Earnings Per 
Share (Formerly Net Income Available To 
Common) 
 
Ws.NetIncome 
The net income the company uses to calculate 
its earnings per share. It is before extraordinary 
items. 
WCAPITAL Working Capital Working Capital 
 
Ws.WorkingCapBalSht 
The difference between current assets and 
current liabilities. 
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RETEARN Retained Earnings Retained Earnings 
 
Ws.RetainedEarnings 
The accumulated after tax earnings of the 
company which have not been distributed as 
dividends to shareholders or allocated to a 
reserve account. 
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes Earnings Before Interest And Taxes (EBIT) 
 
Ws.EarningsBeforeInterestAndTaxes 
The earnings of a company before interest 
expense and income taxes. It is calculated by 
taking the pretax income and adding back 
interest expense on debt and subtracting interest 
capitalized. 
MKTCAP Market Capitalisation Market Capitalisation 
 
Ws.YrEndMarketCap 
Market Price-Year End * Common Shares 
Outstanding 
GROWTH Price to Book Ratio Price/Book Value Ratio - Close 
 
Ws.PriceToBookRatioClose 
Market Price at financial year end divide by 
Book Value Per Share 
LEVERAGE Percentage of Total Debt over Total 
Assets 
Total Debt % Total Assets 
 
Ws.TotalDebtPctTotalAssets 
(Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long 
Term Debt + Long Term Debt) / Total Assets * 
100 
PPENET Net Plant, Property and Equipment Property, plant and equipment- Net 
 
Ws.TotalPropPlantEquipNet 
Gross Property, Plant and Equipment less 
accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion 
and amortization. 
OCYCLE Operating Cycle Operating Cycle 
 
Ws.OperatingCycle 
InventoriesDaysHeld+AccountsReceivableDays 
RNDSALES Ratio of research and development 
to sales 
Research and Development/Sales 
 
Ws.ResearchAndDevelopmentToSales 
Research and Development Expense / Net Sales 
or Revenues * 100 
 
